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NATIONALISM WAR AND SOCIETY

KREHBIEL


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
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NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY

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NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY

A STUDY OF NATIONALISM AND ITS CONCOMITANT, WAR, IN THEIR RELATION TO CIVILIZATION; AND OF THE FUNDAMENTALS AND THE PROGRESS OF THE OPPOSITION TO WAR

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
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To

MY MOTHER

SUSANNAH A. KREHBIEL

WHO TAUGHT ME TO HATE WAR

304520

PREFACE

The presumption of this book I frankly acknowledge; to present impartially subjects of so wide a variety and so complex and controversial a character is nothing, if not ambitious.

For the faults and errors which, I fear, may have crept into these comprehensive pages I crave lenience; they are the result of finite capacity, and not of conscious straying from the truth.

For the aims of the book, the dissemination of ideas and ideals which shall make for a reduction of war, I offer no apology; indeed if, having this cause at heart as I do, I were remiss in it, I should hold myself deserving of great blame.

For the help I have had from whatever source I gladly give thanks and credit: To David Starr Jordan for his inspiration and his permission to use such portions as seemed useful of a Syllabus formerly published by us jointly; to Norman Angell for invaluable suggestions and contributions as herein appear; to Dr. John Mez for ideas and sound advice; to Dr. Denys P. Myers for sundry useful and exact information; and to all those who, whether knowingly or unknowingly, have contributed ideas and labor to this agreeable enterprise now happily finished.

EDWARD KREHBIEL.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
April 3, 1916.

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FUNDAMENTALS

Strife among men appears in many forms — personal rivalry of all kinds, commercial competition, brawls, strikes, riots, revolutions, wars and others — which need to be distinguished from each other. Particularly mischievous is the failure to distinguish martial force from police force, which leads to the common error that, if war be eliminated, we shall also be without police protection. Hence, it is necessary to establish this fundamental distinction at the outset.

Martial force is exercised by the interested party in his own behalf; it is *competitive* and seeks to impose its will, which it identifies with the right, upon its adversary by violence if necessary.

Police force is not exercised by the interested parties to a dispute, but is the force exercised by the agents of a *co-operating* society; its function is, not to help one of the disputants to impose his conception of right on the other, but to see that each is protected against the other and that both are obedient to society.

War is the condition which exists when social groups known as nations employ martial force. Obviously one may be opposed to war and yet sanction other kinds of force.

Militarism is the religion of martial force.

Pacifism repudiates martial force (and martial force only) and demands the extension of police force. It is not content to pronounce peace desirable but proves its sincerity by laboring for conditions which, according to its lights, make for peace.

INTRODUCTION

A day or two after receiving Professor Krehbiel's request to write a brief introduction to this handbook my eye happened to fall upon a review (appearing in one of the most widely read and highly esteemed of New York papers) [1] of the symposium edited by Mr. Charles Roden Buxton, "Towards a Lasting Settlement."

The reviewer admits handsomely enough that what the authors of the book have to say is "all very true and exceedingly well said." But, he is exceedingly annoyed — and says so — that true things bearing on war should be said either well or ill when war has become the most important fact with which men can concern themselves. Then, he implies, we should cease to think about it at all.

I do not think that that is a travesty of the reviewer's thought. I am not attempting a cheap jibe. Such is not only the obvious opinion of this particular reviewer; but he expresses what is quite simply and exactly the attitude of very many, perhaps most, average folk towards the whole problem of war, peace, and world organization. And that such is a prevailing view is perhaps the most important fact of all in the whole problem.

That will excuse my dealing with it at some length. The reviewer in question says:

> To most people, however ardently they may love peace, the present will hardly seem a propitious moment to discuss the settlement of Europe after the war. . . . There comes a time when one nation thinks it had better fight and other nations must

[1] *New York Times*, March 12, 1916.

fight too or knuckle under, and the statesmen must deal with the varying phenomena of nationality as with any other complication of real life. . . . One might go through the book and point out a curious refusal to recognize this as a hard world in which certain forces must come into conflict at one time or another.

Why should not this be a propitious moment? Is the war settlement going to be so simple and easy that the peoples of Europe, coming to it after a long period of war passion, will be able to solve all its problems without preparation or study? Are the problems of European politics of such a nature that we can acquire wisdom and understanding in them as in no other problem of public affairs — without discussion? Of course we know — as the reviewer must know — that this present war is raging because it is the habit of peace settlements to be very bad and defective, of the kind that lay the seeds for future wars. It is because these past settlements — at Vienna, Versailles, Frankfurt, Berlin — have been the outcome of a political vision obscured by the passions of victory, or fear, or historical resentment, or cupidity, or sheer ignorance and stupidity, unchecked by a public opinion clarified and prepared by sane discussion, that they "settled" nothing.

"Because," argues the reviewer I have quoted, "our minds are very apt to go astray after a war, *therefore*, we should not fortify them by discussion, nor prepare them for their task by study; nor check the formation of hasty opinion by the consideration of contrary opinion."

Surely a moment's reflection convinces us that if the close of this war is to be free from the mistakes that have marked past settlements, if its vast agonies are to serve any large human purpose at all, we must take as much trouble with the politics as with the fighting. We who have not fought may well by our mistakes, our failure to be ready for the peace when it comes, render useless everything which the

soldiers have achieved. And that apparently is why "the present is not a propitious moment to discuss the settlement of Europe!"

The great Russian Sociologist, Novicow, has dealt somewhere with reasoning very similar to that just indicated. Every time that a war breaks out, he notes, the public and private oracles are apt to philosophize in this vein:

Note the folly of Internationalists and Pacificists. The first whiff of grapeshot carries all their fine plans to the wind. War continues to break out from any excuse or from no excuse. War is inherent in human nature. It has existed during all recorded history; it will last till the end of time. All the oratory and peace congresses go for nothing. Why refuse to recognize the facts of a hard world? You Pacificists live in an imaginary universe created by a foolish optimism. If you were not utterly impracticable Utopians you would refuse to waste time and money in barren efforts. Stop your dreaming and wake up to the positive realities of life.

Why, Novicow asks, do we not apply the same character of reasoning to the fact that disease is apparently as far from disappearing from the life of the twentieth century man as it was from the life of the man of the stone age. Indeed the man of the stone age was probably the healthier. Statistics seem to show that diseases like cancer are on the increase and in many countries consumption seems hardly to diminish at all. Why, therefore, do not critics, of the type of mind of that from whom I have quoted, argue, whenever there is say a bad epidemic, something in this wise:

You see from this epidemic how utterly foolish are these sanitary and medicinal dreamers who think we can have a world without disease.

Sickness is inherent in human life. It has existed in all recorded history. It will exist till the end of time. Disease is not only

inherent in human nature but in all nature. A perfectly healthy organism has never existed and never will exist. It is a pure abstraction. Just consider the generations of scholars and students who have labored to extirpate disease. And look at the result. These efforts are Utopian. Death and disease are our fate. They are the facts of a hard world which only foolish dreamers and mollycoddles will attempt to shirk. Indeed disease is a necessary moral stimulant and without it our spiritual nature would be poor indeed. Without its discipline mankind would decay from ease and sloth. Stop therefore these futile efforts to change facts in nature, and accept courageously the world as it is.

Or words to that effect.

Nor need we suppose that this kind of reasoning is so fantastic as never to have been made by men concerning things other than war. Half the world to-day — the Asiatic half — still reasons for the most part in just that way concerning disease and death; as for a thousand years or so did Christian Europe. During that period in Europe, as in the East to-day, the human mind was dominated by the kind of fatalism which looked upon the scientific treatment of disease, or the attempt of things like life-insurance to rob death of some of its terrors, as both foolish and impious; an interference with the decrees of Providence, an attempt to escape an inevitable fate. During unnumbered generations of men all effort to deal with disease and other phenomena of life scientifically was resented, derided and opposed by precisely the fatalism which, in fact, underlies the criticism of the reviewer I have quoted.

That criticism is worth the attention of the student of international affairs, because it brings out very clearly a certain inversion of the assumptions underlying internationalism, an inversion that marks what is perhaps the most widespread attitude towards Pacificism. Evidently, to this, as to very many critics of internationalism, that creed is

presumed to postulate a somewhat naïve faith in the good intentions of men and nations; the naturally peaceful character of their nature; their reasonableness, and aversion from war. Whereas, it would be much truer to say that those of us who are Pacificists are so very often — it is certainly the case of the present writer — not because they think man little inclined to drift into wars, but because they think him much inclined so to do; because they believe that there are in his nature elements pushing him to war which need control; that war is often merely the failure of a control which a more definite moral effort or a better understanding of certain facts of human relationship could perfectly well have assured. The needed moral effort is not "natural." It is exceedingly unnatural, like most social discipline; if not deliberately developed it will fail us when we need it most. That is the reason for deliberately developing it, the justification for Pacificism. We are Pacificists, some of us at least, because we have in one sense little faith in human nature; because we believe that that nature, unless we watch it, will betray us into very stupid courses. Wisdom in international politics, like wisdom in most fields, is exceedingly unnatural in that it is very painfully acquired, and not to be acquired at all if all effort towards so doing is to be derided.

And there is a related misapprehension as to the internationalist attitude. The case as between the Pacificist and his opponent is very generally supposed to be that of Force *v.* No-Force. But this is a quite false antithesis. Outside a special and very tiny group, advocates of a completer world organization do not base their case upon opposition to the employment of physical force. They base their case upon the need of making force effective — effective, that is, to the common needs and ends of human society. In the present condition of anarchy, force in the international politics is gen-

erally effective to no end — certainly not that of national security as the present plight of some three hundred millions in Europe shows. As things stand the force of one unit is neutralized by that of another — "cancelled out"; and both reduced to ineffectiveness.

Pacificists as a body do not object to physical force in the shape of the police for instance. There is no such thing as "anti-policism," as there is anti-militarism. Why? Because military force is not the enbodiment in power of the will of civilization, of the society of nations, in the way that the police represent the social will, the law to which all parties have subscribed; of "right" as far as the combined intelligence of the whole community can determine it. On the contrary, militarism connotes the enforcement, not of the will of the community — the community of nations, that is — but of the will of one party to a dispute, and of the determination of that one party to insist upon his own view of his rights simply because he believes that he has the power so to do. Militarism implies the enforcement, not of national right duly determined after discussion by all the various parties concerned, but *our* view of the right in a case to which we are parties; a determination to uphold the view of *our* nation as against another nation, a means to enable us to be judge, jury and executioner in our own case. Such an attitude makes all law, all society impossible. It is anarchy. It is might defying the essential law of any organized society. It is based on the assumption that each individual (individual nation, that is) is fit to be judge in his own case, and to be trusted with the means of enforcing his own judgment. And that is to assume that men are perfect; it is the refusal to "face the hard facts of the world," the "phenomena of imperfect human nature," with a vengeance. At the bottom of the perfectly sound and healthy instinct, however muddle-headedly at times it may express itself, against

militarism lies this realization of its essentially anti-social motive.[1]

This false parallelism of the police and the army is the *pons asinorum* of the Pacificist's opponent. The function of the police is the exact contrary to that of the army. Armies are for the purpose of fighting other armies; a police force is never created for the purpose of fighting other police forces, but for aiding them. An army — like the revolver of a pioneer in a lawless community — is for the purpose of enabling the individual that employs it to assert *his* view of the right as against a rival view, by force. The police are for the purpose of preventing that very thing. When a police force increases its numbers, that extra power is not immediately cancelled because some other police force is increased. When a police force is created or increased all concerned know its purpose: the maintenance of the laws of its state. When an army is increased nobody knows its purpose, how it will be used: not even those who have created it!

And yet to ask the Pacificist if he objects to the police is supposed to be a complete poser; to demonstrate that in his misgivings concerning militarism he is inconsistent!

Force is of course an instrument of the human intelligence, and whether well or ill used depends absolutely upon that intelligence. We are often told that the world is governed in the last resort by physical force. Well, there are animals on the earth that have immeasurably greater physical strength than man. They do not govern the world. Man, who is so much weaker, eats them, or makes them work for him. The world, indeed, was once peopled by immense

[1] I beg the reader to note that there is no argument here against defence. I am a thorough believer in that; in no way opposed in certain circumstances to great navies and great armies. I have gone over that ground elsewhere.

beasts of a physical strength bearing about the same relation to man's that man's does to the blackbeetle's. These colossal creatures have all disappeared, superseded by others that were smaller and physically weaker.

The savage who happened to be born with a longer "reach" than others of his tribe was the bully of the whole until two weaker men put their heads together and agreed to coöperate and so, by taking him front and rear at the same time; brought his tyranny to an end, replacing it by their own, which continued until three weaker men were able to act as one, and so on, until finally we got a combination of the whole community in the policeman. The effectiveness of the policeman resides, not mainly in the fact of the force that he wields, but in the fact that he personifies a common will, which is the outcome of things of the mind.

When you have something resembling a common will you can get the policeman: but until you get that agreement, "force" cannot be used for the ends of the community at all. The final triumph of the community represented the slow growth of a common purpose as against conflicting purposes.

We are told that law and civilization rest in the last resort upon force — the police or the army. Yet the police or the army obeys the instructions of the law. What physical force compels it to do, ensures that it shall do so? Who guards the guardians? What is our final "sanction," or means of compulsion? It is an oath, a contract.

When, as Democrats or Republicans, we vote against an existing President, how do we know that he will obey our votes and quietly walk out of office? The army? But it is he who commands the army; the army does not command him. The army would stand by the country? Then what is controlling its act is a conception of constitutional right, not physical force, since it could easily, presumably, make itself master

of a hostile Republican or Democratic party, as the case may be. Obviously it is not because the North American is more military that he is saved from certain defects of South American civilization. Just as obviously it is because he is less military.

An Englishman says: "It is force alone which vindicates Belgium's rights." But what put the force in motion? What decided England to go to the rescue of Belgium, instead of remaining at home? It was a thing of the mind, a moral thing, a theory: the tradition of the sanctity of treaties, the theory of international obligation, a sense of contract, if you will, like that which makes the President respect the hostile vote instead of intriguing with the army, and the army obey its oath instead of intriguing with the President, or against him. Without this moral thing you cannot get even the effective employment of force in things that look at first sight like sheer violence. You cannot, for instance, have piracy without an agreement and coöperation, without the observance of treaty rights as between pirate captain and crew. If every member of the crew said: "Don't bother me about rules and obeying the captain. I've got a pistol and I mean to make my own rules and act as I see fit" — why, of course you could not run even a pirate ship. Success in piracy depended a great deal on the morals and discipline of the pirates — on the mind of the captain; his fairness in dividing the booty; the capacity of the crew to hang together.

Anyway, alleges the man who is so sure that nothing but physical force matters, nations cannot depend upon anything but their own strength; and all international agreements are futile.

Well, the simple truth is that the present war is a complete demonstration that no nation can depend upon its force alone; that virtually all depend, for their very national existence, upon international arrangement.

Could France have repelled the German attack unless she could have depended upon the aid of her allies, which in turn depended absolutely upon the keeping of an international arrangement?

Could Belgium defend her nationality without the aid which she secures by treaty arrangement?

The European nation which should discard all arrangements with foreign nations would find its power, however great it might be, outdone. War itself has become internationalized.

And if Germany is beaten, as, despite her immense forces, she probably will be, it is because she depended mainly upon her own strength and neglected the element of "opinion" in other nations which has enabled her enemies to range the world against her. "Opinion" — a mere moral thing — was something that the German military leaders seem to have held in immense contempt; and that contempt will be paid for by Germany at the price of defeat. For opinion comes before force, since it determines the direction that force shall take; how it shall be used.

The plain implication of the criticism from which I have quoted is that because wisdom in the international field is very weak we should make no effort to strengthen it. The fact that situations arise in which two nations, both believing themselves to be in the right, come to blows is taken as demonstration of the futility of trying to understand *why* each fails to see the point of the other; *why* they come to blows, and of trying to prevent it. Because physical force is the last resort no effort should be made to avoid it.

This falsification of the "last resort" argument is possibly accountable for more human misery than any other one example of human stupidity. It is worth getting straight.

"In the last resort" a badly managed community whose sources of food may fail will resort to cannibalism. It hap-

pens not only among Polar savages, but has happened during some of the Irish famines and happens during some of the Russian famines now. Cannibalism in those conditions is, if you will, justifiable. It is, like war, the failure of everything. But the fact that men may have to resort to it, and are justified in so doing, is not an argument for so neglecting the tilling of the soil, that cannibalism is pretty certain to be resorted to; for saying: "Since in the last resort, if the crops fail, we shall have to come to cannibalism, cannibalism is inevitable." Rather is it an argument for saying: "If we do not cultivate our fields we shall suffer from hunger and be compelled to eat our children. Let us therefore cultivate our fields with industry." So with reference to the use of force: "If we neglect the understanding of human relationship, and the cultivation of the qualities necessary to make human society workable, we shall in periods of tension get to flying at one another's throats, because we shall not be able to understand the differences which divide us. And that will lead to murder. Let us therefore so cultivate our weak understanding of the things necessary for life together in this world, and let us, perhaps, establish some sort of machinery for the settlement of difficulties and the employment of our force, not one against another but for the common good."

And if the machinery fails? Well, we are back at the starting point of the argument. What if the President of the United States refuses to vacate the Presidential office after he has been duly outvoted, and, like any Mexican or Venezuelan President uses the army he commands to remain in power? Shall we therefore conclude that constitutions which depend in the last resort upon a compact or treaty — the oath of the President and of the army — are necessarily illusory? An army of rebellion is of course "the last resort" — it is the collapse of the whole thing. But if we had

assumed that this contingency *must* arise, and had concluded from that possibility that raising armies of rebellion was the real method of republican government and democratic control — well, this republic would not be what it is. If we had never made any attempt to create a human society because it *might* break down — as it sometimes does — why, of course there would never have been any human society.

And that is why the fatalism, conscious or unconscious, of the very common attitude reflected in the criticism I have quoted is so disastrous. The belief that men cannot by their effort affect their destiny in these relationships — among the most important that concern them — deprives them of the will to make the effort.

"Statesmen must deal with the varying phenomena of nationality as with other complications of real life . . . a hard world with which certain forces must come into conflict at one time or another . . . there comes a time when one nation thinks it had better fight. . . ."

"These facts and forces are there," says the critic in effect, "and your Pacificist won't recognize them." It never seems to occur to him that the Pacificist recognizes them perfectly well — but proposes to alter them. That seems to the militarist preposterous. They can't be altered, he implies. They are forces outside our volition or control; they are a fate to which men must passively bow.

And yet obviously a phenomenon like the tradition of nationality did not come from Mars. Men made it by their discussions and writings — and can unmake it or modify it. It is a relatively new invention and for long centuries in Europe was unknown. Men's hostilities grouped themselves round other traditions and ideas, like religious differences or dynastic allegiances, which having made they have

since unmade. The nets in which we strangle ourselves are of our own weaving.

I believe it is hard to exaggerate the importance of this element of fatalism in the popular attitude towards internationalism. It is the most vital difference in two opposing conceptions of human society — the coöperative conception, that based on the belief that men will get most out of life by joining forces in the common fight against nature; and, the opposite one, which may be termed the cannibalistic conception, that based on the belief that men's interests are necessarily antagonistic; that they live, ultimately, by eating one another, and that under this law the great human groups are condemned by a necessity of nature, to be in perpetual and inevitable antagonism to one another. This belief that man's intelligence cannot determine the character of human society, that it is ruled by some abstraction called "force" — the heaviest metal or the heaviest muscle — is not merely crudely materialistic but implies a gross spiritual slavery. Such a doctrine is not only profoundly anti-social, it is anti-human — fatal not merely to better international relations, but, in the end, to the degree to which it influences human conduct and character at all, to all those large aspirations and spiritual freedoms which man has so painfully won and which sanctify his life.

To all of which, I fear, by the same fatal inversion of the "last resort" fallacy, most critics will reply: "Yes, that is all very well, but what would you have done in August, 1914, when Germany challenged Europe?"

Well, it does not invalidate anything that I am arguing, to say that I would have fought. But the whole point of my argument is that Germany challenged Europe in part because there was no Europe — no internationally organized Europe, that is. If the rival states had organized themselves definitely into a community for mutual protection against a

law breaker, and Germany had known definitely that in violating certain rules of international life she was challenging, not only the patent but the potential forces of civilization, she would not have challenged them. She would not have challenged them because if it had been evident to her people that the forces they had for a generation been asked to contribute were not, as they believed (however falsely), for defence but for the purpose of challenging the law of human society, those forces would not have been contributed. The German government could not have created the instrument wherewith to carry out aggression.

But there was no society of nations; no world-wide organization of states pledged not only to protect any one nation against Germany but also to protect Germany against any hostile state — Slav or Gallic. And so the specious plea of "defence" against the Slav menace, or encirclement or what not, bemused the minds of the German people, seduced them from their natural activities — and gave us this tragedy. It is the price of anarchy in international politics and organization.

But the practical question now is, What of to-morrow?

For if war is inevitable, peace is no less inevitable. The most gloriously futile war cannot go on for ever. The soldier fights with a pacifist end; to establish a peace. What sort of peace is it to be?

Nothing could better illustrate the ineffectiveness of mere military power, either to protect a nation's interests or vindicate its rights; or better illustrate the need of international organization as a need of national defence, than America's position to-day.

Suppose that America goes to war in defence of the rights violated by Germany at sea; is absolutely victorious in that war. How will she know at the peace that she has got what

she has been fighting for? American demands at the end of the war will be that American rights at sea be respected; that, most particularly, non-combatants shall not be drowned by attacks on merchantmen. Very good. Germany gives us her promise. She has given it before. How do we know that it will be kept, either by her or any other nation that in a future war may find a ruthless use of the submarine the only weapon left to it against a power commanding the sea? Can we hope that if we show now that we are ready to fight "at the drop of the hat," in future a hard-pressed belligerent will be overawed by the great American navy? Then why is not the belligerent we now propose to deal with held in check by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Again, when we have that promise at the end of our victorious war how do we know that it will be kept; that we shall have got what we have been fighting for?

And what of the American case against the Allies? Is America now to surrender rights upon which she has insisted ever since she became an independent state? Is America, in fighting Germany to make the British Orders in Council the basis of future sea law, so that when (say) Japan goes to war with some other nation, America will have to submit to Japanese control of her trade and communication with neutral states — even to mail and banking correspondence — as she now submits to British control?

It is quite obvious that American claims have this difference from those of the allies: theirs, in so far as they are territorial can at the peace be satisfied on the spot. America's cannot. Hers depend absolutely upon the establishment, after the war, of a different and better international order; upon agreement as to what shall constitute international law and some method of ensuring its observance.

Now America is in radical disagreement with her own

prospective Allies as to the former of these things. Her historical conception of sea law and the rights of neutrals comes much nearer to that of Germany (monstrous as the statement may sound) than to that of Britain. And even when we are in agreement as to what the sea law shall be, the only hope that it will be better observed in the future than in the past, is in very radical departures of policy which American public opinion as a whole opposes with a dead weight of hostile tradition. Of course, it may be argued that when Germany is thoroughly beaten the causes which have operated heretofore in creating international anarchy will cease. But such a view implies an optimism as to the readiness of nations for coöperation which certainly this present writer does not share. The past relationships of England and Russia or England and France; or Russia and Japan; or Italy and France, or France and Russia, are hardly such as to justify the hope that the mere fact of defeating Germany will dispose of the conflicts, intrigues, ambitions, fears and hatreds that have heretofore stood in the way of a sane world order.

Merely to maintain the present situation is hardly less stultifying and not likely to be capable of indefinite prolongation. To urge on behalf of such a policy that America is not concerned, is to propound an untenable theory that overlooks the obvious condition. America is involved whether she will or no. Her citizens are killed, her trade affected, her resources used to influence the war's issue, and resentment incurred because of the rules which she is laying down. It is not a question of whether she is concerned, but of what represents her greatest concern. It is hardly indeed a question of whether she will intervene, but what manner of intervention will best subserve her chief ends.

There is only one recourse: for America to recognize that she is a member of the society of nations, and to face the

problem of determining just what that involves; what shall be the foundations of the future internationalism; what shall be America's place in it. That cannot be determined without some knowledge of the subjects with which this book deals.

The danger at present is that the country, by a one-sided demand for a very incomplete "preparedness" will be lulled into the illusion that arms alone, if only she has enough of them, can render her secure and solve her international problems. They cannot.

The danger of the present widespread "preparedness" agitation is not in the demand for arms, but in the implication that arms suffice. It is a half-preparedness. I happen to have indicated elsewhere the danger of that in the following propositions, which bear so directly on the problems of America's international relations just now, that I will venture to quote them.

I submit:

(1) That preparedness is dangerously incomplete when it does not include a clear formulation of foreign policy — what we intend to exact from or defend against foreign nations by our military power; the rights of trade, immigration, residence, which we are prepared to grant to foreigners, European and Asiatic, in our own territory and in that which we now, or may later by our increasing power, control; the rights which we demand for our citizens on land, as in Mexico, and on sea, as in the conflict with Germany and England; just how far we will use our military and naval force to coöperate with other nations in upholding what we may decide to be common rights on land or sea; at what point we shall decline to allow such common action to lead us into entangling alliances; the conditions upon which we are prepared to live together with other nations in this world of ours, and to share it with them.

(2) That so long as it is unknown on behalf of what policy and

general principles our military power will be used; so long as its general purposes are not manifest, to ourselves, the world at large, and our prospective enemy, it will, however great, fail to protect our nation and our interest, to ensure peace or to secure our rights; and if we get the armament first and leave the policy to be announced later, the increased armament may prove not merely ineffective in the attainment of such ends, but may be instrumental in defeating them, since sooner or later, in that case, increased armament would, either by increase of power on the part of other nations or by hostile alliances, be neutralized, canceled.

(3) That it is not sufficient that the intention behind a nation's power should be inoffensive and in no way threaten others; the specific object of the power, the foreign policy it supports, must be made clear to others in the way that members of an alliance like that between Russia, England, and France make their respective objects clear to one another. In the absence of that definite understanding power must be mutually threatening (as illustrated in the past military rivalry of the three nations just mentioned), since the basic principle of national defence in the modern world is that superior alien force the objective of which is not manifest must be met by equivalent or greater force; which makes security depend upon the attainment of a condition in which each shall be stronger than the other; that is, upon a physical impossibility.

And, in addition that:

(*a*) A successful American international policy must be the outcome of widely expressed public opinion: it cannot be presented ready-made to the country by a President or an Administration, because it involves, in the radically changing conditions of the world, revolutionary departure from precedent; grave questions of principle which the public alone can decide. Nor can decision be left to a time of crisis. Human nature being combative, coercive, guided largely by impulse and passions and very little by reason and reflection, to expect wisdom at such a time is to ask intellectual and moral miracles of men.

(*b*) Nothing in the foregoing implies a disparagement of armament; it is an argument, not that the advocate of preparedness is asking too much, but that he is asking too little; not that we do not need armament, but that we need something else as well; it is an argument not against preparedness, but against preparedness by dangerous half measures.

It is worth while to recall a few facts, too easily forgotten, that support these propositions.

The commonest assumption behind so much "preparedness" advocacy is that our arms are simply for the defence of our soil, for repelling invasion, and that if only we be strong enough our policy cannot endanger us.

That is a pernicious and dangerous fallacy. The armies and navies of great states are not for the purpose of defending their territories so much as their policies, as American, like European history shows. Although America has had several foreign wars, and been near to several more, not one has been for the purpose of repelling invasion. The causes have included resistance to piratical tribute on the high seas — the Barbary war; resistance to other high-handedness at sea — the 1812 war; defence of American lives and interests on foreign soil — the Mexican war; the termination of barbarous government — the Spanish war; the restoration of order — the Philippine war. All good causes, but American arms were defending American policies, not American soil. So in the European war: Austria's action in July, 1914, brought into the war in turn, Russia, France, Belgium, England, Japan, Italy and Portugal; but not because Austria was threatening to invade them. If Russia and Europe generally had been ready to give Austria a free hand to crush Serbia there would have been no war. But they believed such a policy dangerous and resisted it.

The importance of the distinction between defending a policy and a territory, is that in a conflict of policy both

sides may plausibly believe themselves to be acting on the defensive and defending the right.

If the Venezuelan matter in 1896 had led to war between England and America, as it very nearly did, both sides would have believed that they were defending their rights: Great Britain her citizens from transfer to a disorderly government like Venezuela, America the Monroe Doctrine. A clear definition of policy on both sides would in such cases obviate conflict.

We cannot always count on such conflicts having so satisfactory an ending. This country may, probably will, drift into war at no very distant date. If in the future America is compelled, as she may be, to go into Mexico and administer that country, and possibly cancel concessions made to foreigners, conflict may arise from the fear of foreign nations that America will use her increasing power on this continent to exact commercial preference for herself and exclude rivals. Such conflicts might easily develop into wars (which would of course be with a group of powers if at all) that clear formulation of policy might avoid.

Force has no peace-preserving value unless the prospective disturber of the peace knows in what circumstances it will be used against him; and that again implies a statement of policy.

Even if England had possessed a great army in 1914, it would not have restrained German aggression unless Germany knew clearly that in such and such circumstances it would be used against her. And very eminent English public men have declared that Germany did not know the circumstances in which England would enter the war against her. If that is true the military power of England as a force making for peace would have been nullified by the absence of any clear policy on England's part.

So with Italy. Italy's very considerable army was use-

less as a preventative of German aggression, and as an element in the maintenance of European peace, because Germany did not know it would be used against her; she may have hoped even that it would be used for her. When we are told that if only England had adopted conscription, Germany would have been restrained, we should remember that when England first began to consider the question of conscription twenty years ago it was for the purpose of opposing France; at that time England was talking of an alliance with Germany; a little earlier she was preparing for war with Russia; earlier still — in the Crimean War — she was actually fighting Russia and upholding Turkey, a course which Palmerston justified partly on the ground that it was necessary to protect Germanic civilization against Russian barbarism! It is partly because English arms have defended the Turks in the past that we had in the Balkans the conditions out of which the present war arose. Where policy shifts in this way — one war undoing the work of the last — no amount of mere military preparedness will give a nation security.

Where does America stand in the grave questions that will confront the world to-morrow at the peace? What is *her* international policy?

Is she prepared to pledge her power to support more civilized international conditions: to exact the maintenance of international law? In that case the slogan of "no entangling alliances" must go by the board. At present her attitude to international questions is that any power which commands the sea can secure her material support — money, munitions, etc., — whatever the merits of the cause that power may be defending.

The Germans after the war will consequently argue that if they had commanded the sea they could have availed themselves of America's national resources, however bad the

German cause might be. And any other prospective belligerent will argue similarly, that a nation desiring to avail itself of American resources does not need to concern itself as to the nature of its wars, whether they are just or unjust, defensive or aggressive; all it needs is to command the sea. It can then be sure of what is virtually the economic alliance of Americans. That, to say the least, is unfortunate. If America were to declare that on behalf of certain causes, no nation, whether it commanded the sea or not, could count upon American material support, America's resources would then be a factor thrown on the side of international good behavior, instead of being, as at present, a premium upon armament competition. No one knows—Americans themselves do not know—where America stands in international matters, nor how she proposes to use her increasing military power.

Is she prepared, for instance, to assure Europeans that in going into Mexico or Haiti or San Domingo or elsewhere she is not going to use her power to exclude them in any way commercially? Such a self-denying ordinance would involve revolutionary changes in our conceptions of national sovereignty. Yet, without it she may drift into conflict.

Human nature, being what it is, the very worst policy is to leave these things until the crisis arises. To do so is to ignore the plain fact of human imperfection. It is not in the midst of an international crisis that nations can decide the wise course. At such times we are all likely to lose our tempers and call it patriotism, and to use our force to ill purpose.

If we look back in history we find plenty of arms and fighting; men never seem to have shown much unreadiness for that; but we find little patience to understand each other's purposes, little tendency to make those adjustments by which alone, however, they can live together.

Force is, or should be, the servant of man, an instrument of the human intelligence; and whether it is well or ill used depends absolutely upon that intelligence. The same instrument can be either a means of defence or suicide. Force is not a thing that operates of itself apart from the human will, and wisdom will not come of itself. It demands a definite moral effort to the end that we may use our instrument well instead of ill.

If we are to use it well we cannot ignore the issues with which this book deals. They are of the essence of the problems that will face America to-morrow at the peace, or earlier. They will dominate, certainly during our generation, all other problems whatsoever, for upon their solution depends the whole character of organized society. If it is Utopian to concern ourselves with these subjects, then indeed is the choice before us "Utopia or Hell."

NORMAN ANGELL.

NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY

NATIONALISM, WAR AND SOCIETY

I

NATIONALISM

I. Nationalism: absolute sovereignty of state.

A. At present each nation (state [1]) is theoretically sovereign; that is, it is independent of every other state.

[1] There is some confusion in the use of the terms "state" and "nation". The former when applied to a unit like Great Britain, Germany or France, clearly means the political unit. By "nation" some mean a state in which there is one *nationality*, a national-state. These would say that Austria-Hungary is a *state*, but not a *nation*. However, in *international* relations Austria-Hungary is considered a *nation* like every other. As this study has to do with international affairs, the terms nation and state (when referring to a sovereign power) are used synonymously. *Nationalism*, then (as distinct from nationality) is the political system of co-existing sovereign states.

An excellent definition of a nation is that of Lieber: Nationalism, pp. 7–8. "What is a nation in the modern sense of the word? The word nation, in the fullest adaptation of the term, means, in modern times, a numerous and homogeneous population (having long emerged from the hunters and nomadic state) permanently inhabiting and cultivating a coherent territory, with a well-defined geographic outline, and a name of its own, — the inhabitants speaking their own language, having their own literature and common institutions, which distinguish them clearly from other and similar groups of people, being citizens or subjects of a unitary government, however subdivided it may be, and having an organic unity with one another as well as being conscious of a common destiny. Organic, intellectual and political internal unity with proportionate strength and a distinct and obvious demarcation from similar groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern nation in its fullest sense. A nation is a nation only when there is but one nationality; and the attempt at establishing a nationality within a nationality is more inconsistent and mischievous even than the establishment of 'an empire within an empire'."

There are certain attributes of sovereignty. Thus a state to be legally sovereign must have:

1. The power to make war and peace.
2. The supreme and effective jurisdiction over a given area and its inhabitants.
3. The right to coin money, raise revenue by taxation, maintain a military establishment, make war and peace, make and denounce treaties.

B. The Great War has resulted in attempts to distinguish between German, British and American conceptions of sovereignty.

1. Germany is said to regard sovereignty as absolute, and seeks to make the facts tally with this conception: a sovereign state admits no obligations to other states.
2. Great Britain is said to regard absolute sovereignty as a theory only, which must be and is modified to meet the practical requirements of international intercourse: each state must recognize certain rights of others in the present condition of things, no matter what the theory of sovereignty is.

C. Current philosophy of the state accepts the nation as the best and highest possible development.

1. "Nature has decreed that the struggle for survival shall be in *groups*. The national group is the only one suited to cope with conditions. In the war of race against race, the nation has to foresee how and where the struggle will be carried on." — Karl Pearson: National Life from the Standpoint of Science.

"The state is the realized ethical idea." — Hegel: Philosophy of Law.

"The state alone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highest degree of life." — Bernhardi, p. 25.

"We must bring to the solution of every problem an intense and fervid Americanism, — that is, broadly American and national, American in heart, soul, spirit, and purpose, proud beyond measure of the glorious privilege of bearing it." — Roosevelt: True Americanism: American Ideals and other Essays.

"Eliminate if you can, the competition between the several nationalities. . . . The result may be that European civilization will not survive, having lost the fighting energy, which heretofore has been inherent in its composition." — Mahan: Armaments and Arbitration, p. 10.

2. Federation impossible.

a. Theoretical objections.

"To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individuals, leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a whole, struggle, and by implication the most essential vital principle, would be ruled out. Any action in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Utopias." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 25, note.

"There never have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here and there particular relations can be brought under definite international laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest ideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an injustice, and thus dishonor itself." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 32.

"The work of the nation is not yet finished, and the world-state is too remote a conception to influence any but a few idealists, who have insufficiently appreciated the intense exclusiveness of existing groups. The world-state is hundreds and perhaps thousands of years in the future." — Geoffrey C. Faber: War and the Personality of Nations, *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1915.

b. Practical objections urged against federation.

Racial differences are insuperable. Races could not get along amicably, even if their national existence was merged into a larger federation. Differences in culture would merely be accentuated by biological differences.

Federation requires some fundamental constitution. This could not be secured if a single powerful state opposed it; for vacillating states, allies or dependents of the opposing state, would join in the opposition.

Even if such a constitution were devised and accepted it would not assure justice or greater security, inasmuch as the failure of law to secure justice would still be true; it might indeed be worse, in the event some clique or machine secured control of the mechanism of government.

D. The claims of the several states (nations).

1. Each regards itself, and its ideals, *Kultur* or civilization, as superior. Hence foreigners came to be called barbarians. This accounts for the perennial discussion of the respective merits of Shakespeare and Goethe, of the respective places of German, French, English and other scientists. It also accounts for the claim current in several nations that

its nationals invented the railway or telegraph or what not.

"Insofar as an Englishman differs in essentials from a Swede or Belgian, he believes that he represents a more perfectly developed standard of general excellence. Yes, and even those nations nearest to us in mind and sentiment — German and Scandinavian — we regard on the whole as not so excellent as ourselves, comparing their typical characteristics with ours." — Memoir of Herbert Harvey, by Earl Grey. Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, pp. 136–137.

"I contend that the British race is the finest which history has yet produced." — Cecil Rhodes' Will — *Encyclopedia Britannica* XXXII (10th ed.), p. 228.

2. Each nation believes it has a peculiarly important mission to perform.

"God has assigned to the German people a place in the world and a rôle in history which demand continual sacrifices. Our pride should make us bear them with good heart." — The German Chancellor: Speech, February 15, 1915.

"To us [the British] has been given by our history a work and a mission perhaps the loftiest ever assigned to a people." — Wyatt, *Nineteenth Century*, 45, p. 225.

"The Anglo-Saxon race is infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the history and civilization of the world." — Chamberlain — Cited by Harris: Intervention and Colonization in Africa, p. 15.

"France, l'univers a besoin que tu vives! Je le redis, la France est un besoin des hommes." — Victor Hugo — cited by Harris, Ibid., p. 15.

In the United States men have been fond of speaking of the "manifest destiny" of the nation.

"His [De Tocqueville's] prophecy that 'America will one day become the first maritime power of the globe — they are born to rule seas, as the Romans were to conquer the world,' will doubtless be fulfilled in time." — Luce: *North American Review*, 153, p. 675.

"We must play a great part in the world, and especially . . . perform those deeds of blood, of valour, which above everything else bring national renown." — Roosevelt: The Strenuous Life. Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, p. 132.

3. Each nation claims its citizens show a superior bravery and fighting quality.

In former times it was customary to designate these as *furor teutonicus, furia française,* Spanish Fury, etc.

"The fire [on the *Volturno*] grew worse. . . . The captain behaved splendidly, and so did the officers, who were English. I am sorry to say that the crew, who were Germans and Belgians, behaved very badly." — London Newspapers on the *Volturno* accident.

"The captain and the officers lost their heads. They ran hither and thither and behaved very badly." — German newspapers.

4. Each state believes that its aspirations and policies are righteous; of course if any other state holds a conflicting policy, it must be in the wrong (though from its standpoint it is surely in the right). Once national feeling gets behind the respective views, each regards itself as absolutely right and its opponent as absolutely wrong. A nation can do no wrong.

"Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical

life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, and none can say that one nation has a better right than the other." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 32.

5. Each believes that its highest duty is to survive.

"The state is itself the highest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the duty of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the state, for there is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher." — Treitschke, Politik 1, 3. Cited from Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 46.

By "survival" is meant physical survival as a state, for it is contended that national ideals depend on the existence of the nation, and would disappear without the protection of the latter. This is said to be disproven by the Jews.

"Nations cannot be created, nor can they become great, by any purely ethical or spiritual expansion. The establishment, in great or small entities, of tribes and states is the resultant only of their physical power; and whenever there is a reversal, or an attempted reversal to this, the result is either internal dissolution or sudden destruction, their dismembered territories going to make up the dominions of their conquerors." — Lea: The Day of the Saxon, pp. 10–11. Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, p. 129.

6. In general each state is supposed to stand for something *sui generis;* to have a personality and qualities

peculiar to it and not attainable by other peoples; and its ideals or *Kultur* are supposed to be incompatible with others and to lead to conflict.

REFERENCES

See Chapter III

II

THE COROLLARIES OF NATIONALISM

I. Imperialism. A vigorous nation must expand.

A. Because, its ideals being superior, it would be immoral not to bring them to other peoples; expansion is a part of the national mission, it spreads civilization. Hence, promises not to add territory in the future are meaningless, if not immoral.

"The imperialism of the American is a duty and credit to humanity. He is the highest type of imperial master. He makes beautiful the land he touches; beautiful with moral and physical cleanliness. . . . There should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinement it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means such as armed conquest, commerce, diplomacy. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty, because we are idealists and are thereby bound by establishing protectorates over the weak to protect them from unmoral Kultur." — *Seven Seas Magazine* (Organ of the Navy League of the United States), Nov., 1915, pp. 27–28.

B. Because a state cannot stand still.

"Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual *expansion* of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 21.

"But when the State renounces all extension of power, and recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when 'at peace on sluggard's couch it lies' then its citizens become stunted." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 26.

"Colonization is for France a question of life or death. Either France will become a great African state, or she will in a century or two be a second-rate power." — Leroy-Beaulieu. Cited by Harris: Africa, pp. 15–16.

C. Because after a war, even if not undertaken from ambition for territory, the victorious nation naturally enlarges its boundaries.

D. Whether necessary or not, all strong nations have expanded.

II. Each state is the rival of every other. Each is assumed to be a unit competing with every other, hence, we personify the nation and speak of its trade, as though the nation itself, instead of its individual citizens, were in business.

III. Each state, being in competition for existence with every other does what is in accordance with its interests. The fundamental principle is that national necessity is above law.

A. National necessity takes precedence of everything — international law, treaties, promises, humane considerations, or ordinary conceptions of justice.

"Necessity knows no law. The injustice we thus commit we will repair as soon as our military object has been attained." — Bethmann-Hollweg: in Reichstag (August, 1914) in explanation of the invasion of Belgium.

"Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law [than the seizure of the Danish fleet

by Great Britain in 1807]. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of it? No, certainly not; we are proud of it." — Major Murray: Peace of the Anglo-Saxons, pp. 40–41.

B. Neutrals are expected to yield to it, for the rights of belligerents, fighting for their existence, usually take precedence and belligerents do not hesitate to infringe the interests of neutrals as far as they can prudently do so.

German submarine blockade and the United States.

The British long-distance blockade of Germany.

C. Citizens are expected, and required to approve of the course adopted by the nation, and support it in every way, no matter what they privately think. Patriotism precedes conscience: "My country, right or wrong." Conscription is employed to compel citizens to aid the national cause.

D. God is declared to be on the side of the nation. This is extending conscription to Heaven.

E. Diplomacy, being designed to advance the national interest, uses what means achieve this end; and the end justifies them. Hence diplomacy has often been filled with intrigue and treachery. Secret treaties and engagements have often emasculated public treaties; and have at times committed peoples to causes which they did not approve. Happily, modern diplomacy has improved somewhat. In any case diplomats cannot be actuated by the code of individual morals.

"Governments are corporations, and corporations have not souls; governments, moreover, are trustees, not principals, and as such must put first the lawful interests of

their wards — their own people. . . ." Admiral Mahan: The Interest of America in International Conditions.

IV. Force is the ultimate solvent of differences between nations.

V. It behooves every state to develop its power for the inevitable conflict.

"I think, and have always thought, that the possession of force, of power, to effect ends is a responsibility — a talent, to use the Christian expression — which cannot by the individual man or state be devolved upon another, except when certain that the result cannot violate the individual or the national conscience." — Mahan: Armaments and Arbitration, p. 30.

A. Means of doing this.

1. Developing the mental, material and moral solidity of the people by sound education, by aiding material progress, and by cultivating loyalty to the nation.

2. Arming. Preparedness to assert one's rights in any difference that may arise is held to make differences less likely to rise, and hence is considered a guarantor of peace. This system is known as the "armed peace." It was on this theory that the Kaiser was urged as a proper candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.

a. "Preparedness is the best insurance against war." — Major-General Wood.

"Our surest guarantee would therefore be a well-trained Army, numerically sufficient to ensure respect, standing behind the overwhelming Navy we may be considered at present to possess." — Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 200.

"How many people in the British Isles realize that Germany and France owe their security from inva-

sion to the latent threat of their enormous Armies, or that they keep them up to fullest fighting power because they know that the Nation who fails in this respect will inevitably go under?" — Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 201.

b. These expressions can be duplicated in any country.

Preparedness is compared to insurance, fire equipment, quarantine, vaccination or inoculation, window screens. Certain organizations have undertaken to keep their respective nations alive to the need of preparedness; among them the following:

Great Britain: Navy League; Army League; National Service League (favors compulsory service).

New Zealand: National Defense League.

United States: Navy League; Army League; National Security League; American Defense League; American Defense Society; Pacific Coast Defense League; National Defense League; Special Relief Society.

Germany: Wehrverein; Flottenverein; Frauenflottenverein; Schülerflottenverein; Freie Vereinigung für Flottenvorträge; "German Defense Alliance."

France: Ligue Maritime; Ligue pour la service de trois ans.

Japan: Kokubogikai (National Defense League).

Mexico: Sociedad promovedoro de la defensa nacional.

c. It is urged that to secure adequate preparedness, the advice of experts (meaning usually men in the army and navy) should be followed.

B. The uses of power.

1. The use of martial or armed force has by some been classified under two heads.

   Aggressive force, to be used for expansion. This is said by foreigners to be the purpose of the armed forces of Germany.

   Defensive force, used only to discourage attack or to compel recognition of rights. It is stated that Great Britain, France and the United States, among others, have military establishments for defensive purposes.

2. There must be no hesitation in using force when conditions demand it.

   "The lessons of history confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 45.

   "The statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, and seeing war inevitable, hesitates to strike first is guilty of a crime against his country." — Clausewitz: On War, I, vii.

3. The "utmost use of power". When once force is employed, it must be used unsparingly and in every way that will secure the desired end. Anything less is a source of weakness. This principle is at the bottom of "frightfulness" or "thoroughness". — Clausewitz: I, 5-6. Col. Maude subscribes to Clausewitz.

C. Some contend that nations which claim to be armed for defense only, do so because they have already, by aggression, acquired what they want, and now urge the abolition of aggression and of armaments and propose arbitration and peace programs as a means

of avoiding competition with more vigorous nations. "National stand-pattism."

"Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at the Hague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the actions of the United States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried to conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first and foremost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 17.

"Great Britain had all the territory she needed; her obvious idea was peace in which she and her Daughter Nations should have leisure to develop the resources of the vast territories they already possessed." — Lord Roberts: *Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1914, p. 9.

VI. The balance of power. Instead of relying on their own strength to balance that of individual rivals, nations may enter into combinations with friendly nations. The threatened nation naturally does likewise to secure an equipoise. Peace depends on an equilibrium. This is the balance of power. Any gain by one nation disturbs the equilibrium and causes other nations to demand gains in turn. The instability of the combinations makes the instability of the system quite obvious.

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III

THE CASE FOR NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM

I. War, and hence the need of being prepared for it, is inevitable.

A. War is a divine institution. It follows, of course, that war is beneficial and desirable.

"Der Krieg ist ein Glied der göttlichen Weltordnung."— Moltke.

"Unless, as I believe, war is the divinely appointed means by which the environment may be readjusted until ethically 'fittest' and 'best' become synonymous, the outlook for the human race is too pitiable for words." — Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 18.

That war is not contrary to the divine will is maintained by many writers, among them: Rear-Admiral Fiske: *North American Review*, Oct., 1915, p. 525; Maxim: Defenseless America, pp. 46–55; Speer: Jesus and War (Pamphlet 35, of the Navy League of the United States).

B. History confirms it. There have always been wars, hence, judging the future by the past, there always will be wars.

History is one series of wars.

3357 years: from 1496 B. C. to 1861 A. D.

3130 years of war in that time.

227 years of peace.

13 years of war to one of peace. — Bloch: Future of War, LXV.

C. Human nature, which is unchangeable, is so constituted that it makes war inevitable.

1. In the case of individuals.

a. Differences between individuals are inevitable.

b. The individual has a fighting instinct; he considers fighting for his opinion manly and honorable, and despises one who will not fight as a craven or coward. War is action, and appeals to the natural instinct which likes to do things; peace is inaction. Virile men enjoy a fight and instinctively recognize courage. "Spoiling for a fight."

c. This tendency to fight is aggravated by the love of adventure, the desire for change and the struggle for existence. The pressure of hunger, economic necessity, makes man a fighter: avarice, cupidity, lust, and like tendencies lead men to attack one another.

d. Man is impulsive and often goes into strife regardless of expediency or consequence.

e. Even if he is not impulsive, but deliberate, he will have convictions that he considers worth fighting for regardless of cost.

2. In the case of nations. Nations, being groups of individuals, show the same characteristics as individuals, and often in a more marked degree.

a. Differences between nations are inevitable.

Universal peace presupposes the same standard of civilization for all nations; and homogeneity within the nations. As long as there are "inferior" peoples, superior peoples will take advantage of them.

b. Each nation has its pride, its fighting instinct, and national honor, and these impel it to fight rather than to submit.

"When a state sees its downfall staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of a state." — Treitschke. Cited by Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 46.

"It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than not to have fought at all." — Roosevelt: Message to Congress, Dec., 1906.

c. The commercial rivalry of nations is economic competition which drives nations into strife. Cupidity leads one nation to attack another.

"There is no one lesson which history teaches us more plainly than that the possession of wealth by a defenseless nation is a standing *casus belli* to other nations, and that always there has been the nation standing ready to attack and plunder any other nation when there was likely to be sufficient profit in the enterprise to pay for the trouble." — Maxim: Defenseless America, p. 12.

d. Nations, even more than individuals, are impulsive; and when wrought up will go into war regardless of every cost or consequence. Crowds and masses never act coolly.

e. Even when perfectly calm, nations will have ideals or aspirations of the justice of which they are convinced and for which they will fight no matter what the cost.

"It must ever be kept in mind, that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honorable men and upon an honorable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war is in the long-run

far better for a nation's soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice." — Roosevelt: Message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1906.

f. Certain differences between nations can be settled only by the use of force: such as those which touch its honor, freedom from oppression, slavery, states rights and any conflicting ideals or aspirations. Force alone determines which conception shall prevail, and in this way is the only practical way of discovering which is right. Might makes right.

"War was the only means of solving the great political problem of the abolition of slavery." — Luce: *North American Review*, 153, p. 676.

"Between states the only check on injustice is force." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 20.

II. War exerts a wholesome moral influence.

A. This follows *a priori* from the premise that war is divinely ordained.

B. It develops numerous virtues and good qualities, such as patriotism, sacrifice of self for the common good, efficiency, inventiveness, a sense of equality between social classes, economy and frugality, courage, discipline.

1. Military training in time of peace is beneficial as it develops patriotism, a sense of service to the nation and equality among men with the colors, educates the recruit through free travel and in other ways, and gives him employment, physical and moral discipline, at the time he most needs them.
2. Only in powerful states can individual capacities reach their fullest development.

3. War stimulates art and literature and deepens religious feeling.

C. It preserves physical virility with its corresponding devotion and labor for national culture and ideals. Rivalry of nations keeps them keen and alert.

"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social putrefaction and stagnation." — Kuno Fischer: Hegel, I, p. 737. Cited by Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 27.

"Yet unless human nature shall have been radically modified in the course of evolution, unless it shall have attained a moral strength and stature unknown at present, it appears certain that the attainment of this much desired universal peace will be as the signal for the beginning of universal decay." — Wyatt: *Nineteenth Century*, 45, p. 225.

"All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war. . . . There is no great art possible to a nation, but that which is based on battle. . . . All great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace." — Ruskin: "War" in The Crown of Wild Olive.

D. It helps progress by deciding differences.

"If at any given period in the past, war could have been abolished, social evolution must have been arrested, because the only practicable means of effecting change and movement among nations and states would have been removed." — Wyatt: *Nineteenth Century*, 45, p. 218.

III. War performs the biological function of selecting the nation with its ideals which is best fitted to survive. Social Darwinism. (Huxley has noted that the best morally is not necessarily the best fitted for survival

in the biological sense.) War is a necessary part of the law of struggle; hence military efficiency is an expression of national efficiency.

"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which can not be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization." — Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 18, footnote.

The struggle for survival among nations "is not, fortunately for humanity, decided by peaceful competition alone, but ultimately by . . . war." — Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 243.

"The hope of banishing war is not only meaningless but immoral. Its disappearance would turn the earth into a great temple of selfishness. Our age is an iron age. If the strong vanquish the weak, it is the law of life." — Treitschke.

A. Some advance the argument that war is necessary to prevent over-population.

B. To the claim that war is injurious to the race (see Chapter X) it is replied that Nature cares for the species, and but little for the individual; and that the biological harm, if there is any, is more than offset by the rejuvenation of a people through the fact that all non-essentials are sloughed off and men get down to solid living.

It is also urged that the loss of life should not be advanced as a condemnation of war any more than against ordinary economic conditions on railroads and in factories which exact a great annual toll of life. — Stockton: Peace Insurance, 95–97.

IV. War is of an economic advantage to the victor; (and indirectly it redounds to the benefit of progress that a

nation with strength and initiative blazes the way, for all others are forced to imitate or drop out of the race).

A. The victor profits at the expense of the vanquished:
By annexing territory.
By exacting an indemnity.
By levying tribute in the form of tolls, or taxes on the trade of the vanquished.
By crushing the competition of a rival nation; (which implies that the prosperity of one nation is a menace to others).

B. Political domination gives trade advantage; "trade follows the flag."

"The teaching of all history is that commerce grows under the shadow of armed strength." — Rifleman: The Struggle for Bread. Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, p. 128.

"Bethmann-Hollweg had the courage and the common sense to lay it down as a maxim that . . . the armed forces of any nation or empire must have a distinct relation to the material resources of that nation or empire. This position seems to me as statesmanlike as it is unanswerable." — Lord Roberts: Message to the Nation. Cited by Angell: America and the New World-State, p. 125.

"The Navy and Army, therefore, are the foundations of commercial credit, and, as every engineer knows, it pays to put good work, and enough of it, into underground work." — Maude: War and the World's Life, p. 80.

V. The war system has certain obvious economic advantages.

A. It gives employment to great numbers in supplying military and naval units with equipment of all sorts. To abolish war or the military system would mean economic disaster. — Maude, pp. 78 f.

B. Trades are taught in the army, and army discipline

is wholesome training for the economic life of the man leaving the service. He may even save something if he wishes, with which to get a start after leaving the army.

VI. Armies are very useful to society in times of peace.

A. They perform police duty: San Francisco Fire; Earthquake in Italy; Strike in Colorado; etc.

B. Service in sanitary work: Panama and the Philippines.

C. They advance all kinds of scientific work: researches in tropical anemia and hookworm diseases in Porto Rico; yellow fever in Cuba; typhoid inoculation.

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IV

THE FAULTS OF NATIONALISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM

I. At the bottom of the current theories of the relations of nations there lie a number of premises which are regarded as axioms, when they really are not. This is not strange as it is quite natural for men to formulate working principles which, though they become antiquated, are considered as authoritative long after the conditions which produced them have changed. Thus there are always current a set of phrases and maxims which are ordinarily accepted without reflection or thought. These are considered irrational by the opponents of war.

II. Irrational phrases and maxims, sentiments uttered and accepted without thought; often their meaning is vague or is anything that one wishes to make it. They all appeal to sentiment or passion instead of intellect; all are difficult to define.

National honor, national destiny, the field of honor, heroism, glory, duty, liberty, self-sacrifice, courage, victory, invincibility, glorious traditions of the nation, inevitability of war, human nature does not change, maintaining the balance of power, worthy of our ancestors, manifest destiny, blood is thicker than water, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence (*Kampf ums Dasein*), a place in the sun, war is the basis of all things (πόλεμος πατήρ πάντοων), in the time of peace prepare for war (*si vis pacem, para bellum*), white man's burden, yellow peril, black peril.

Many terms applied to pacifists are of this class: molly-

coddles, weaklings, poltroons, degeneracy of peace, Chinafy, peace-at-any-price, *Narren des ewigen Friedens*, dubs of peace.

III. Fallacious assumptions. Many of the premises which underlie the present national and martial system and are ordinarily taken for granted have of late been questioned or denied. These are here assembled with the reasons that are advanced in their support. In some cases the premises are no more than personal convictions, and in such instances the contrary view may, — and with equal foundation, — be posited as a mere personal opinion. The proposition is stated, and followed by the counter proposition.

A. A nation (state) represents a natural or sort of final entity.

For a full discussion of this see Chapter XVI, section II.

B. Nationalism is the highest possible step in progress.

International coöperation is not only possible but, as analogous experience in history shows, also beneficial. Indeed it is necessary, if there is to be an end of war. (See Chapters XV and XVI.)

Nationalism no longer corresponds to the actual facts of life: economically and culturally men are world-citizens; only politically are they national, because juridical ideas have fallen behind the facts. Nationalism is so general because it has been emphasized in the teaching of history; for this is devoted almost exclusively to political affairs, which are chiefly national, and hence is oblivious of the great international tendencies in all other fields.

C. The Kultur of each nation is peculiar to it and the conflict between national ideas is irrepressible.

Ideas or characteristics, even though at any given

stage more advanced in one nation than in another, are not peculiar to the first in the sense that others have not the capacity to grasp and apply them. Germans understand Shakespeare; the English and French have appropriated and applied various things from Germany; Japan imported western civilization.

Though the Kultur of another nation may be adopted voluntarily, it cannot be imposed by force.

National cultures are regarded as rivals, not because they are, but because the backward political institutions, noted above, nurture and exaggerate cultural differences for national purposes. This is at its worst during war, when each government paints its foes as black as possible in order to secure a degree of rivalry that would otherwise not exist.

Nations which insist on the sacredness of national cultures, do not hesitate to suppress other nationalities. In short, the present system, though pretending to, does not preserve nationalities. Germany: Alsatians, Poles; England: Irish, Persians, etc.; Russia: Finns, Poles, Persians, etc.; Austria: Serbs, Czechs, etc.

D. *The lives of individuals and of nations are analogous, and both are subject to the evolutionary law of competition, which when applied to nations is called "social Darwinism."* — Lea: Valour of Ignorance, pp. 8 f.

The biological laws governing the struggle for existence do not apply to individual human beings in the same way as to lower beings; the latter compete with each other for what sustenance nature has provided; human beings, instead of fighting each other for what nature has bestowed, by substituting labor for fighting can increase the supply

of sustenance — and doing so is the essence of civilization. Popper-Lynkeus estimates that an efficient coöperative organization of society would enable each person to earn a livelihood for life in an average of seven years, working five hours per day; and that the present resources of earth could with proper distribution support from four to six times the present population.

Social Darwinism entirely overlooks mutual aid as a factor in evolution.

The laws of evolution apply to individuals, not to groups.

Nations consist of individuals. These die and are constantly replaced by others, but the complexion of society remains much the same. A nation is like a corporation or fraternity whose membership, though ever changing, may constantly be of the same kind. As long as the individuals composing a fraternity — or a nation — are sound and strong the organization will be strong and it need never reach old age.

E. War, or the possibility of it, maintains national virility and courage; in other words, peace breeds cowardice and degeneracy.

Martial nations have not endured; it is alleged that they declined precisely because war drained their best blood (Jordan, see Chapter X), and because of the degeneracy which follows the exploitation of the vanquished by the victor.

Is courage a trait of human nature that is inherited in its full form? If so, how does war increase it? If it grows by use, then may there be "experts" in courage? Do such experts transmit their greater courage to posterity? Whatever be the answers

to the preceding they apply also to the vices which get their chance in war: brutality, lust, hatred, cowardice, subjection of law to force, and of justice to victory.

Not war, but labor, industry, and thrift, which make for solidity of individuals, maintain national virility. Illustration: the Swiss mountaineers; the Hebrew people; the Puritans. Only as war necessitates labor and effort does it make for virility. Honest labor, compelled by other forces than war, is just as effective to that end, without the accompanying evils of war. Hence the advisability of nations developing moral or other equivalents for war. (James: Moral Equivalent of War.) The heroes of peace: Miss Davis, who took gangrene anti-toxin to test it; Salvation Army workers. — Addams: Newer Ideals of Peace.

The birth-rate, not the size of the army, is the true indicator of a nation's virility. — Graham: War and Evolution.

F. "*My nation is superior to every other.*" *National pride.*

This is impracticable, as it means that each nation considers itself superior to every other.

It is also untrue, because no nation excels in every particular and it is arbitrary to assert that its particular excellence is superior to the chief quality of another nation.

G. "*My nation is right in all disputes.*"

This is contrary to reason, for both nations to a quarrel cannot be right.

It is likewise contrary to fact: Germany did wrong in invading Belgium, England in attacking Denmark (1807) or in forcing opium on China.

Finally it ignores personal conscience and universal morality, that are common to all men.

H. Might makes right. Force or war is the final means of determining which of two conflicting views shall prevail, and hence, is right.

That Poland succumbed to might does not make it morally right.

Superior might or force is sometimes a matter of accident, of incompetent generalship, of miscarried or delayed orders, of unseasonable rain, of treachery or personal rivalry in high command, etc., etc. "God is on the side of the strongest battalions." "The fate of nations often hangs on five minutes." — Napoleon. (See also Clausewitz, On War, I, p. 10; and Bernhardi, p. 53.)

Force never settles anything vital, and other things can be settled without resort to force. "Truth crushed to earth will rise again." Force cannot triumph over faith, conscience, reason; *e. g.*, the Christian martyrs, the forerunners of the Reformation, the fathers of democracy. Force at best merely hastens what men are already disposed to consent to. Thus the South would voluntarily have abolished slavery in time, just as in England this great reform came without war. — Johnston: Arms and the Race, p. 156.

I. Armaments secure peace. "The best insurance of peace is to be prepared for war."

Armaments do not preserve peace as Europe shows.

When war breaks out armaments afford *protection;* but they cannot prevent war or secure peace, because they are themselves a part of the rivalry of nations; and it is folly to think that, even if all nations could at some time be so prepared as to deter others from attack,

they would forever remain so. A simple change in alliances, and the whole of the armed peace loses its effect. The balance of power is unstable.

If, as is claimed (Maxim: Defenseless America, pp. 96 f.) preparedness makes wars less bloody and that therefore "the quick-firing gun is the most beneficent implement of mercy ever invented" then preparedness would seem to be less of a deterrent from war than unpreparedness.

J. Those who seek to eliminate the use of force place individuals and society at the mercy of the wicked.

Opponents of war do not wish to eliminate *all force;* but only that one kind of force known as *war*. Consequently if war were extirpated, there would remain the police force, which is the basis of our security; all other forms of competition would also remain.

K. Human nature does not change and as long as men continue men they will make war.

Human nature does change, even though slowly. Today not only does no one burn witches, but no one wants to.

It is no justification for an act that human nature prompted it. The control of human nature measures the civilization of man.

Even if human nature had not changed, the demands of society on human nature have greatly changed; and where these modern demands are enforced, as within nations, there we are said to have civilization.

Courage is a part of human nature; why should militarists fear that courage will decline through peace, unless human nature is changeable?

The present manifestations of human nature are in some degree the result of education of children, for human nature is not solely hereditary, but is influ-

enced by environment: war toys, exhibition drills, military bands, attractive uniforms, etc.

Reason is a part of human nature. Its influence grows greater with increasing knowledge. If men believe that war does not pay and that there is a better way of settlement reason will not be ineffectual.

Folly is also a part of human nature. When it asserts itself war is not unlikely. Obviously this phase of human nature should be combatted and not urged in extenuation of its manifestations. Certainly doctrines or influences which deliberately lead men to act foolishly or impetuously should be opposed.

L. War is inevitable unless human nature is changed; until men become angels there will be war.

Peace also is inevitable.

Death is inevitable if one swallows poison, but swallowing poison may be avoided. Similarly war results not from human nature, but from the conditions under which human nature is compelled to work, that is, in rival national groups which are arbitrary and not inevitable. If, then, the conception of rival nations is replaced by a conception of friendly cooperating nations, peace will come without one iota of change in the human or moral nature of men. Illustration: — the creation of the United States out of thirteen rival states, and the unification of the hostile states of Germany brought peace within the new units, without necessitating a moral improvement of citizens. All that happened was putting the existing human nature under conditions that favored peace instead of war. The average man does not want war, and never did, as appears from folksongs which always bemoan wars and express a longing for

peace. Hence the difficulty of human nature as an obstacle to peace is exaggerated.

M. War is divine institution.

Does this mean that God by a special act of will sends war, or that war is a natural factor in human strife and is divine in the sense that God permits it? Many repudiate the former interpretation. The latter carries with it the vital conception, that war is man-made, and hence can also be abolished by man.

The dilemma of those who try to justify war as a divine institution and who at the same time must, as civilized human beings, deplore it, is illustrated by the following quotations from the same article:

"The truth is that war is an ordinance of God." — Rear-Admiral Luce: The Benefits of War, *North American Review*, 153, p. 683.

"War is certainly a great evil, and abhorrent to every right-minded person." — Ibid., p. 680.

N. The present war discredits the opponents of war.

The Great War discredits the present national system which produced it, and justifies those who have sought to change this system to one that shall tend to prevent rather than produce war.

O. Military force is necessary to secure reforms, freedom or relief from oppression, e. g., the American Revolution, Wars of Liberation waged against Napoleon, etc. The right of revolution cannot be denied. If it was ever true that salutary reforms had to be secured by force of arms, it is less the case to-day, when democratic institutions, particularly free elections, furnish a means of ascertaining popular desire, and self-government gives the means of putting the desire into execution. Every extension and improvement of democracy diminishes the necessity of war.

P. Victorious nations profit at the expense of the vanquished. This is what Angell has called the "Great Illusion." It is treated separately in the next section.

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(Note also the references to other Chapters.)

V

"THE GREAT ILLUSION"

I. Current theory.

A. The universally accepted theory is that commercial and social advantages are secured for a nation by military and political power over others and that in the struggle for sustenance in a world of limited space and opportunity the survivors will be those militarily strong, the weaker going under.

B. The theory involves the notion that victorious nations increase their prosperity at the expense of the vanquished, through an actual transfer of wealth by:

1. Territorial acquisition.
2. Indemnities or tribute in some form.
3. Economic or commercial control of the conquered area especially in the way of securing preferential treatment for the commerce of the conqueror, "concessions," etc.

C. Admiral Mahan voices the current conception when he says that "just as it is an advantage for the Steel Trust to own its ore fields, it is an advantage for a nation to own its raw materials" and goes on: "It is the great amount of unexploited raw material in territories politically backward, and now imperfectly possessed by the nominal owners which at the present moment constitutes the temptation and the impulse to war of European States." — "Force in International Relations."

He makes an important extension of the same thesis in the following passage:

"Governments are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards — their own people. . . . More and more Germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. More and more she requires assured markets and security as to the importation of food, since less and less comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly increasing population. This all means security at sea. . . . Yet the supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetually latent control of German commerce. . . . The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of Great Britain, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession. . . . From this flow two results: the attempt to possess and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already achieved. This statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences — industry, markets, control, navy bases. . . ."

D. Hilaire Belloc has summarized modern opinion as to the best way to strike profit from victory as follows (*San Francisco Examiner*, January 17, 1915). There are three sources from which indemnity can be recovered:

1. The foreign investments of a country, *e. g.*, German investments in Brazil.

   All these can be transferred to the victor, so that he will secure the profits which formerly went to the rival nation.

2. Domestic stocks, which include everything that can be removed from the soil: bullion, particularly gold; stocks; certain forms of mobile machinery; ships; unproductive stocks such as pictures and furniture.

   A certain proportion of these, particularly of bullion, can be transferred from conquered to conquerors, but only so much as can be absorbed. Under modern industrial conditions transferrence of the above "is for the most part an error." — Belloc. It kills the goose that lays the golden eggs.

3. The productive power of a country, the national capacity for work and production.

   This consists largely in the health, thrift, inventiveness, and industry of a people, which obviously cannot be transferred to the victor. All that can be done is to levy some sort of tribute on this productive power, and guarantee the tribute by military occupation. "The longer that period of military occupation extends, the better for the victors." — Belloc.

II. This theory as enumerated both by Mahan and Belloc is challenged by Norman Angell who calls it "The Great Illusion" on the following grounds: [1]

A. The political transfer of territory does not involve the transfer of its wealth to the conqueror; the wealth still remains in the hands of its original owners. When the government of Alsace passed from France to

[1] I am indebted to Mr. Angell for this statement of his position.

Germany and that of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State from the Boers to Britain, the land, mines and factories did not change hands; there was no transfer of property.

B. Colonies are not "owned" by the mother country; if successful they are not even administered. The British colonies are administratively independent of the mother country; Britain has virtually no administrative rights even in such very recent acquisitions as the Transvaal and the Free State. The British government does not "own" the mines of the Transvaal in the way that the Steel Trust owns an ore field which it has purchased. The conquest in the one case is an operation having no resemblance to the operation of purchase by the steel trust; the whole analogy is misleading.

C. Even in the case of politically backward communities administered as "Crown Colonies" by the great European powers all experience goes to show that it pays best to surrender the attempt to use political power as a means of exacting commercial preference for the ruling state; that trade monopolies, preferential tariffs, etc., imposed upon a backward people by its European rulers only operate to the benefit of small groups of merchants and financiers and that the people as a whole of the governing European state gain nothing by this economic and political servitude of weaker peoples. This is proven historically by the case of nations that in the past resorted to this form of exploitation to the utmost. The mass of the people in Spain during the most flourishing of her imperialist period were poorer than the people of lesser states; the same is generally true of Portugal, of France when she ruled in India and America and of England

when her policy was imperialistic in this sense. To-day only a small fraction of England's immense over-seas trade is with the backward territories governed from London. The great bulk of England's trade is with foreign countries. Concessions and monopolies obtained by political power — Morocco, Bagdad, etc., represent but the tiniest fraction of the foreign trade of the great states which is mainly with one another and countries like the United States and South America. The more successful colonizing nations like England have indeed abandoned the method of treating the territories, administered by them, as a field of commercial monopolization. Experience has shown that the attempt to do so places the administered territory necessarily at a commercial disadvantage and so checks its development as finally to diminish its value as a market. Thus merchants and investors of all countries are accorded about equal privileges in territories like Egypt and India and the peoples of the European states, controlling backward territories, have every interest in making such equality of treatment a matter of agreement and treaty instead of paying the costs of wars which take from them infinitely more than the monopolies can ever possibly return them. The same order of reasons apply with even greater force to tribute exacted by military occupation in the way suggested by Belloc.

D. Modern commerce needing above all markets, two tendencies have been set up which bear fundamentally upon the relation of military power to national prosperity. The need for markets implies the steady financial and commercial development of the communities that are to constitute the markets. This

in its turn implies (*a*) the intangibility of their property and credit and (*b*) the forming of economic currents that flow irrespective of political boundaries so that the political unit — the state — ceases to coincide with the economic unit.

With reference to (*a*): If credit and commercial contract is tampered with in an attempt at military confiscation, a real economic "conquest," the commercial development essential to the creation of an expanding market is no longer possible because the basis of credit and financial confidence is shaken. This will react unfavorably upon even the investments and enterprises of the conqueror; while a country whose finances are unsound cannot be a good market.

With reference to (*b*): The competition is between individuals or competing trades not nations: "If we want to sell harvesters to Argentina, we should be glad to have Europe buy her wheat; and if Europe is to buy her wheat, Europeans must sell something in some foreign market wherewith to get the money and so become our competitors somewhere. A market is not a place where things are sold; it is a place where things are bought and sold; and the one operation is impossible without the other, a fact which makes our competitors necessary to our markets and our markets impossible without our competitors. America is no more a rival of Britain or Germany than Virginia is a rival of Missouri."

E. War indemnities have never yet shown a "profit." The only really large indemnity was that obtained from France by Germany in 1872. Yet when we consider, in addition to the cost of the war Germany's cost in preparation, the cost of meeting the armaments which France created afterwards in order

to see that "it should not happen again" — in other words all the indirect cost to Germany of the attempt to make her war against France "profitable" (the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was in part due to that attempt), this most successful of all cases of indemnity exaction is very far from showing a profit. But there are certain subsidiary considerations. The general financial dislocation, involved in the transfer of enormous sums other than in the normal course of commercial transaction, implies a very serious discount on the nominal sum exacted. In the case of the French indemnity Germany undoubtedly suffered in this way; a few years after the payment, her general financial condition was not as good as that of her enemy who had made the payment.

To exact an indemnity or tribute at all implies virtually the complete defeat of the enemy — the occupation of his territory as was the case by Germany in France in 1870. But with the increasing cost of modern war and the devastation such occupation involves, it is at least doubtful whether the credit of a country defeated, devastated, deprived of its trade and normal industry, could ever be made to yield the enormous sums expended in its conquest. (The amount of bullion that could be seized would of course be relatively trivial. Payment would have to be made through credit in some form).

F. The outstanding and unmistakable fact as against uncertain and elusive statistics is the high prosperity of the small countries as compared with that of the great. Not merely do their national stocks stand higher in the markets of the world but the standard of life of the populations of countries like Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, is higher than that of

great imperialist states like Russia, Austria, Germany and England. Yet, if prosperity came from conquered territory and colonies, and political and military power, the population of the great states should be markedly more prosperous than that of the small.

G. Caution against misconstruction of Angellism.

In the preface to "The Great Illusion" Norman Angell writes: "The argument . . . is *not* that war is impossible but that it is futile — useless, even when completely victorious, as a means of securing those moral or material ends which represent the needs of modern European peoples." The mere fact of war's futility will never of itself stop war: there must be general realization of its futility. "Men's acts are determined not by the fact but what they believe to be the fact."

III. Angell's thesis is not based upon a narrowly economic interpretation of human motive in international action. The larger part of "The Great Illusion" deals with the psychology of international conflict and the relation of politico-economic truth thereto. The ethic of his thesis is summarized as follows:

> "For one to impose his will upon the other by force implies resistance; thus two energies are cancelled and end in sterility or waste. For even when one triumphs, there are still two slaves: the vanquished slave to the victor, the victor to the need of maintaining supremacy and being ready to use force against the vanquished. This creates a form of relationship as wasteful in economics as it is disastrous in morals. It explains the failure of all those policies based on coercion or aggression — privilege and oppression within the State, conquest and the struggle for power between States. But if the two agree to combine forces in the common fight against

Nature for life and sustenance, both are liberated and they have found in that partnership the true economy: still better, they have found in it the true basis of human society and its spiritual possibilities. For there can be no union without some measure of faith in the agreement on which it is based, some notion of right. It indicates the true policy whether national or international — agreement for united action against the common enemy, whether found in Nature or in the passions and fallacies of men."

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VI

THE ARMED PEACE AND ITS FRUITS

I. The military equipment of nations. These consist of vessels, aircraft, men, guns, animals, military and naval stations, forts, barracks, arsenals, proving grounds, munition factories, uniforms, utensils, engineering outfits, telegraphic appliances, stores, etc. As statistics relating to these quickly get out of date they are not given here except for a few items. However, reference is given to annuals where up-to-date information on these matters may be found. (Besides the following, note the references at the end of this chapter).

A. Naval strength of the chief nations.

Brassey's Naval Annual [The Naval Annual]. Navy League Annual. Statesman's Year Book (under each nation). World Almanac. Hazell's Annual. The Britannica Year Book. The World's Work, Nov., 1915. Knight: Navy Year Book, 1914. Tillman: Navy Year Book, 1915.

B. Strength of land forces.

World Almanac. Statesman's Year Book. Whitaker's Almanac. Hazell's Annual. The Britannica Year Book.

C. War implements rapidly depreciate in value.

1. Every bit of progress in science and invention tends to put the existing equipment out of date.
2. Under the present system armaments must be up to date; old implements are about as good as none.
3. Keeping armaments up with improvements costs money; the more there is of inventive genius, the greater the cost.

D. Military drill, maneuvers, mobilizations, war games, etc., which are necessary to keep armed forces in readiness are also costly.

II. Cost of military establishments, of preparedness; Annual budgets for defense.

A. Navy budgets of the principal navies (see Appendix).

B. Army budgets of the leading powers (see Appendix).

C. Costs per man.

Cost of Armies per Unit of Fighting Force. (Table VI. A. W. Allen: The Drain of Armaments, published by The World Peace Foundation, 1912.)

Austria-Hungary	$ 278	per annum
France	291	" "
Germany	306	" "
Great Britain	378	" "
Italy	273	" "
Japan	209	" "
Russia	232	" "
Spain	282	" "
United States	1,314	" "

D. Military charge resting upon the individual citizen.

Total Military Charge per Unit of Population. (Table III. A. W. Allen: The Drain of Armaments, published by The World Peace Foundation, 1912.)

Austria-Hungary	$2.56	per annum
France	6.64	" "
Germany	4.81	" "
Great Britain	7.80	" "
Italy	3.57	" "
Japan	1.81	" "
Russia	2.32	" "
Spain	2.50	" "
United States	2.65	" "

E. The relation of military to other governmental expenditures.

The federal government of the United States devotes about 42% of its expenditures to army and navy. Pensions are not included in this calculation; were they, it would bring the percentage to about 70. This is another "peace-at-any-price" policy.

If all expenditures of the United States and the several states are compared with their expenditures for military purposes the latter are relatively small.

F. Is this expenditure absolutely necessary?

1. Is it all spent honestly and wisely?
2. Does it pay; does it achieve its object, and really insure a nation against attack?
3. Is there no other means of securing the peace of a nation that is more effective and less expensive? If there is, the expenditure for armament is a waste, no matter how small it is.

III. The futility of the armed peace.

A. It is to be noted that the cost of insuring peace by competitive armaments has in the last decade risen very rapidly and out of proportion to the increase in population, wealth, or prosperity. If armaments insured peace all nations should be more secure than formerly. On the contrary, no nation feels one whit more secure. Even if a nation outruns all competitors it gains no security, as fear impels other nations to make new alliances which change the balance of power. No ruler or prominent political personage can visit another country without creating endless speculation on the political significance of the event. Thus uncertainty, suspicion and fear are abroad and are subject to the exploitation of the unscrupulous.

(To appreciate the rapid increase in military expenditure, see the diagram showing new construction in the British Navy since 1882. Naval Annual, 1914, facing, p. 434.)

B. The fundamental difficulty is illustrated very well by the circumstance that German and French bills of 1913, providing for an increase of the army, each advanced the same reason for the increase, — the change in the balance of power.

IV. The "armed peace" brings a competitive race in armaments; each government strives to outdo and outwit the other by what means it can.

A. By securing more or better equipment.

On the quality of its equipment a government must take the opinion of its experts. These often differ and cannot always be trusted. (See *San Francisco Chronicle*, Feb. 3, 1914, "Experts juggle figures to reduce naval rank of the United States.")

B. By spying on its competitors.

One of the great evils of the present system is that each nation regards it as right to corrupt the citizens of other states; it tries to produce among others what at home it regards as a most heinous crime — treason. Espionage has become so important that nations have passed laws for their protection.

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C. By keeping its own affairs secret and guarding against treasonable sale of military secrets. The most conspicuous case of the many affairs of this kind was the Dreyfus affair.

V. Under the system of the "armed peace," governments are at the mercy of those who unconsciously stir up international feelings or deliberately use them for their purposes.

A. Armament makers profit by war and by war scares, which give them contracts.

They are powerful financial corporations.

The capitalists in them often own newspapers.

They also have great influence in politics and on the government.

It is estimated that one man in every six "employed" men in Great Britain depends on armament makers. (Perris: Hands Across the Sea.)

Frequently they take officers out of the army and navy into their service.

They maintain agents at the several capitals.

These agents at times engage in crooked practices. In 1912 it was disclosed that Krupp agents, apparently with the knowledge of high officials of the firm, had bribed government officials in Germany to secure military secrets.

They may and apparently do advance prices to the government when, by reason of war or threat of war, it is in a predicament.

They affiliate closely with the financial concerns through inter-locking directorates and money trusts.

Their importance in the armed competition of nations leads some to give them extraordinary rank in the body politic. Hudson Maxim calls the area about New York "the heart of America" because it contains the most of the manufactories of armaments and war materials, together with the principal coal fields of Pennsylvania.

There is evidence that the armament concerns of various nations coöperate; indeed there is a sort of international armament trust. Firms of one nation often supply war materials to foreign nations rated as unfriendly; they even have branches in these nations. "Although you cannot establish it, there is no doubt of an armor plate trust all over the world." — Secretary Daniels before the House Naval Committee, Feb. 2, 1914.

B. War scares operate to open the pocket of the taxpayer and to produce an enlargement of the military establishment.

"Have you ever noticed that about the time that the appropriations for military purposes are under consideration in the Congress, in the House of Commons, in the Chamber of Deputies, or in the Reichstag, or just before such a time, hostilities are always on the point of breaking out in two or three parts of the world at once? Just at these times war prophets begin to see visions and to dream dreams, and the poor, gullible people rush off to their cyclone cellars and shout timorously to their representatives to vote at once and as much as possible in order that great ships and guns and forts may be built to protect them from their fears." — Nicholas Murray Butler: The International Mind, p. 55.

1. The irresponsible press often creates or spreads war scares. Yellow journalism, jingo press. The tendency toward sensationalism, which is a feature of the yellow press, makes "news" of possible international friction; and paying reporters by space induce them to find sensations. These circumstances alone encourage stories of espionage, treason, sale of military secrets, new inventions which scrap all existing war appliances, night visits of aviators, etc., etc. Even though canards, such stories alarm the public, and newspapers often enough take no pains to correct them.
2. Not all war scares are the result of misinformation or of innocent blundering. News is a commodity which, like food, can be contaminated if it pays. We need pure news laws as well as pure food laws. Some newspapers are believed to be printing matter designed to cause the United States to intervene in Mexico. There are several papers in the United States which seem to have a policy to keep relations with Japan disturbed. The Turtle Bay Story; The Magdalena Bay Story. The Liebknecht disclosures in 1913 showed that the Krupp concern tried to use newspapers in France as well as in Germany to stir up national anxiety about armaments.
3. Incendiary speeches, books, plays, "jingoism," "chauvinism," war-criers.

   Their sincerity need not be doubted; but it is possible that they do more harm than good because their country-men, — who know them — regard them as alarmists and ignore them; whereas the foreigners against whom they warn, — who do not know them — consider them as spokesmen of their fellows,

and in turn take alarm; thus they give foreign nations a ground for suspicion, which tends to ripen into open hostility and finally war.

The Battle of Dorking (1875) describing imagined invasion of England by Germany.

"The Englishman's Home," a play with the same theme.

"The Typhoon" a play turning on a Japanese invasion of the United States.

"America Fallen" by J. Bernard Walker; describing imagined invasion of the United States.

"Germany in Arms" supposed to be the work of the Crown Prince.

Hobson and the Japanese Peril.

VI. Defense becomes a political issue. Since 1906 the Tories have tried to oust the Liberals by attacking the state of preparedness; and the government has protected itself by ever-increasing military budgets. Much the same situation now exists in the United States.

Each party tries to outbid the other; the foreign nation which is pronounced the foe — for one is necessary in these political machinations — is carelessly insulted and thoroughly roused by political panic-mongers; the munition makers in both countries secure orders; the people pay the bills of preparation for war — and also of the war which these tactics sooner or later produce, and which is then declared inevitable. What of the patriotism of those who seek power by such methods?

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VII

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

I. Destruction of property.

A. Formerly an essential part of war: war must support war.

B. The tendency of treaties has been to make property immune from warfare as far as possible.

II. Disturbance of economic conditions. War is pathological, as it produces an abnormal economic condition.

Preparation for war in time of peace has tended to make the disturbance at the outbreak of war less violent. Advance information about war. (See article by Childe in *Harper's Weekly*, December, 1911.)

A. Credit.

1. An enormous number of businesses depend on credit; that is, they are run on borrowed capital.

2. Credit, or the ability to borrow money, depends on the risk and probable profit of the investment; that is on:

a. The character of the borrower, his ability, thrift, health, honesty, reputation, friends, etc. His nationality does not matter much, if at all.

b. The character of his enterprise and the probability of its success. This in turn depends on general business conditions and is subject to violent alteration by external causes.

3. Banks.

a. Facilitate investment.

By investigating the reliability of prospective borrowers.

By accumulating capital in the form of deposits.
By lending capital; or discounting notes in advance.

b. They are thus a sort of sensory system in the financial world, since the invention of rapid communication responding almost instantly to any condition which affects credit.

c. For their protection and to meet sudden demands of their depositors, they must keep a reserve of cash on hand; this reserve is, of course, far from equal to deposits. Hence a bank is not in a position to meet all its obligations at once and accordingly does not want abnormal conditions or panics.

B. Effect of war on business.

1. Dislocates business by altering the demand for goods.
2. Increases the risk, hence injures credit in all enterprises, either directly or indirectly, because business is sympathetic and, broadly speaking, prospers or suffers as a unit.

a. Business is uncertain, demand is reduced or altered, sales doubtful, as everyone holds back as far as possible.

b. Prices fluctuate; some rise, some fall. (See Chapter IX).

c. Freight rates are likely to alter.
Requisition of railroads and ships for war purposes.
In Balkan War, 1912, freight rates rose on an average from $2.27 to $3.44 per ton, that is $1.17. (World Peace Foundation Bulletin.)

d. Insurance rates are likely to rise.
Danger of loss in shipments of various kinds through delay or seizure.

e. Wages affected.
Men called to colors.
Laborers may take advantage of situation to secure higher wages.

f. Securities and stocks decline in value.

g. Men often cannot meet their financial obligations and *moratoria* are declared.

3. Interest rates rise, that is, investors hesitate to lend at the old figure because the risks are greater.

4. Discount rates rise because the probability of fluctuation has increased and banks must be protected against the greater risk.

5. Cash, especially gold, is at a premium because everybody wants something stable.

a. Withdrawal of deposits from banks, perhaps causing runs on banks. Banks may need to suspend specie payment.

b. Collecting outstanding loans as soon as possible and refusing to renew except at the increased rate of interest.

c. Hoarding cash, preferably gold; that is, withdrawing it from circulation and also reducing the amount of capital available for investment; thus aggravating the rise in the rate of interest.

d. Securities are sold to secure cash.
They generally sell at depreciated value at the outbreak of war.
This liquidation may assume such proportions as to require stemming. Closing of all stock exchanges, August, 1914.
The sale of securities operates peculiarly to the injury of the man who, to secure cash, has to

sell; and benefits the man who has available capital for investment. The rich grow richer, the others poorer.

6. All business enterprises must be more cautious.
   Those which are near the limit of their resources (as is likely to be the case with any new venture or with one that has undertaken to expand) are in danger of failure; hence bankruptcies.
   Business concerns to avoid reducing profits resort to one of the first means at hand to cut down expenses, namely, discharging employees.
7. Unemployment, with all its consequences. (See Chapter IX.)
8. In the course of the war, business readjusts itself to new conditions and confidence returns.
   It is always apprehensive because it is subject to severe disturbance by the events of war; and, because being a wartime, hence abnormal business, it has always to guard against the effect of peace. The return of peace may be as disastrous as was the advent of war.

III. Effect of wars on public finance.

A. The cost of wars.

1. The cost of wars in the past (Mass. Commission on the Cost of Living: The Waste of Militarism, p. 7). See Table, p. 62.
2. The cost of the Balkan Wars $1,264,000,000.
3. The cost of the European War. (Statements of Asquith and Ribot, Sept., 1915.)

France (June, 1915)	$ 8,700,000 per day
Great Britain (Sept., 1915)	17,500,000 " "
Russia (Sept., 1915)	12,000,000 " "
Germany (Sept., 1915)	16,670,000 " "

THE COST OF WARS

Dates	Countries Engaged	Cost
1793–1815	England and France	$ 6,250,000,000
1812–1815	France and Russia	450,625,000
1828	Russia and Turkey	100,000,000
1830–1840	Spain and Portugal (civil war)	250,000,000
1830–1847	France and Algeria	190,000,000
1848	Revolts in Europe	50,000,000
1845	United States and Mexico	
1854–1856	England	371,000,000
	France	332,000,000
	Sardinia and Turkey	128,000,000
	Austria	68,600,000
	Russia	800,000,000
1859	France	75,000,000
	Austria	127,000,000
	Italy	51,000,000
1861–1865	The rebellion	5,000,000,000
1864	Denmark, Prussia, and Austria	36,000,000
1866	Prussia and Austria	330,000,000
1864–1870	Brazil, Argentine, and Paraguay	240,000,000
1865–1866	France and Mexico	65,000,000
1870–1871	Germany	954,400,006
	France	1,580,000,000
1876–1877	Russia	806,547,489
	Turkey	403,273,745
1898	Spain and the United States	1,165,000,000
1900–1901	Transvaal Republic and England	1,000,100,000
1904–1905	Russia and Japan	2,500,000,000
Expense of wars, 1793–1860		$ 9,243,225,000
Expense of wars, 1861–1910		14,080,321,240
Total		$23,323,546,240

B. Credit of a belligerent government is injured.

1. Bonds and paper money fall in value.

   For illustration of the effect of former wars on government paper see the Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris, 1909, pp. 314–349.

2. This process is aggravated by the tendency to hoard specie. To protect itself a government may be compelled to suspend specie payment. Great Britain suspended specie payment in 1797; the United States in 1862; France in 1870.

C. To finance a war, governments:

1. Increase taxation.

   a. Direct taxes, poll taxes, personal taxes, income and property taxes, etc. Well illustrated by the British Budget proposals of Sept. 21, 1915.

   b. Indirect taxes (tariffs, excises, stamp duties, etc.). To maintain a supply of coin some governments require import duties to be paid in coin, often in gold.

2. Borrow money. War loans. (See Chapter VIII.) Governments issue bonds, which must be of a character to induce investors to buy. Investors want:

   a. A high rate of interest, preferably payable in gold. The greater the difficulty of a government, the higher the rate of interest it must pay.

   b. A discount. Anglo-French bonds of 1915 sold at 97·5.

   c. Exemption from taxes or assessments; as otherwise the yield of bonds may be eaten up by taxes, as was the case with British South-African war bonds.

   d. Suitable terms of conversion or redemption.

   e. Financial houses require a commission for floating the bonds.

It will be observed that in its plight a government must make loans that are advantageous to investors (hence disadvantageous to it); for profit, and not patriotism alone, persuades men to buy.

Loans of this kind mean debt, a mere deferring, not an evasion, of paying for the war; in other words, what cannot be secured by taxes now is passed on to the taxpayer of the future.

If the bonds are well distributed among the people of the borrowing nation, then the repayment of the loan consists in collecting taxes from the people to repay the people. This process, though undesirable, does not reduce the total wealth. But if a portion of the people hold the bonds, then repayment consists in taxing all to repay this portion; a condition which invites non-bondholders to seek to evade taxes and impose them on bondholders; a form of confiscation.

The belligerents in Europe have tried to secure general participation of their people in war loans, even to the extent of having banks advance money to individuals to be used in buying bonds, the government guaranteeing the banks against loss. In this way it is hoped to make everyone, if possible, a sharer in the financial burden, instead of having it rest on a fraction of the people.

3. Issue fiat money (non-interest bearing paper money).

This becomes increasingly necessary when a government's credit sinks, as it does in consequence of large loans, failure of its arms, or other misfortunes.

Fiat money must be made a legal tender otherwise it would not be accepted at all.

The government must agree to redeem it, otherwise it would depreciate.

Not redeemable too soon, or the government cannot meet its obligations.

Not redeemable too late, or the paper will depreciate.

Fiat money depreciates with the misfortune of a government; it is worth only what the government is.

Depreciation in Civil War, Dewey, p. 293.

IV. After-effects of the war.

A. Peace brings a reversal of war conditions and a readjustment, similar to that at the outbreak of war, occurs.

1. The demand for war goods suddenly stops; business hastens to take advantage of the new demand for the usual commodities; there is danger of booms, all the more because, confidence being restored, hoarded money returns to circulation and capital is easy to get.

2. The disbandment of armies suddenly increases the numbers engaged in the various branches of business and tends to create uncertainty.

B. The rehabilitation of the military equipment costs the government much, but it also gives employment and tends to steady conditions.

C. Pensions, a drain on the public exchequer, whether the beneficiaries were trained or not before the war.

D. Indemnities, if there are any, complicate the economic situation. (See Chapter V.)

E. Transfers of territory and their effect on victor and vanquished. (See Chapter V.)

F. The Public Debt. (See Chapter VIII.)

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VIII

PUBLIC DEBTS

I. In modern times, wars and the competitive armaments during peace have, along with increasing taxation, forced governments to borrow money and get into debt. Only a part of the present public debt is for military purposes but it is now the larger part in the debt of most of the great powers. It should be noted that, if there had been a system of relationship between states that made competition in arms unnecessary, nations could have met all civil expenses and would need to have no debt.

II. The history of public debts.

A. Public debts were small until the end of the eighteenth century. There are several reasons for this:

1. The absolute monarchs of earlier times were able to levy practically unrestricted taxes on their subjects of the lower classes.
2. Monarchs could repudiate debts and accordingly their credit was not considered good by men with means, who therefore lent no more than they were forced to.
3. The nations were still relatively isolated and the rivalry between them was less insistent than today.
4. The activities of governments were less complex and expensive.

B. Constitutional government, which has developed since 1789, made borrowing possible, as the people became the guarantors.

Popular governments have not, except in a few cases to be noted, repudiated their debts partly because so far there has been no need; but also because it is not advisable or probable that a people will repudiate a debt of which it is itself the holder.

C. Wars have increased public debts for both victor and vanquished.

1. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars created the first great national debts, particularly the British debt. The debt of France even declined during Napoleon's earlier wars because he levied tribute on conquered nations and thus made them pay the cost of his wars and help to retire the French debt.
2. The American Civil War increased the debt of the United States from about sixty-five millions to over two and one-half billion dollars. (See plate on page 74.)
3. The Franco-Prussian war increased the debt of France by a billion dollars.
4. The present war (1915) has increased the debts of the belligerents on an unparalleled scale.

How the expense of the war has increased the national indebtedness of the countries involved is shown in the following diagram. The white part of the line gives the amount of the debt per head before the war. The black part of the line gives its increase per head according to the latest published figures. If the war last through a second year the burden

of the financial obligations of the belligerent governments will become almost unbearable. It must be remembered, however, that a diagram showing the financial ability of the various nations would look much like the following diagram of their indebtedness. Great Britain and France have the greatest wealth per capita of any people, while Italians and Russians are comparatively poor. Germany would come in the order of wealth above Austria.

THE BURDEN OF THE WAR DEBT


FRANCE. BEFORE $186; NOW $276
GREAT BRITAIN. BEFORE $77; NOW $233
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. BEFORE $73; NOW $108
ITALY. BEFORE $60; NOW $91
GERMANY. BEFORE $17; NOW $68
RUSSIA. BEFORE $25; NOW $46

(By permission of *The Independent*. Printed Sept. 29, 1915.)

D. Since 1870 the "armed peace," the race in armaments, has caused a rising debt in all military nations.

The United States adopted the policy about 1890, with like result.

E. Plates illustrating the history of debt.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN



Source: The Statesman's Year Book, 1895 and 1914; British Parliamentary Papers, 1909, Vol. L. Cd. 4657.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF FRANCE



Source: The Statistical Abstract of Great Britain, 1908, p. 323; The Statesman's Year Book, 1914.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF GERMANY



I. The Imperial debt. Source: Statistical Abstract of Great Britain, 1908, p. 319; The Statesman's Year Book, 1914.

II. The Debt of the German States. Source: Pfitzner-Entwickelung der kommunalen Schulden in Deutschland, p. 36.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF FRANCE

Source: The Statistical Abstract of Great Britain, 1908, p. 323; The Statesman's Year Book, 1914.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF GERMANY



I. The Imperial debt. Source: Statistical Abstract of Great Britain, 1908, p. 319; The Statesman's Year Book, 1914.
II. The Debt of the German States. Source: Pfitzner-Entwickelung der kommunalen Schulden in Deutschland, p. 36.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES

(Net debt after deducting cash in the Treasury)



Figures for the years 1791–1859 derived from Annual Treasurer's Report for 1893, page xcvi.

Figures for the years 1860–1894 from Annual Treasurer's Reports. Tables on "Analysis of the Public Debt."

Figures for the years 1895–1912 from Monthly Treasurer's Reports.

III. The evils of public debts.

A. Ethical objection. A debt is a burden on the future Has the present the right to obligate the future?

1. Some answer affirmatively on the ground that a war is for the benefit of future generations as well as the present, indeed that it may be like a good investment, the profits of which accrue to posterity (for instance, England's wars against Napoleon); that, therefore, a loan is a fair means of distributing the costs to all beneficiaries. They contend that it is like a commercial loan of a corporation, which with borrowed capital builds for the future; and the future approves of the process.

2. Others reply negatively on the ground that it is not right to load a new generation with debt without

its consent. They hold that the analogy between state and corporation is not accurate because the corporation borrows for a "going" concern, one which produces wealth; whereas a state is not in a profit-making business — is in fact largely excluded from profit-making, which is reserved to private enterprise — and in going to war actually destroys wealth; hence a corporation can repay a loan out of its profits: whereas a state, not being in business, has no profits and must resort to taxation. If it be contended that this taxation falls on corporations and persons who ought to pay, because the successful issue of the war increased their business and profits, it is replied that business as a whole is not national and the victory of the nation does not mean the success of business within its bounds; and *per contra*, that even in defeat business as such often continues unscathed. (See Chapter V.)

3. The assumption that war is of advantage to the business of a nation probably results from the fact that "big business" by its influence over the government has secured, or hopes to secure, favorable legislation in the form of tariffs, foreign loans and concessions, etc., all of which would suffer through a defeat in war. War then is chiefly in the interest of "big business." Are national war debts justifiable under such circumstances?

B. Practical objections.

1. The power which debt gives to a government's creditors may be injurious, if the loan is concentrated in unscrupulous hands. Popular governments are too likely to be run by men of financial power as it is, and if they are, monarchy and aris-

tocracy have merely yielded to plutocracy. Hence a wide dispersion of bonds among the citizens of the state is desirable. But if people can buy bonds, why should they not be taxed in the first instance? The fact is that people cannot be taxed and the average man has no money to invest in bonds, which therefore must be taken by men with means. Thus present wealth takes a lien on the taxation of the future.

The power of foreign creditors, particularly of the creditors of lesser states, is backed by the military force of their nations: Egypt, Persia, Turkey, China and various states in Africa and South America.

2. There is no adequate check on this process, as borrowing on a future which need not be consulted, and doing so in the name of patriotism, national existence and expansion knows no limit unless it be national bankruptcy, some form of repudiation or excessive taxation.

3. Preparedness for war, which is based on borrowed money, is a bad investment and cannot claim to be sound insurance for peace; for the war prepared against is no more to be feared than the effects of a repudiation or of a revolution on the part of those who refuse to pay the taxes.

IV. The ultimate result of debts.

A. Few nations have done anything substantial in the way of paying off public debts.

There is a partial justification for this in the fact that government bonds are among the most stable securities and, hence, they serve to steady markets by furnishing a relatively secure investment. For this reason the amount of government bonds may properly increase with the volume of business.

B. Public debts have recently risen more rapidly than public wealth, or the volume of business, indeed on a scale unrelated to general economic conditions.

C. How can this process continue indefinitely? What are the alternatives?

1. Bankruptcy. This is not probable.
2. Repudiation of the debt.
   - *a.* No nation of first rank has done this in more than a hundred years.

     The Confederate States were compelled to repudiate their obligations at the close of the Civil War, hence they escaped paying a large part of the cost of that war.

     Certain South American states have repudiated debts within the nineteenth century.
   - *b.* It is not advisable, as many of the people are themselves bondholders. (See II *B*, above.)
   - *c.* It is conceivable that if the bondholders are one class of society, other classes through their majority in legislative bodies may evade taxation and levy it on the bondholders in the form of income taxes or the like. This would in effect be a repudiation except for the fact that these additional taxes can be passed to the ultimate consumer in the form of increased cost of living.
   - *d.* Increase of taxes on income from bonds is a form of repudiation.
   - *e.* Fiat money by depreciating values increases prices. Hence a government by issuing excessive amounts of fiat money really reduces the purchasing power of the interest it pays its bondholders and thus there is the equivalent of the government shifting a part of its burden to the bondholders.

f. After a war, nations reduce the burden of their obligations by refunding their debts at lower rates of interest as quickly as possible. To facilitate this they often reserve the right of retiring bonds at any time.

3. Increased taxation.

The economic and sociological effects of higher taxation cause social unrest (see Chapter IX) and tend to create opposition, even revolution of the masses upon whom the burden of taxes ultimately falls.

4. Limitation of expenditure or restricting borrowing to certain kinds of enterprises.

Debts contracted for "going" enterprises, those which make a profit, will have no evil consequences in the future; hence states may safely contract such debts.

Debts for destructive purposes, war and preparation for it, give no convincing profit to the future and may have evil consequences. Expenditures of this kind should be borne by those who believe they benefit by them, the contemporaries.

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IX

WAR AND SOCIOLOGY

I. Economic evils which affect social conditions.

A. Effect of competitive armament. (See Chapter VI.)

1. Taxes increased.

2. The cost of living increases, high prices resulting from scarcity of gold, depreciation of securities and paper of all sorts, cornering or storing commodities for high prices, etc. A commission of the Massachusetts legislature in 1910 made an investigation of the cost of living and declared its conviction that militarism is a most far-reaching influence increasing and perpetuating high prices. (An extract "The Waste of Militarism" printed by the World Peace Foundation, 1912.)

a. The reduced purchasing power of money since 1895 is shown in a report of the United States Bureau of Labor.

1895	purchasing	power	$1.00
1905	"	"	.83
1912	"	"	63

b. INDEX NUMBERS OF CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF FOOD PRICES SINCE THE YEAR 1900 IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND BRITISH DOMINIONS OVERSEA

(1900 = 100)

COUNTRY	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906
United Kingdom...	100	100	101	103	102	103	102
Foreign Countries:							
Austria-Hungary:							
(*a*) Austria ...	100	100	99	101	105	108	113
(*b*) Hungary..	100	101	102	103	111	122	118
Belgium.....	100	101	102	113	109	110	112
France.....	100	100	95	98	99	97	95
Germany.....	100	103	106	105	105	114	118
Holland.....	100	100	100	102	103	102	103
Italy.....	100	100	99	99	97	99	99
Norway.....	—	100	99	99	97	100	103
Russia.....	100	104	107	102	104	112	116
United States...	100	105	111	111	113	113	117
Japan.....	100	97	100	108	120	132	127
British Dominions:							
Canada.....	100	104	109	106	109	111	115
Australia.....	—	100	109	105	95	101	101
New Zealand....	100	101	109	109	102	107	107

(Table continued on p. 83.)

COUNTRY	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
United Kingdom...	105	108	108	109	109	115
Foreign Countries:						
Austria-Hungary:						
(*a*) Austria....	113	118	120	126	128	135
(*b*) Hungary..	122	128	131	129	137	—
Belgium.....	115	116	120	122	128	132
France.....	100	102	100	104	117	115
Germany.....	116	116	124	127	128	130 [1]
Holland.....	105	107	109	115	117	123
Italy.....	101	105	112	114	118	120
Norway.....	108	109	106	108	111	119
Russia.....	130	130	127	116	121	—
United States...	122	126	133	140	139	—
Japan.....	134	136	132	132	138	—
British Dominions:						
Canada.....	128	129	133	135	136	151
Australia.....	98	106	104	103	103	116
New Zealand....	112	117	108	110	116	—

(From Report of Board of Trade of Great Britain, 1913: *London Weekly Times*, August 15, 1913.)

c. Cost of clothing, boots and shoes advanced in Great Britain from 5 to 15 per cent since 1895.

d. Rents advanced slightly.

e. In Great Britain average prices have since 1895 advanced in various districts from 9 to 12 per cent.

3. Wages did not advance at the same rate.

a. Advance in wages 1905 to 1912 in Great Britain.

Building trades..... 1.9 %
Laborers..... 2.6 "

[1] Baden only: figures for the remaining States not yet being available for this year.

Engineering trade:
Skilled men..... 5.5 %
Laborers..... 3.9 "
Printing trade:
Compositors..... 4.1 "

(*London Weekly Times*, August 15, 1913.)

b. The relation of prices and wages during the Civil War. (Dewey: Financial History, 294.)

Year	Prices	Money Wages
1860.....	100.0	100.0
1861.....	100.6	100.8
1862.....	117.8	102.9
1863.....	148.6	110.5
1864.....	190.5	125.6
1865.....	216.8	143.1

4. Salaries advance even more slowly because salaried men do not, like laborers, have organizations to force an increase.
5. Unemployment — Firms to weather a period of stress discharge men. The man at the bottom eventually bears the cost.

B. Effect of War. (See Chapter VII.)
1. All the above evils are aggravated.
2. The economic disorder accompanying the advent of war forces men and businesses with a small margin of working capital to the wall, or to continue their business at a disadvantage. (See Chapter VII, Section II, B.)

II. Sociological consequences of war.
A. Evil consequences.
1. Unemployment, poverty, distress.

2. Widowed, orphaned and wounded become dependents.
3. Social disturbances and unrest and, after the war, strikes for better conditions.
4. Increase of crime, disease and the death-rate.
   a. Crime is fostered by the lawless ideals of war and by the increased chance war gives to the criminal class to ply their trade.
   b. Diseases are more common at home during war than in peace (see Chapter X) and this is important sociologically if not biologically.
5. All social work suffers or is neglected for lack of funds, workers or time. Schools and education are most seriously injured. The social processes whereby society in time of peace endeavors to improve itself are suspended and leave a heritage of things undone to posterity.
6. War reduces respect for ordinary law and morality, for force has precedence. "Inter arma leges silent." What is the effect on the individual, and is it wholesome for society?
   a. War babies — and their future.
   b. Cessation of ethical relations with the foe.
   National hatreds: "The Song of Hate"; rejection of all things related to the foe, and the resultant evils.

B. Compensating benefits.

1. Self-sacrifice — dying for a cause. Patriotism.
2. Reducing petty national friction and substituting unity of action.
3. Developing courage, action, heroism, and the full exercise of personal talents.
4. Victory — perhaps.

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X

WAR AND BIOLOGY

I. The principles of evolution.

A. Heredity means the law of continuity among organisms, which tend to reproduce after their own kind: "like the seed is the harvest."

B. Variation: organisms though tending to similarity are never quite alike.

C. Law of natural selection: nature selects among these variations and preserves the adaptable: the survival of the fittest. This phrase means those most fit to meet natural conditions, those of nature.

D. These laws apply to human beings as to lower animals.

II. Artificial or unnatural selection.

A. Any process by which the normal workings of nature are altered produces artificial selection, and an altered product.

1. This has been conspicuously shown by the experiments of Luther Burbank.

2. Eugenics rests on the principle of selection for purposes of reproduction, the underlying idea being to select and perpetuate the best, and thus improving the race.

B. Reversed selection: when this process of artificial selection goes to the point of selecting the fit for destruction and preserving the others for perpetuation we have reversed selection: the survival of the unfit.

III. War, it is claimed, causes reversed selection in physical qualities.

A. War and compulsory service select physically fit men

for armies and reject the physically unfit at the age of greatest reproductive power.

B. These are, even in peace, exposed to greater danger of diseases — especially the venereal.

C. In war the men in armies are killed or rendered unfit by artificial implements which make no distinction as to the fitness of their victims and they suffer heavier mortality from disease than those who stay at home.

1. Artificial causes: Death from gunshot and other injuries in battle.

a. A rough estimate (based on Bodart and Myrdacz, mentioned in the references) indicates that in wars before that of 1914 losses were about as follows:

Average number of men killed outright in land engagements 2.2% – 2.5%.

Average number wounded, 8% – 10%.

(Ratio of killed to wounded, 1:4.)

Average number fatally wounded, 10%.

Average number of whole force dying from wounds, about 1%. (Attention to military hygiene has diminished this number considerably.)

b. Indications are that this percentage is too low for the present war, as the change in the character of fighting changes all calculations.

c. The loss in a *given* battle is different from the loss during the whole war.

In the Russo-Japanese War (1905) Japan's losses from action in battle were 8.83% of the whole army. (Seaman, 104.)

d. Johnston (Arms and the Race, 26) states that the less destructive the weapons used in war the greater the loss of life; and that the deaths from

artificial causes have decreased since 1850 from 8% to $\frac{1}{8}$ of 1%.

DEATHS IN THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES IN FOUR RECENT WARS.



Note the diminishing importance of illness as a factor in the death rate of the armies. The present war should show a further advance in this particular.

(By permission of *The Independent*. Printed April, 19, 1915.)

2. Natural causes: disease. Deaths from disease depend on sanitary conditions.
   a. In the Crimean War the rate was as high as 16% in the armies of the Allies; four men died of sickness to every one from injury.
   b. In the Franco-Prussian War deaths in the German army from disease (not counting wounds) was 1.8% of the whole force.
   c. In the Russo-Japanese War the loss of the Japanese from disease was 2% — about one-fourth the loss in engagements. (Seaman: 104.)

D. It is very important for what follows to note that the tendency is for deaths by artificial causes to increase and deaths by natural causes to decrease as sanitation and military hygiene improve.

E. The men left behind become the fathers of the next generation and perpetuate their own inferior qualities.

F. The evil effects of war extend to the civil population, increasing disease and the death-rate. (Dumas — see references.)

IV. It is also claimed by some that war institutes a reversed selection and a deterioration of moral qualities. (Jordan, Seeck.)

A. The courageous, daring, adventurous and those animated with the highest love of the cause at stake are the first to enlist: cowards and those with lower ideals remain behind.

B. Those who join the army die in greater proportion than those who remain at home, because:

1. They die in battle.
2. Their very qualities of courage make them take exceptional risks.
3. They are more likely to die from disease than those who do not enlist. This is true even in times of peace: it is asserted that venereal diseases are more prevalent in armies than in the civil population.

C. The stay-at-homes, the cowards, the deserters, the inert, the ambitionless, become the fathers of the next generation.

V. These contentions are by no means generally accepted.

A. Many prominent scientists and others have inclined to accept the contentions: Spencer, Jordan, Galton, Ammon, Richet, Schallmayer, Kellogg, Villerme, Novicow, Legoyt, La Pouge, Heckel, Seeck.

1. Circumstances tending to confirm these contentions. (Kellogg, Bionomics of War, pp. 46–49.)

a. There seems good evidence that the average stature of the next generation of French people was

lowered by the drain of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on men of more than average stature. (La Population Française, 1889–1892, III, 524–533.)

b. Infirmity seems to have been greatly increased in the new generation in France.

B. Difficulties and objections.

1. The physical effects of war on the race must be sharply distinguished from the moral effects.
2. Certainly men have never been selected for armies on the ground of their moral or spiritual qualities.
3. Granting that the law of survival holds for human beings as for the lower animals, it does not at all follow that war has reversed selection.

   Until modern times there was no real selection for military service on the ground of physical fitness; men volunteered. A few qualities such as stature, age, eyesight, alone were taken into account, and these are not of themselves evidences of biological fitness. Many an injured soldier returns from the war still *biologically* fit.
4. Even now there is no adequate criterion of biological fitness.
5. Society tends to root out the unfit at home.
   a. Cowards and deserters cannot be a dangerous factor as public opinion ostracises them.
   b. Women prefer soldiers to the feeble stay-at-homes and this counteracts the danger of perpetuation from inferior stock.
6. The energy, effort and confidence engendered by war offset its injuries, *e. g.*, Dutch after the Spanish Wars.
7. As a nation, under pressure for men, abandons care-

ful selection of recruits, the danger of biological harm lessens.

VI. The danger of injury to the race is increasing with:

A. The adoption of compulsory service instead of volunteering.

B. More scientific and rigid examinations of recruits, and rejection of the unfit.

C. Increase of deaths in war by artificial selection as machinery improves, as compared with deaths from disease as medical science and sanitation improve.

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XI

WAR AND THE STATE: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF WAR AND MILITARISM

I. War always tends to produce centralization of power and a corresponding reduction of personal liberty and hence is undemocratic in its influence.

A. This condition is inherent in the military conception.

1. Obedience in armies and navies must be absolute.

Secretary Daniels has been greatly blamed for his efforts to "democratize" the navy on the ground that he will merely demoralize it; as Pelletan is said to have done in the French navy a few years ago. (*N. Y. Sun*, Feb. 14, 1915; *Army and Navy Journal*, Jan. 16, 1915, p. 616, *et passim;* and many others.)

2. It is apparent in the bullying and abusive tone which militarists and military journals so frequently adopt when it comes to difference of opinion: they would suppress, if need be violently crush, the contrary-minded instead of mending the weaknesses of their own positions. It is the theory of force.

B. A military class is an inevitable concomitant of an army and navy.

1. Men who enter the military profession have just as much of an instinct and as much of a right as others to struggle for their own advancement and the welfare of wife and children. They naturally seek to enlarge their profession and its opportunities in every possible way; that is, they seek to enlarge their class and its position in the community.

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2. The military class is largely drawn from the "upper classes" and its sympathies and affiliations are with the aristocrats rather than the people. How closely the officers of the British army were identified with the Tories appeared when the Ulster Question came to a crisis, and officers resigned rather than obey the government.
3. A large military class, animated by the undemocratic spirit noted above, becomes a menace to the civil population (*e. g.*, the Zabern incident), to the democratic institutions of the state and to the peace of the world.

Armies have quite as often been the agents of tyrants as the protectors of freedom.

C. The military class, believing in force as a means of settling questions, naturally is impatient at delay or pacific settlement.

It is military men and nations that have opposed arbitration.

The militarists have shown the greatest impatience at Wilson's Mexican policy of "watchful waiting."

D. The military class naturally wants to resort to arms for other than the above reasons.

1. It is human nature to want to see how well one can do what he is training to do; and how well guns and other equipment work.
2. War is relief from the ennui of ever waiting to act; which is all the more welcome because those in the service usually are considered "men of action."
3. War furnishes the chance for distinction and advancement.

II. Democracy *versus* National Efficiency.

A. Democracy means liberty of thought and of person:

this means diversity in society, disagreement, lack of unity, etc.

B. National efficiency means common purpose, which means unity, therefore restriction of personal liberty, and thus a strong central government.

C. The question is whether a people can set up a strong central government under its own control, or whether it must abandon democracy to secure efficiency. Competitive nationalism favors absolutism.

III. The centralizing action of war on a free state appears in many ways.

A. Martial law is proclaimed and constitutional guarantees of personal liberties are thereby suspended.

B. The press and public speech are put under censorship. This is an anomaly in a popular government, for how can people vote intelligently unless they know what is transpiring?

C. Thus elections become useless and are abandoned. The British General Elections, which should have come in January, 1916, were omitted and Parliament prolonged its own life.

D. This coalition government acquires autocratic powers, and the legislative body, though it has the power, is not likely to exercise restraint inasmuch as the cabinet consists of the leaders of all parties.

E. The centralized government:

1. Conducts the military operations without consulting the people; it could not if it would.
2. Lays down minute restrictions for individuals.
3. Conceals news or issues false reports to keep the sympathy of the people.

F. Conscription, mobilization of labor and resources make individuals, like materials, handled by the government. Men are forced to fight no matter whether

they believe the cause to be just or not; their liberty of conscience is denied. A few exceptions.

IV. Compulsory or Universal Service.

A. This is the rule in most European countries and Japan, and also in Australia and New Zealand. In the latter it was adopted in 1909 largely as a result of the agitation of the National Defense League. It was opposed by the New Zealand Freedom League; in Australia by the Australian Freedom League.

B. The volunteer system was, until the Great War, adhered to in Great Britain and the United States.

In Great Britain, the National Service League has advocated compulsory service. Lord Roberts and others approved it.

In the United States, a demand for compulsory service is appearing.

C. Compulsory service has political dangers.

1. It means that all persons within the age of compulsory service are subject to martial instead of civil law. Thus the government may use martial law to achieve things it could not do under civil law.

a. Briand in France suppressed a strike of railway employees for better conditions, by calling them to the colors, that is, invoking military law.

b. The British laboring men oppose conscription because they fear that military law, once they are subject to it, will be used by the upper classes, who dominate the army and often the government, to defeat popular demands for reforms.

2. The essential point, as far as democracy is concerned, is whether those in authority favor the people.

V. The political dangers from centralization through war.

A. Formerly it was to be feared that some army idol would use his influence to become ruler, as did the French

Terrorists and Napoleon. There are abundant instances of this in the past. It is no longer a real danger in well-established republics. The attempt of Boulanger to use his military prestige for anti-government purposes, is the last conspicuous instance of the kind.

B. It is to be feared that any war will increase militarism in a country. The disbanding of the United States army in 1865 was regarded with concern and its success was considered a real achievement. Despite the violent criticism of Prussian militarism there is a wide-spread disposition to imitate the Prussian military system, the proposal being to have the latter without the former. Some question whether this is possible.

C. War stops reforms which are working through normal political channels. Some hold that governments hard pressed by movements, such as Socialism, syndicalism, labor legislation, welcome war as a means of escape.

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XII

NATIONALISM AND MORALS

I. National righteousness. A common charge against pacifism is that it favors unrighteousness by failing to resist it. This is called the "peace of unrighteousness." The counterpart is that a war is justified when it is for righteousness. This is true. But what is righteousness, and who determines it?

A. Each nation always considers its cause absolutely just, and never concedes that it can err. Hence it approves in its own case precisely what it condemns in other nations: *e. g.*, the United States went to war with Spain to suppress atrocities in Cuba, yet within two years it was justifying American atrocities in the Philippines upon the people just "rescued" from Spain (Angell: America and the New World-State, pp. 148–185). The views of the Allies and of the Central powers on the violation of Belgian, Chinese and Greek neutrality by their respective opponents illustrates the point. Americans condemn the violation of Belgian neutrality and approve the seizure of Panama on the basis of what seems righteous to them in each case.

B. What is to be regarded as righteousness and a worthy national cause is too often decided by rulers, whether monarchial or elective, and not by the people. The people, and even their representatives, have little chance to know of the preliminaries leading to a war. This is regarded as a private affair of a government

and even in England a common reply to questions in Parliament is "it would not be to the public interest to give the information." The alleged popular clamor for war cannot be more than an unreasoning reaction (the result of education) to such information as authorities, who are concerned about justifying their own course, give out. It is notorious that diplomatic documents are not open to the public or to students for a half century or so after an event. Wars in their inception are virtually the private business of diplomats and are eventually approved by the emotionalism of an uninformed populace; and the official censorship sees to it that independent thinkers and sentiment for ending the war secure no hearing. Nationalism has become a power, like the religions of old, through which the authorities may exploit the people. Emancipation from this modern tyranny is needed — Democracy should begin at home.

II. Wealth and influence have the ear of ministries and the latter are in effect executive committees of the former. Thus the alleged righteousness of a nation in any given case is probably the interest of the dominant group behind the government presented for popular consumption in the usual pious phrases about national honor or destiny, the cause of civilization and humanity, etc., etc.

III. The mischievous self-made standard of righteousness ignores the existence of other nations. The result is international anarchy. Both nations cannot always be right. Why should we assume that any one nation is always right when in civil society we insist that the individual's conception of right must yield before the general conception? Is not the national conception of righteousness just as arbitrary, and hence im-

practicable, as the discarded individual righteousness was found to be? Why should a group of individuals be justified in doing what it punishes one of its number for doing?

IV. The conception of national righteousness subjects religion and personal conscience to enterprises which, as just noted, may have a sordid basis. Declaring God to be on the side of the nation puts an end to religion as a guiding influence and reduces it to a sham used for self-justification. That such a procedure produces tares is no wonder.

A. Espionage, bribery, trickery, diplomacy are justified in the national cause.

B. Untruthfulness about foreign peoples as well as one's own is approved. National characteristics are exaggerated, foreign qualities are minimized; this, though lying in the name of patriotism, is still lying. Patriotism of this kind is sometimes subsidized by interests. Newspapers frequently grossly misrepresent foreign nations. Text-books are given to lauding national virtues, would probably not sell if they did otherwise; the truth does not pay as well as misrepresentation.

C. In international affairs morals are geographical, that is, they depend on what chance to be national boundaries. Thus "planetary morality" which is the expression of the common morality in humanity is defeated.

V. Nationalism hinders reflection and calm judgment about foreign questions. Sentiment and passion usually replace intellect. Slogans and catch-words are very useful in bringing this about. "Man lives not by bread alone, but chiefly by catchwords" — Robert Louis Stevenson. "Remember the Maine," "Fifty-four forty

or fight," "Manifest destiny," "God wills it," "Revenge for Sadowa," "Deutschland über alles," "Britannia rules the waves," "For King and country," "Für Kaiser und Reich," "Dieu et mon droit," "My country, right or wrong," "Gott mit uns," "Gott strafe England."

VI. Nationalism breeds national vanity, which, being unreasoning, hinders nations from dealing with each other as equals. In any case vanity is a vice and not a virtue.

VII. What is right in a difference between nations should not be decided by the nations themselves or by the force they possess, but by an international court, backed by force, as is the case when differences arise between individuals or groups within a state.

XIII

THE RÔLE OF FORCE

FROM FORCE THROUGH LAW TO JUSTICE AND PEACE

I. In primitive society, according to theorists, each individual, or at least each individual family, was at war with every other. "The state of nature is a state of war." — Hobbes.

A. There was no law governing their relations.

B. Force determined what was right in any difference. Thus *Faustrecht*, the law of might, was accepted. An individual had no fundamental rights; all he had was what he could command by his strength. Therefore there was no stability or security.

C. This conception of primitive society is now disputed and it is asserted that man was from the beginning a social animal living in groups. These groups have enlarged throughout history.

II. The family, clan and tribe represented a union of individuals or individual families; a social group.

A. Internal law and force.

1. Within each group there was a law governing the individuals.

a. It was supposed to have a supernatural or divine origin, and was discovered and interpreted in its several stages by the patriarch, by prophets or priests, and finally by chieftains of tribes or tribal kings (the primitive Teutons had positive law. See below). Each group had its own God.

1. Great reliance was placed on direct expression of divine will through omens, portents, and the like.
2. Force was restricted within each group by the legal machinery.
3. This law and force provided a means of securing justice and hence fostered peace and order.

B. External relations.

1. There was no law governing the relations of the respective groups.
2. As each tribe had its own God, whom it must of course obey and who was a rival of every other tribal god, war between tribes became a religious duty, each believing that it was advancing the cause of its deity by extirpating unbelievers. This is illustrated by the instructions of Samuel to Saul (1 Samuel, 15). Thus the use of force between tribes was considered a part of religion and therefore wars were common.

III. The ancient monarchies and empires were products of the tribal system. A given tribe under a competent leader extended its dominion over neighbouring tribes, which became subject peoples.

A. Internal law and force.

1. Within such a monarchy there was a law for all, enunciated by the ruler and, as he was regarded as God's anointed, frequently even considered a God and worshipped as such, this law was held to be of a supernatural origin.
2. This ruler controlled the force of the state with which he secured obedience to his decrees. Within his realm there prevailed peace through, in this case, often an imposed peace. The Roman Empire in this way imposed peace on all subject states, the *pax Romana*. The modern *pax Britannica* also

represents a peace produced by force though in time it comes to be maintained by a unity of interests.

3. Law and force operate to secure justice and peace.

B. External relations. Co-existence of states was inconsistent with the views of the times; hence a powerful monarchy sought to conquer all contiguous peoples and make them subject to its internal laws. War was accordingly the normal relation between rival peoples.

IV. Feudalism was another development from the tribal stage. The tribal heads were displaced by a military aristocracy which enjoyed absolute power over the common man, but in turn was in a vague way subject to the king of a given country.

A. Internal conditions.

1. Within a feudal entity the local baron was the law-giver and executor. Hence there was a means of securing what was called justice and this favored peace. As these rulers were supposed to be God's agents, their decrees were accepted as God's will. Ordeal and trial by battle were freely used.

2. Within the king's jurisdiction, that is between the several feudal entities, there was no law backed by adequate force. The king was nominally and legally superior to his vassals, but the latter had force and used it against each other and sometimes even against the king. War was chronic. The "imperial peace," the peace of God, and the truce of God were attempts to remedy this situation.

B. External relations.

1. There was no law or custom governing the relations of the several feudal kingdoms.

2. Hence force was the solvent of their differences.
The substitution of monotheism for tribal gods made religion less of a driving force for war, as all kings were supposed to be ruling as the agents of one and the same God.

V. Nations succeeded feudal society, because kings of groups with elements of cohesion broke down the power of the barons and centralized government in their own hands.

A. Internal conditions.

1. These monarchs still claimed to rule by divine right and this claim was for some time accepted. Law was considered of supernatural origin.

a. The Reformation contributed to this result. In their devotion to their espoused creed, different peoples rallied about their sovereign as the champion of their faith: in England and Spain this circumstance produced a recrudescence of religious differences as a cause of war.

b. The monarch possessed the force to execute the law and within his dominion there was a means of securing justice, and hence there was order.
Loyalty was expected of subjects; it represented a personal obligation to the sovereign, who personified the state.

2. Natural law. The religious wars of the sixteenth century discredited the theory of divine rights, that kings were the agents of God. Hence theorists sought a different source of law, one which was more inclusive, and professed to find it in nature, by means of human reason. They maintained that this law was universal, hence superior to local rulers, and contrary to their dynastic ambitions. Their contentions, which were widely accepted

by the lettered though never by the masses, were instrumental in breaking down absolute monarchy and preparing the way for positive law.

3. Positive law. (Voluntary, customary, man-made law.) Reliance upon human reason to discover law worked into individual responsibility in making law, that is, into democracy or self-government. Instead of accepting, as divine, the decrees governing human relations pronounced by prophets, priests or monarchs, men resolved to decide these things for themselves and provided machinery for the purpose.

a. Through the ballot they register their wishes: make law.

b. By elected agents they seek to have their will executed: they jointly control the force which makes the law respected.

c. Defects in the machinery (which are abundant), they strive to correct as they acquire experience and wisdom.

Patriotism succeeded loyalty. Patriotism means an obligation to the particular group to which one chances to belong, and to its ideals. The state, in fact, became impersonal, but it continued to be conceived as a personality.

Ultimately this system rests on public opinion: law must be backed by force; but force cannot be effective in a democracy unless public opinion is behind it.

B. External relations.

1. There was no law governing the relation of nations as long as kings by divine right were in power. Hence force was unrestrained.

a. With the conception of natural law, came a dimi-

nution of royal prerogative and a conviction that there ought to be a law of nations. (Grotius, see Chapter XX.)

b. International law has developed since that time to cover a great many relations, with the object of securing justice by peaceful means.

c. Its development was stimulated by democracy, for this rests largely on the conception of the fraternity and equality of all men, and therefore tends to break down the historic and juridical differences between the several nations, and to substitute an international relationship based on principles of humanity.

d. At present, as under feudalism, the law between states is weak (physically, not morally), because force, instead of being behind it, is in the control of the individual states, that is, law and force are not unified; international law lacks adequate sanction. (See Chapter XX.)

e. It should be noted that international law has considerable moral strength, as is shown by the appeals of belligerents against those who violate it, or by the effects upon Germany of her violation of Belgian neutrality.

f. It should also be observed that international law must, like law within a nation, ultimately rest on public opinion for its effectiveness.

VI. Summary.

A. Human beings have historically organized into ever enlarging groups, families, clans, tribes, and nations.

B. Within these groups, no matter of what stage or size, there has always been a law common, broadly speaking, to all individuals in the land. Its object was to provide a means of securing justice and individual

rights, for true law is an expression of true human interests.

1. The origin of this law was once considered to be supernatural. Law is now considered man-made.
2. Law was formerly not applied with impartiality, but there were privileged classes. The tendency of history is to do away with privilege and make all equal before the law.

Its highest development so far is in the form of universal suffrage. A free election provides a means of ascertaining the popular will, provides a substitute other than forceful revolution through which to procure progress and change, and is the greatest known institution making for justice by peaceful means instead of by selfish violence. It is the great hope of the future. Political machinery produces law, law is the best known means of securing justice, justice means peace. War is inevitable only when the machinery of popular government fails to function.

C. Force has always been a factor in human affairs.

1. Under primitive conditions force was the sole reliance and each undertook to secure what seemed just to him by means of force; each was a law unto himself; force was *competitive.*
2. With the erection of groups of men, force became of two kinds:
   a. Internal force, that within a given group. Each such group is a peace society. Force was taken from the individual and placed under the control of an authority, — patriarch, prophet, chieftain, monarch, or elected agent, — whose function it became to use this force to back law and justice.

As long as this central authority was himself sovereign and therefore above the law, justice was not assured. But when the people became sovereign, force in the hands of their elected executive became truly *coöperative.* It became police force. Martial force is in fact incompatible with democracy, for the instant one repudiates the decisions of democratic government he places himself above the whole of his society, a process which, if permitted and copied, means a return to lawlessness and violence. Coöperative force in connection with positive law-making, provides the nearest approach to justice that is so far known; it is infinitely superior to savage force. *Justice means peace.*

b. External force, that displayed when states clash. Martial force. This has remained competitive; as with the primitive individual, each state is a law unto itself. Justice between nations is still sought by means of violence, and the strongest is held to be right.

VII. Question: If enlarging governmental groups and improving democracy within those groups have promoted justice and peace, can and should world democracy be sought; and how would it affect justice and peace?

The possibility of a broader democracy and a closer union of states depends on what elements of such union exist. These are discussed in Chapter XV.

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b. Great reliance was placed on direct expression of divine will through ordeals, portents, and the like.

2. Force was restricted within each group by the legal machinery.

3. This law and force provided a means of securing justice and hence favored peace and order.

B. External relations.

1. There was no law governing the relation of the respective groups.

2. As each tribe had its own God, whom it must of course obey and who was a rival of every other tribal god, war between tribes became a religious duty, each believing that it was advancing the cause of its deity by extirpating unbelievers. This is illustrated by the instructions of Samuel to Saul (1 Samuel, 15). Thus the use of force between tribes was considered a part of religion and therefore wars were common.

III. The ancient monarchies and empires were products of the tribal system. A given tribe under a competent leader extended its dominion over neighboring tribes, which became subject peoples.

A. Internal law and force.

1. Within such a monarchy there was a law for all, enunciated by the ruler; and, as he was regarded as God's anointed, frequently even considered a God and worshipped as such, this law was held to be of a supernatural origin.

2. This ruler controlled the force of the state with which he secured obedience to his decrees. Within his realm there prevailed peace though, in this case, often an imposed peace. The Roman Empire in this way imposed peace on all subject states, the *pax Romana.* The modern *pax Britannica* also

represents a peace produced by force though in time it comes to be maintained by a unity of interests.

3. Law and force operate to secure justice and peace.

B. External relations. Co-existence of states was inconsistent with the views of the times; hence a powerful monarchy sought to conquer all contiguous peoples and make them subject to its internal laws. War was accordingly the normal relation between rival peoples.

IV. Feudalism was another development from the tribal stage. The tribal heads were displaced by a military aristocracy which enjoyed absolute power over the common man, but in turn was in a vague way subject to the king of a given country.

A. Internal conditions.

1. Within a feudal entity the local baron was the law-giver and executor. Hence there was a means of securing what was called justice and this favored peace. As these rulers were supposed to be God's agents, their decrees were accepted as God's will. Ordeal and trial by battle were freely used.

2. Within the king's jurisdiction, that is between the several feudal entities, there was no law backed by adequate force. The king was nominally and legally superior to his vassals, but the latter had force and used it against each other and sometimes even against the king. War was chronic. The "imperial peace," the peace of God, and the truce of God were attempts to remedy this situation.

B. External relations.

1. There was no law or custom governing the relations of the several feudal kingdoms.

2. Hence force was the solvent of their differences.
The substitution of monotheism for tribal gods made religion less of a driving force for war, as all kings were supposed to be ruling as the agents of one and the same God.

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XIV

THE CHANGE IN THE INSTITUTION OF WARFARE

I. War is an institution which, like other institutions, such as church, state, taxation, business, education, has its history. It has developed and undergone changes.

II. The change in the implements of war, and its consequences.

A. Earlier implements were mostly shock weapons and the combat was hand to hand.

1. Hence individual prowess, strength and ability was given a chance and the fitter man was likely to emerge victorious.

2. This was true on the whole through the Middle Ages, though during the latter there was a noteworthy peculiarity:

a. Only men of rank became fighters — the common people did not become soldiers.

b. Making war was a profession; many a knight lived by attacking his neighbor with no provocation other than a desire for the neighbor's possessions.

c. The much-vaunted courage of the medieval knight is largely a fiction.

Knights did not fight to kill, but to capture and hold for ransom. If captured, their vassals had to pay the ransom.

They and their steeds were armored; hence they had little fear of injury — all the more as the adversary could not, under the rules of honor,

take advantage of a misfortune. They had only to fear accidental and unintentional injury.

The accounts of medieval courage were written by minstrels who were patronized by the knights whose prowess they sang. Much of the traditional view of that day still clings to the profession of arms in this.

When firearms, which were really dangerous, were invented the knights abandoned the prerogative of being the fighters and hired mercenaries to wage war.

B. The introduction of missile weapons, such as firearms, of poisonous gases, of dreadnoughts, submarines and aircraft has changed the nature and effect of fighting.

1. Guns have steadily been made more effective, in range, accuracy, and rapidity of fire.

   By improving explosives.

   By improving mechanical appliances (sights, ignition, loading, automatic feed, range finders, etc.).

   By increasing the size and mobility of guns.

2. Hand-to-hand fighting has been reduced to a minimum. Most fighting is at long range, by means of physical forces; machinery. War is machine made. (Lamszus.)

3. In this kind of warfare, personal prowess or ability counts for little, if anything. Man is no match for the machine, hence, weak or strong, he succumbs to it. Thus modern warfare does not result in a survival of the fittest in the biological sense, except as the physical qualities of the individual give him strength to endure the shock of explosions and the hardships of the campaigns.

4. Warfare, in this particular, becomes a struggle be-

tween brains, inventive ability and mechanical skill of the belligerents.

C. Warfare has thus become a matter of brains instead of brawn, of cold scientific knowledge instead of flaming enthusiasm. Personal bravery amounts to little compared with dogged persistence and rational effort. This is getting to be more and more an age of science.

It has been remarked that, as wars have largely been the result of passion, the scientific tendencies of the day should operate to restrain hasty wars.

III. Change in the methods of warfare and its consequences.

A. Changes in organization.

1. Armies levied for a given war have been displaced by standing armies.
2. Volunteering, whether of mercenaries or nationals, has (except in Great Britain and the United States) yielded to compulsory service of the physically fit, after the Prussian pattern, devised as a means to expel Napoleon.
3. Loose, disorganized fighting of hordes has given way to fighting between machine-like organizations, well trained and led by officers versed in tactics and strategy.
4. Foraging and self-supporting armies have been replaced by armies provisioned by their governments.
5. Neglect of the wounded and dead has yielded to sanitation, medical attention, and scrupulous care of the victims of war.
6. Another evidence of humanity is found in the modern laws of war granting every possible immunity to non-combatants.

B. Consequences.

1. The system of compulsory service of the physically

fit exposes an artificially selected group to the ravages of war. (See Chapter X.)

2. Armies grow automatically with population.

IV. Tendencies and attempts to debrutalize war.

A. The development of democracy gave the individual a power and also a value he did not possess under monarchies. The effect of this humanitarianism is apparent in:

1. The greater care of sick and wounded. This was stimulated by the advantage it brought to armies.
2. The attempt to limit war as far as possible to combatants.
3. The considerable body of conventions, chiefly during the last half century, containing laws of warfare on land and sea. (See Chapter XX.)

B. Care of the sick and wounded in war.

1. Practically no arrangements for the purpose existed in ancient, medieval, or early modern wars.

   Sully established the first military hospital in 1594, and Austria did so about the same time.

2. Real development began with the Napoleonic wars.
   a. Larrey (later Napoleon's chief surgeon) introduced "flying ambulances"; gave primary aid to the wounded and removed them from the sphere of action (but not during battle).
   b. Percy (Frenchman) organized the stretcher-bearers (about 1793), who collected the wounded during battle. They were regarded as combatants.
   c. Napoleon's disregard for his men during his western wars; only in his Russian campaign did he show concern for their welfare. The typhoid epidemic in the French Army, 1813.
3. Private enterprise for a time outdid the states, which indeed exhibited little interest.

a. The Crimean War (1854–6) demonstrated the hopeless inadequacy of methods of caring for soldiers.

Hunger, typhoid in the armies, no forage obtainable.

One-third of the French succumbed to disease.

Public opinion was aroused in England; fall of the Aberdeen ministry, 1855.

Private organizations came to the rescue of the sufferers in the Crimea. Florence Nightingale.

b. Italian War, 1859.

Henri Dunant at Solférino, 1859.

Dunant's experiences related in "Un souvenir de Solférino." This book contributed very largely to the Geneva Convention.

c. Civil War in the United States.

Francis Lieber Code, 1863. Scott: Texts, 350–376.

Many private relief societies, estimated at about 7000.

Provided hospitals and nurses; also hospital trains and hospital ships.

Effectiveness shown at Gettysburg, where by the morning of July 4 all the sufferers of the three days' battle, July 1–3, were cared for.

d. Private enterprise culminated in the Red Cross Societies.

4. Government action. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and wounded of Armies in the Field, 1864. (Scott: Texts, 376–378.)

a. Influence of Dunant and of Moynier, President of the Society of Public Utility of Geneva, in bringing about the convention.

b. First meeting, 1863. Sixteen nations represented.

c. Meeting of 1864. Same nations represented. Provisions adopted (10 articles).

(1) Ambulances and military hospitals neutral as long as sick or wounded may be therein, and they are not held by a military force.

(2) All persons employed in connection with ambulances or hospitals shall have the benefit of neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as there remain wounded to be aided.

(3) These persons may, even after occupation by the enemy, continue to fulfill their duties with their ambulances or hospitals, or may rejoin the corps to which they belong. To be aided, not hindered, in doing so.

(4) Equipment of military hospitals subject to the laws of war and cannot be carried away by above persons when withdrawing. Ambulances, under the same conditions, retain their equipment.

(5) Inhabitants of the country may aid the wounded, without being considered belligerents. They are to be encouraged in every way to aid the wounded.

(6) The sick and wounded are to be cared for indiscriminately. Those who recover may be paroled.

(7) Ambulances, hospitals and persons attached to them have a distinctive flag (or light at night), which must in every case be accompanied by the national flag; and an arm badge is given to neutralized persons, to be delivered by the proper military authorities.

The badge is to be a *red cross* in a white field.

(Turkey gave notice in 1876, that her badge would be a red crescent.)

(8–10). Ratifications, etc.

d. Practically all nations have accepted the convention.

e. Diplomatic conference of Geneva, 1868, proposed to extend the above rules to naval warfare; proposal was not ratified then. This step was taken at the First Hague Conference, 1899.

5. Red Cross Societies.

a. Made possible by the Geneva Convention. Each nation to authorize one civic society to send medical aid to war.

b. In Germany and France the Red Cross Society is placed under military control, no independent volunteer service being permitted in the field.

In England and the United States the Red Cross organizations are independent, but coöperate with the military organizations for the aid of the wounded.

c. American National Red Cross Society founded 1881. Clara Barton, first president (d. 1912).

Extended its relief program to other calamities besides wars, and has rendered great service in various directions.

d. The several national Red Cross Societies hold international congresses at intervals. (For a list of these see Annuaire de la Vie Internationale, 1908–9, p. 885.)

The Society of Geneva is regarded as a central committee.

e. Problems of the Red Cross.

Abuse of the flag: it has been used by unauthor-

ized persons, sometimes out of ignorance, supposing that it guaranteed immunity, sometimes deliberately to escape the fate of war.

The Red Cross in civil war. The convention permitting the Red Cross gave the society the right to perform its functions, under certain restrictions, in international wars, but failed (by oversight) to grant it the same right in case of civil war. This will undoubtedly be remedied.

6. All nations now have well developed and organized medical staffs and hospital corps attached to armies. What it is possible for these branches of the army to achieve was demonstrated by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. See Seaman: The Real Triumph of Japan.

V. Bloch's conclusions as to the effect of the changes in methods of warring upon future wars.

A. That any war between first-rate powers will be indecisive, and tend to end in stalemate.

B. That it will end because of exhaustion not because of military superiority of either party.

C. That neutrals alone will benefit by it.

D. That the economic and sociological evils of indecisive war are likely to produce revolutions. This happened in Russia after the Russo-Japanese war.

Bloch's writings and views on the futility of armaments influenced the Czar of Russia in taking the initiative for the first Hague Conference.

VI. Summary.

A. Formerly war was waged between whole peoples; now a distinction is made between combatants and non-combatants and the latter are expected to be spared as much as possible.

B. War formerly meant personal antipathy between the

combatants; now it is more nearly a conflict between two causes.

C. Victory formerly meant subjection for the conquered; now the conquered often retains his independence.

D. Formerly war was waged with little or no preparation or strategy; it has gradually been reduced to a science which requires experts in all departments.

E. Formerly individual prowess counted, and a skillful fighter stood some chance in battle; now the leaders of the army are expected to have the prowess, and the private ordinarily is expected to do nothing more than obey orders (which is contrary to the spirit of democracy); and under fire the keen and wide-awake soldier has little more chance to escape death than the sluggard (except perhaps in retreat).

> ". . . the soldier knew
> Some one had blunder'd:
> Theirs not to make reply,
> Theirs not to reason why,
> Theirs but to do and die."
>
> — *Tennyson.*

F. Plundering and wanton destruction of property, which were formerly the rule, are now discouraged.

G. Modern public opinion demands the greatest possible degree of humanity in war.

H. War has grown very much more expensive than it was.

I. War was formerly decided upon by the rulers and they, if anybody, were the beneficiaries; their subjects who fought risked life and gained little except by plunder. To-day the people theoretically have a voice in deciding upon war, but get little out of fighting except the satisfaction of being victors. Others get the prizes.

J. The realization of this and the enlargement of the power of the people over foreign policies and diplomatic machinery militates against war.

K. Finally, and most important, in view of the changes in warfare, not to mention other changes, one cannot use past war as a basis for argument relating to the present.

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XV

MODERN COMMUNICATION AND INTERNATIONALISM

I. The improvement of transportation.

A. Transportation is from eight to twelve times as rapid as it was a century and a half ago.

1. This is, as it concerns travel and commerce, equivalent to a shrinkage of the earth.

2. Furthermore, the multiplication of transportation facilities (roads, railways, canals, ocean carriers, etc.) has opened regions which were formerly wholly inaccessible.

B. The result is that the products of a region are no longer confined to its markets, but are carried into any market that has use for them. There has, of course, been a corresponding expansion and interweaving of the financial institutions of each region with those of every other. Capital has ceased to be national and is largely non-national; it goes wherever there is a prospect of profits. Business has ceased to be local and has become world-wide; world economy has replaced local economy. Each part of the world has become dependent on every other.

Labor has, like capital, become highly mobile and seeks employment anywhere.

Travel is a natural consequence of the above and is increasing.

II. The improvement in communication.

A. Communication, which was formerly no more rapid than travel, is now practically instantaneous, thanks

to telephone, telegraph, cable, wireless, and to news and mail services.

B. Information, which is in many senses merely a commodity, can now be conveyed rapidly to all quarters and has accordingly become common property. News, good ideas no matter where they originate, business orders and information reach the whole earth in incredibly short time.

This is particularly noticeable in financial circles. Large banks with their foreign correspondents and their means of rapid communication give the earth a sensory system, which quickly learns of matters of importance, conveys the information to all quarters, and stimulates the readjustment that may be necessary.

III. Result: internationalism — the private relation of the citizens of the several states with each other, and the official coöperation of the states. Jeremy Bentham is credited with coining the word "internationalism" in 1780. It was little used before the middle of the nineteenth century. (Faries, p. 11.)

A. Unofficial or private internationalism. This is either individual or organized. The relations of individual citizens of one country with those of another are so numerous and so complex that their existence and, accordingly, their significance is hardly noticed. Organized international activity is much more easily observed because, as will be noticed below, there is often a society with headquarters, officers and an official organ.

1. Of an economic character.

Business is international; buying and selling is conducted on the basis of profit — not of nationalism, except in so far as this is affected by legislative en-

actments, such as tariffs on foreign goods. Money is non-national — one might even say unpatriotic, for it seeks investment where the profits are safest and largest, no matter if it is abroad. One can justly speak of a *business world* and a *financial world*. The export of capital has reached great proportions.

BRITISH EXPORT CAPITAL

(*Economist*, Feb. 20, 1909)

CAPITAL INVESTED IN COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES

India	£470,000,000
Australasia	321,000,000
Canada	305,000,000
Transvaal	220,000,000
Cape Colony	98,000,000
Rhodesia, E. Af	59,000,000
Natal	30,000,000
Others	63,000,000
	£1,566,000,000

CAPITAL INVESTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

United States	£485,000,000
Japan	115,000,000
Argentine	254,000,000
Brazil	101,000,000
Egypt	97,000,000
Mexico	51,000,000
Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Denmark	48,000,000
China	47,000,000
Russia	45,000,000
Balkan States incl. Turkey and Greece	39,000,000

CAPITAL INVESTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES—*Continued*

Italy, Switzerland and Austria....	£26,000,000
Spain.....	25,000,000
Uruguay.....	25,000,000
Cuba.....	21,000,000
Chile.....	42,000,000
Others.....	63,000,000
Total foreign investment..	£1,484,000,000
Grand total.....	£3,050,000,000

This is about one-fifth of the total capital of the United Kingdom, which is much greater than the foreign investment of any other nation.

2. Of an intellectual or cultural nature.
   a. Knowledge and ideas are human, not national. If, as is claimed, culture is national in its creation, it is not national in its consumption. Knowledge and ideas meet a like response everywhere. Men of like professions or trades understand "foreigners" as well as nationals. Normally, each group forms an international guild; the engineering, the medical, educational, literary *world*. Only in war times do they pretend that there are fundamental national differences.
   b. Literature, — which depends on language, the chief external characteristic of a nation, — and to a less degree music and painting, are more national than science, which is necessarily non-national because the laws of nature are everywhere the same; the emotional elements of culture are more national than the rational elements.
3. Organized international activity. (La Vie Internationale, 1908–9, 537–1282.) A great many interests have felt the need of international coöperation

and have accordingly held international congresses. In a number of cases permanent international organizations, with officers, regular meetings, and official organs have been established. To illustrate the types of international activity, the following selected list, arranged in an arbitrary way, is given:

Libraries.
- International Institute of Bibliography.
- International Catalogue of Scientific Literature.
- International Congress of Librarians.

Press.
- Reuter's News Service. Havas, Wolff, Associated Press.
- International Press Association.

Legislature.
- Interparliamentary Union. (Cremer, 1889.) One-fifth of the members of national legislatures are members of it (1910).

Peace.
- International Peace Congresses. (See Chapter XVIII.)
- International Friendship Societies.

Ethical and Philanthropic.
- International Union of Ethical Societies.
- International Congress against Immoral Literature.
- International Congress against Intemperance.
- International Congress of Protectors of Animals.
- International Union against Vivisection.
- International Congress against Duelling.
- Red Cross Society.
- Friends of Young Women.

Religion.
- World Alliance of Churches.
- World's Parliament of Religions.
- Eucharistic Congresses.
- Salvation Army.
- Young Men's Christian Association. Over 800,000 members.
- Young Women's Christian Association.

Sociology.
- International Institute of Sociology.
- International Institute of Statistics.
- International Colonial Institute.
- British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.
- International Penitentiary Commission.

Labor.
- International Socialist Bureau.
- International Federation for Sunday Observance.
- International Association for the Legal Protection of Laborers.
- International Coöperation. (See its Year Book, 1910.)

Law and Government.
- International Law Association.
- International Alliance for Woman Suffrage.
- International Association of Lawyers.

Insurance.
- International Congress of Actuaries.

Education.
- Universal Federation of Christian Students.
- Cosmopolitan Club, affiliated with Corda Fratres, 1911. (Various Congresses have been held.)

Commerce and Transportation.
International Railway Association.
International Marine Association.
International Free-trade Congress, 1910.
Philology.
(International Languages: See Chapter XXVII.)
Sciences: Pure and Applied.
(Many of them have international organizations.)
International Medical Association against War.
Pan-American Scientific Congresses.
Geography.
International Congress of Geography.
International Geodesy. (Is preparing a world map.)
International Polar Commission.
Fine Arts.
International Institute of Public Art.
Sports.
Olympic Games.
International Aeronautical Federation.

B. Official international activities, those of the states as such.

1. Non-political. States have participated in conferences and have entered into various conventions regarding matters of convenience to their citizens, but which have no political importance.

Universal Postal Union (1878). (Bridgman: First Book of World Law, 20–71.)
Practically all countries are members. Headquarters, Berne.

Universal Telegraph Union (1875).
About 30 members.

Convention Concerning the Metric System (1875).
About 23 states have accepted it.

Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883).
About 19 members. Headquarters, Berne.

Union for the Protection of Works of Literature and Art (1886).
About 15 states are members. Headquarters, Berne.

Union Concerning Railway Transports and Freights (1890).
Nine states are members. Headquarters, Berne.

Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (1890).
About 30 members. Headquarters, Brussels.

Phylloxera Conventions (1878, 1881).
12 members.

Convention Concerning Private International Law (1893, 1896, 1900).
About 15 members.

Sanitary Conventions.
Cholera (1893, 1894, 1899).
Plague (1897, 1900).

Monetary Unions.
Latin Monetary Union (1865). Five members.
Scandinavian Monetary Conference (1892). Seventeen states represented: no practical result.

Convention for the Suppression of the Slave-trade (1892).

Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals in Africa (1900). Seven signatories.

Convention Concerning Bounties on Sugar (1902). About 12 members. Headquarters, Brussels.

Others of the same kind relating to trade in arms, spirituous liquors (1899, 1906), the use of international rivers, canals, and waterways generally, protection of ocean cables, radio-telegraphy, rules of traffic at sea, international signal code, fishing on the high seas, protection of travellers, exchange of documents, agriculture (1905), scientific expeditions, World's prime meridian (1884), "white slavery" (1904), etc.

2. Political. States have also held congresses and have made joint treaties (as distinct from bilateral) concerning matters involving their political aspirations.

a. Inter-governmental conferences, congresses, treaties, etc.

Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (1815). "Concert of Powers."

The Holy Alliance (1815).

Protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818).

Treaty of London (1839). Neutralization of Belgium.

Declaration of Paris (1856).

Geneva Convention (1867). Neutralization of Luxemburg.

Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868).

Congress of Berlin (1878). Near Eastern Question.

General Act of the Congo-Conference (1885).

Treaty of Constantinople (1888). Suez Canal neutral.

Pan-American Conferences (1889–90, 1901, 1906, 1910).

Final Act of The Hague Peace Conference (1899).
Treaty of Washington (1901). Neutralizes Panama Canal.
Algeciras Conference (1906).
Central American Conferences (1906, 1907).
Final Act of the Second Hague Conference (1907).
The Declaration of London (1909). Private property at sea, etc. Not generally ratified as yet.
"A. B. C." or Niagara Falls Conference, 1914.
And many others (Fried: Handbuch I, 127–132).

b. Inter-governmental administration and joint-action.

Bureau of American Republics.
Central American Bureau.
Central American Court of Justice.
Permanent International Bureau at The Hague.
The Hague Tribunal (1899).
The Danube River Commission (since 1856).
The Congo Commission (1885).
Pacific blockade of Greece by the powers (1886).
Joint (temporary) control of Samoa (1889) by Great Britain, Germany and the United States.
The joint occupation of China during the Boxer revolt (1900).
Joint occupation and administration of Crete (1899–1913) by Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy.
The blockade of Scutari by an international naval force (1913).
Commissions to control the Turkish, Egyptian and Greek Debts.

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2. The volume of international intercourse has aroused a practical as well as academic interest of each people in every other.

a. It is claimed by many that this knowledge of other peoples tends to reduce national and racial prejudices, and hence tends toward international friendship and the brotherhood of man. This is, however, not necessarily true, for acquaintance does not always mean friendship, especially if, as in the case of nations, there is commercial rivalry. Relatives are sometimes the bitterest of enemies.

b. However, it seems to be true that international trade and intercourse of every kind tends, like the democratic tendencies noted in the preceding chapter, to create affiliations between the peoples of the several nations, which give true elements of cohesion and coöperation.

3. Education, to be up-to-date, must take notice of this increasing internationalism. "New occasions teach new duties."

IV. Summary.

A. The economic life of man has to a great extent become international.

B. His cultural and intellectual life is likewise largely international.

C. His political life remains national.

D. When his nation goes to war he rallies to his political or national, at the expense of his international, existence.

The reason for this conflict in his life seems to be that man's political institutions have fallen behind, and are no longer in agreement with the actual facts of his existence.

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See also References to Chapter XXVI.

XVI

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPPOSITION TO WAR

I. Nationalism and the current conception of national sovereignty together with their corollaries lead to war and a consequent exaltation of the rôle of force. (See Section IV below.)

A restriction of sovereignty and of existing nationalism should, then, reduce the probability of war and alter the function of martial force.

II. The basis for such a restriction of nationalism is at hand.

A. Nationalism has performed its work. It increasingly hinders progress because it obstructs the development of planetary and humanitarian institutions, by vitiating international law in which the interests of mankind find their expression.

B. A nation is unstable under present conditions and its stability cannot be assured by force because no nation can possibly protect itself against every combination of rivals. The circumstance that the usual remedy, armed defense, does not guarantee stability or peace, leaves every rational mind dissatisfied because there must be something wrong with a remedy that does not cure.

C. The nation is no longer the cohesive unit of society that it once was. A transition is in progress which promises in time to extinguish the present conception of nations as cohesive competitive units.

1. Geographically: Nations have always freely ignored natural features in fixing boundaries. Modern

transportation methods, steamships, railroads, tunnels, cables and telegraphic facilities have reduced the value of natural boundaries.

2. Different races, languages and religions are found within a nation, and a given race, language or religion is found in various nations.
3. No nation is economically isolated; national boundaries do not exist in world trade except as they are emphasized by national tariffs. The very existence of tariffs is a recognition of economic intercourse between nations.
4. The greater part of so-called national culture (*Kultur*) is intelligible to other peoples. The ideals of different nations are *not necessarily* in conflict. When it is expedient, nations can easily compose their differences no matter of how long a standing (*e. g.*, France and England, foes from 1200–1900, allies now). The conflict of national ideals is irrepressible only when it suits national purpose to consider them so. (Angell: The World's Highway.)
5. Only in the political or juridical sphere is nationalism still a reality. This does not mean that there is a difference in the political system, but that political systems which may be quite alike are under different managements. In other words, the present political institutions governing the relation of nations are out of keeping with the economic and cultural phases of international life; a reconciliation is needed. Certain opponents of war rest their case upon this feature of the matter.
6. The nation represents no external or material reality that is fundamentally distinguishable from other nations. What distinctive character it possesses is something abstract, "A nation exists where its

component atoms believe it to be a nation" — *London Nation*, June 26, 1915. Nationalism is a faith, a religion, and as such it is a real working force. It originally had a basis in external conditions; education has perpetuated the old conceptions and failed to coördinate them with new developments. Internationalism (see Chapter XV) has, however, in great measure swept away the original foundation of nationalism.

a. Commerce and finance have become internationalized.

Foreign investments benefit the investor and not the average citizen of the home nation which is, under present theories, expected to back up the foreign investor and help him succeed. This tends to raise doubt as to nationalism in the mind of the average man.

b. The intellectual and cultural interests of men are international, not national. There are medical, educational, financial, scientific, and literary, worlds. These, though severally experiencing no incompatibility because of nationality, are supposed to be in fundamental conflict when acting in groups. The evident untruth of this supposition militates against nationalism.

D. Practically all parts of the earth have been explored and settled. Nations can soon no longer expand except at the expense of each other and hence a perpetuation of nationalism means war between great nations compared with which past wars will appear insignificant.

E. Nations have already found it expedient to abandon the extreme sovereignty of former times. This has so far generally been voluntary. The modern individual

cares more about the economic conditions than the political system he lives under.

1. The mere necessity of systematizing the present international intercourse of every kind demands treaties; every treaty represents a restriction of sovereignty in the degree to which the treaty governs the future conduct of signatories.
2. Nations have coöperated even in matters of a political nature. (See Chapter XV. Also Fried: Handbuch I, 106–135.)
3. The advantage of this voluntary surrender is a security that cannot be attained under competitive force. Charles Richet states it thus,

> "True, I limit my personal liberty and divest myself of a right when I agree not to shoot off a revolver on the streets whenever I feel like it. But in submitting to this restriction — which an American frontiersman will not tolerate — I secure the advantage over him that I am safer on the streets than he, since my fellow-citizens may not shoot either." (Fried: Handbuch I, p. 108.)

F. There are precedents.

1. The national replaced the feudal state in the natural endeavor to make the political institutions fit economic conditions which had ceased to be feudal.
2. The United States is a federation of once sovereign states, whose interests had become largely identical. It rests on the denial of the full sovereignty of the several states.
3. The German Empire is a Union of once particularistic and very hostile states. It is typical that the political union was preceded by economic unity represented by the Customs Union.
4. Italy is another case. There are strong tendencies

toward federation in the British Empire. Pan-Americanism, as interpreted in some quarters, is a federative movement.

III. International organization is the method by which to restrict nationalism and to suppress its evils.

A. This international organization may follow one of several lines. (See Chapter XXVI.)

B. International federation is condemned as Utopian by many.

1. Fried (Handbuch I, 118) on the contrary holds that a project is Utopian only when it posits a constructive condition instead of one which represents a natural development.

2. In this sense international organization is not Utopian for it merely means a reconstruction of international political machinery to bring it into keeping with the existing economic and cultural intercourse between nations. In other words, the economic bases for world organization are already present; and, as in the unification of Germany, the political conditions can be made to fit the economic.

3. The opposition to the development of closer international relations comes:

a. From the supposition that nations represent incompatible ideals.

b. From the natural inertia and "standpattism" of society.

c. From ignorance of the extent of international life, and its conflict with nationalism.

d. From aristocratic or plutocratic interests which fatten either by using the nation to promote selfish interests (tariffs, foreign investments) or by profiting from the rivalry of nations (munition makers).

IV. The function of pacifism is to reconstruct society by doing away with the institutions, ideas and fallacies which cause war and erecting others which, by securing justice, procure peace.

A. Nationalism is the fundamental cause of war.

1. What is usually called the cause of a war (the murder of the Archduke, the sinking of the Maine, etc.), is merely the occasion, the pretext on which nationalism operates and justifies its action.
2. Human nature can be said to cause war only because it works through nationalism; the same human nature within national bounds does not cause war, but is taken care of by institutions devised for the purpose.
3. National expansion in any form causes resistance.
4. Errors and fallacies about nationalism cause war. (See Chapter IV.) Among these should be mentioned:
   a. Social fatalism: the belief that war is inevitable.
   b. Unilateral aberration: reasoning about international matters in terms of one nation only.
   c. Irrepressible conflict of ideas: the assumption that nations are units that are fundamentally different and therefore necessarily hostile.

B. Contributory causes. Those persons or interests which may profit in any way by a conflict between nations may aid in precipitating war.

1. Munition makers.
2. Military and naval men who get a chance to do something and to get advancement.
3. The common man who finds war attractive because it gives him a chance for travel and adventure, a change from the monotony of his hum-drum life.

4. Persons who dislike another nation and get satisfaction from a chance to attack it.

C. Religious groupings formerly caused war. Racial differences may succeed nationalism as a cause of war.

V. Weaknesses and faults of pacifism.

A. It has been too largely idealistic and abstract. This shows evidence of being corrected by the modern inductive pacifists. Even the latter are charged with being too intellectual to reach practical people. It must, however, not be forgotten that all reforms are subject to the foregoing charges.

B. It has relied too largely on emotion and sentiment in trying to eradicate war by describing its horrors and the sufferings of women and children.

C. It is charged with being negative only, standing for "passivism," non-resistance, peace-at-any-price, defenselessness, unilateral disarmament. Aggressive pacifism is wanted: "Blessed are the peace-*makers*."

D. It has toyed with irrational catchwords: "eternal peace," "disarmament," "lay down your arms," "brotherhood of man."

E. It has suffered from those who join its ranks because it was fashionable or good advertising. The "P. P. P's." — Pacifists for Personal Prominence.

F. Persons who join the fight against war, at first show a disposition to criticize all previous pacifists as being "all wrong." The result is a divergence of opinion and action. This, though often commented on by opponents of pacifism, is not a real weakness, as it is no worse than disagreement among other men.

1. The reliance on any *one* method, scheme or program to bring about peace is, however, a doubtful policy.

a. Religious pacifism has long been tried in vain.

b. Socialism, though removing strife between labor

and capital, would not remove the present racial prejudices.

c. Free trade, though it would remove certain economic causes of war, would not correct other causes.

d. Democracy, alone, will not bring peace. France, though a Republic, breathed *revanche.*

e. Universal brotherhood, though helping toward peace, does not assure it, for acquaintance does not remove dislikes; a family quarrel is notoriously the bitterest. We need not love foreigners, we merely need to coöperate with them.

f. Disarmament will not cure the military spirit, which is part of nationalism.

G. Peace must be made more interesting and attractive.

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XVII

DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM TO 1789

I. Deductive pacifism is that which, premising peace as something desirable, labors for it in any way that promises to be effective.

The ideal of peace may, in its origin, be religious, emotional or rational. As long as the ideal of peace is the starting point, the resultant pacifism is *a priori* or deductive. It includes all sentimental opposition to war and its horrors.

II. Deductive pacifism has always predominated, though at intervals there have been other forms. Only in the last two decades has a real addition in the form of inductive pacifism appeared.

III. The history of deductive pacifism.

A. That peace has always been an ideal men have wished for, appears in the folklore of all times and peoples.

B. In ancient times peace, for the most part, remained an ideal which was praised and recommended.

1. The prophets of the Old Testament, particularly Isaiah, prophesied and praised eternal peace.
2. The religions of the Persians, Chinese, and Hindus contain the peace ideal.
3. Among the Greeks, Homer, Euripides, Aristophanes, Æschylos, Plutarch, Epictetus and Zeno give expression to longing for peace. The last two, Stoics, preached the brotherhood of man and suggested a world-state; and Plato in "Tamias" and "Critias" pictured the peace-state "Atlantis."

4. The Greeks also achieved practical results in peaceful settlements. (See Chapter XXI.)
5. Of the Romans, Ovid, Lucretius, Virgil, Sallust, Seneca, and Probus favor peace as an ideal. Cicero, Tacitus, and Marcus Aurelius are quite outspoken in this opinion, the last advancing the brotherhood of man.
6. The New Testament is full of peace sentiment, and quite naturally the Church Fathers, Ireneus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius and Augustine restated them.

C. In the Middle Age.

1. The conception of a federation of states was common in the medieval period. Usually, however, the conception had at bottom the purpose of organizing Christian States for war on non-Christian peoples, chiefly on Islam. The head of the federation was, depending on the writer's predilections, to be the Pope or the Emperor.
   a. Thomas of Aquinas (13th century) favored the Pope.
   b. Dante's "De Monarchia" conceives of a federation under the Emperor; The Abbé Honoré Bonnor in "Arbre de Bataille" (1380) does likewise.
   c. Marsiglius of Padua in "Defensor Pacis" (1324) proposed to transform the Church Councils into a body representing the European States.
   d. Peter Dubois in "De recuperatione terre Sancte" (1305) constructed what is the oldest document containing a plan for the organization of states, and a proposition for a permanent European Court, which is much like the one adopted for the Hague Tribunal in 1899.
   e. George Podiebrad (1420–1471), King of Poland,

influenced by his Chancellor Antonius Marius, advocated an eternal peace league of Christian princes, with a congress of delegates empowered to settle disputes. The object was not peace but a league of friends with whom to oppose an unfriendly papacy.

f. Erasmus (1467–1536) opposed war in numerous writings notably in "Querela pacis" and "Adagia." He was among the first popularizers of the peace idea.

2. The truce of God "Treuga dei" declared in 1041 and promulgated for all Christendom by Urban II in 1095 proscribed fighting for certain days of the week. It too was designed to suppress strife among Christians in order to make the crusades possible.
3. Many disputes were arbitrated in the Middle Age, the Pope figuring most frequently as arbitrator.
4. The restrictions upon private war led to the development of duelling as a prerogative of knights and the higher classes generally. This continued unrestrained for a long time, until the developing monarchs acquired strength to suppress it.

a. Emperor Maximilian I in 1495 decreed the "peace of the realm" which forbade duelling.

b. In France it was Richelieu chiefly who suppressed private warfare.

D. Modern Period: religious pacifism.

1. Luther (1483–1546) expressed opposition to war.
2. The Mennonites, a sect originating in the Netherlands about 1534, adopted non-resistance as one of their cardinal doctrines. They have held to it to this day.
3. The Quakers or Friends, under the leadership of

George Fox (1624–1691) and Robert Barclay (1648–1690), taught non-resistance and peace.

a. Ann Austin and Mary Fisher worked in Massachusetts, 1656.

b. William Penn (1644–1718) carried Quaker principles into practice in his colony, Pennsylvania, (1682) and his success in dealing with the Indians remains as evidence that even primitive peoples will be friendly and pacific neighbors, if they are treated fairly.

Penn in 1693 published his "Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates." (Old South Leaflets, IV, No. 75.) This advocates a permanent international congress and proposes the use of joint force to compel members to submit their differences to the congress and to accept its award.

c. John Bellers in 1710 published a book based on Penn's ideas.

d. The Quakers secured exemption from military service in the American colonies.

e. They continue active in urging their opposition to force and war through their peace societies. (See *Friends' Intelligencer*, January 22, 1916.)

4. Various Christian ministers and organizations have from time to time and in increasing numbers opposed war. There is, however, the greatest difference of opinion upon the proper relationship of Christianity and war. The following regard war as opposed to Christianity:

a. The Salvation Army.

b. The Church Peace Union (70 Fifth Avenue, New York). Endowed by Andrew Carnegie.

c. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (92 St. George's Square, London, S. W.).

d. World Alliance of Churches (70 Fifth Avenue, New York).

5. The Bahaists, instituted by Baha 'o'llah in Persia, 1851. "Let not a man glory in this, that he loves his country; let him rather glory in this, that he loves his kind."—Baha 'o'llah.

Present leader is Abdul Baha.

E. Modern Period: Early individual pacifists and their projects.

1. Henry IV of France (1589–1610) "The Great Design." (English edition by Mead, 1909.) Proposed a hegemony subject to France against the Hapsburg power; therefore not a disinterested peace project. Sully, Henry's minister, is supposed, by some, to be originator.
2. Emeric Crucé (Emeric de Lacroix about 1590–1648); "Le nouveau Cynée" 1623; "The New Cyneas" (Balch, 1909). Proposes an international council of all nations with headquarters at Venice to settle all differences and preserve the peace. He is the first to proclaim free trade as a means to peace.
3. Grotius (1625) and Zouche. (See Chapter XX.)
4. Campanella (1568–1639) projected a universal monarchy under the Pope.
5. Amos Comenius (1592–1676) "Consultatio catholicà." Favored peaceful settlement of disputes.
6. Count Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels (1623–93) proposed a league of Catholic princes to settle disputes in a tribunal under papal supervision.
7. Duke Charles of Lorraine and Bar favored some central organization of states.

8. Other opponents of war of this period:
   Spinoza (1632–77); Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) favors federation and arbitration; Christian Thomasius (1655–1728); Friedrich von Logau (1604–1655); Archbishop Fénélon (1651–1715); Pascal; La Bruyère; Pierre Bayle; John Locke.

F. Period of Enlightenment or Rationalism:

1. Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743).
   "Abrégé du projet paix perpétuelle inventé par le roi Henri le Grand . . ." 1713 (Extract in Darby, International Tribunals, 71 f.). The first "coherent" proposal for an international tribunal (Richet, 247). Exercised an influence toward the creation of Holy Alliance.
2. Rousseau (1712–1778), "Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre" (Darby, 105); "Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle," (Darby, 117).
3. Leibnitz (1646–1716), favored federation and commented favorably on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's plan.
4. Montesquieu (1689–1755), approved of universal monarchy or federation, and commented on the disturbance of trade occasioned by war.
5. Voltaire (1694–1778), opposed Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project, but favored his aim, the elimination of war. In his usual sarcastic style he condemned war as advantageous to princes and aristocracy only. During his stay in England Voltaire learned to know the Quakers and mentions them and their views on war in his correspondence.
6. Prince Kaunitz, Prime Minister of Austria, made a proposal for reduction of armaments to Prussia, about 1764. (See Chapter XXV.)

7. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), incorporated a plan for universal and permanent peace in his "Principles of International Law." Proposed extension and codification of international law, abandonment of imperialism, conventions to limit armaments, free trade, an international congress and an arbitral tribunal.
8. Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), "On War and Peace," 1788. (Old South Leaflets, VI, 162.)
9. The Encyclopedists (Holbach, Diderot, Turgot); Ange Gondart (1720–1791); La Harpe; Gaillard; Mayer; Gottsched; Palthen; Totze; Lilienfeld; Vattel; Lessing; Herder; Wieland; Schiller; Hippel; Schinly; Swift; Hume; Price.

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See next Chapter

XVIII

DEDUCTIVE OR IDEALIST PACIFISM SINCE 1789

I. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Period marks the beginning of a new era in which democracy and the brotherhood of man have been in the ascendant. These favor coöperation and peace, and accordingly pacifism has gained in vigor as democracy has advanced.

A. The formation of the United States was a practical application of federation of states. As such, as well as for other reasons, it is an event of greatest historical importance.

B. Various leaders of the French revolution were advocates of peace and international federation: Beauharnais, Mirabeau, Pétion, Cloots, Abbé Gregoire, Eschasseriaux, Condorcet.

C. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) "Der Ewige Friede," 1795. "Perpetual Peace" a translation, by Benjamin Trueblood, American Peace Society.

Throughout Kant's works there runs a criticism of war. In "Perpetual Peace," which is drawn up in the form of a treaty, he favors federation, reduction of armaments, but says nothing about an arbitral court. His aim was not to secure peace, but to show the conditions necessary to securing it. There are three, according to him:

1. Every state must have popular government. Sovereigns are largely responsible for war. This idea shows Kant's recognition of the new era.
2. International law shall be backed by a federation of free states.

3. There must be world citizenship, permitting men to visit everywhere, but not allowing ownership in foreign lands. This is directed against imperialism.

D. Other opponents of war of this period: Schelling, Zachariae, Malinowsky, Fries, Batain, Jean Paul, Gustav Hugo, Heeren, Krause, Archduke Charles of Austria, Fichte (in his earlier life), de Constant, Paoli-Chagny. From the social point of view: Fourier, Saint-Simon, Thierry.

II. During the nineteenth century.

A. Peace Societies.

1. New York Peace Society, founded in August, 1815, with about 30 members. David Low Dodge (1774–1852) first president. "The Mediator's Kingdom not of this World." 1809.
2. Ohio Peace Society founded December 2, 1915.
3. The Massachusetts Peace Society, founded in Boston, December 28, 1815, by Noah Worcester (1758–1837) and William Ellery Channing (1780–1842). Worcester: "Solemn Review of the Custom of War." 1814. Edited "The Friend of Peace."
4. Other societies were founded in Philadelphia, Rhode Island, and Maine and their union as the American Peace Society occurred in New York, May 8, 1828, under the leadership of William Ladd (1778–1841). (Headquarters: 1834, Hartford, Conn.; 1837, Boston; since 1911, Colorado Building, Washington, D. C.)
5. The Peace Society (English) founded in London, June 11, 1816, by a Quaker, William Allen (1770–1843), and Joseph Price. (Headquarters: New Broad Street, Finsbury, London, E. C.) Has since 1819 issued the "Herald of Peace." Sent

representatives to continent to spread peace idea.

6. Peace Society at Geneva, founded December 1, 1830, by de Sellon (1782–1839), who got the idea from London.
7. English Quakers founded the "Société de la morale chrétienne" in Paris in 1821, which in 1841 developed a peace department. Saint Simon and Fourier had helped to prepare the ground.
8. Peace societies in 1910. About 160 societies with many branches.

England, 22 societies with about 45 branches.

France, 36 societies, some of which have as many as 40 branches.

Germany, 3 societies with 95 branches.

Austria, 8; Belgium, 3; Hungary, 2; Italy, 55; Norway, 2; Portugal, 3; Russia, 2; Spain, 2; Sweden, 8; United States, 17; Canada, 1; South American States, 7; Australia, 4; Japan, 2; Denmark, 2, with 37 branches.

(For a list of peace societies see Annuaire du mouvement pacifiste, 1910, and The Peace Year-book, 1911.)

B. International Peace Congresses.

In 1841, when the relations between Great Britain and the United States were strained over a boundary question, Joseph Sturge, an English Quaker, came to America to consult about means of securing better feeling. During his stay he proposed to the American Peace Society an international peace congress, which was realized in 1843.

1. International peace congress, London, 1843. Charles Hindley, M. P., president. Really an Anglo-American conference: 294 English, 37 American, and 6 continental delegates.

2. International Peace Congress at Brussels, 1848.
   a. Elihu Burritt (1810–1879), "the learned blacksmith" of New England, through extensive travel, speaking and publication contributed very materially to the development of peace sentiment in Europe and to the international peace congresses. He advocated congresses of nations, arbitral courts and peaceful settlement of all disputes.
   b. August Couvreur and August Visscher of Belgium secured government support.
   c. Delegates from England, United States, France, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Visscher, president. Burritt's influence on resolutions very noticeable.
3. Paris, 1849, Victor Hugo, President, Richard Cobden, Vice-President; Frankfort-on-Main, 1850; London, 1851; Manchester, 1852; Edinburgh, 1853.
4. With the Crimean war there occurred a lapse in the congresses. Congresses were held in Geneva, 1867; Paris, 1878; Brussels, 1882; Paris, 1889.
5. Since 1889 they have practically met annually. Permanent headquarters established at Berne in 1891: "Permanent International Bureau of Peace." List of congresses found in Annuaire de la Vie Internationale, 1908–9.
6. The influence of these Congresses toward developing official international congresses and ultimately the Hague Conferences is very considerable. The influence of World Fairs in this connection is also noteworthy. (Faries: Internationalism.)

C. Official recognition of the peace idea.
1. This is briefly treated in connection with the development of arbitration (see Chapter XXI), and with

the development of official international conferences. (See Chapter XV. See also Fried: Handbuch II, 70–95.) A few only of the many persons active in securing government recognition can be mentioned: William Jay, Charles Sumner, Richard Cobden, John Bright (Quaker), Henry Richard, Marquis of Bristol, Randall Cremer, Frederic Passy, Manzini.

2. The Interparliamentary Union, founded 1889, is a most significant indication of the strength behind the idea for the improvement of international relations.

a. It grew out of the proposal of Frederic Passy and Randal Cremer to the French Foreign Minister, Goblet, to have delegates of Parliament and the French Chambers meet to discuss an arbitration agreement like that between Great Britain and the United States. The minister supported it. The proposed meeting occurred in 1888 and called a meeting to be held at the Paris exposition, 1889. At the latter the Union became permanent as a medium between national legislatures.

b. Any member of a National legislature may become a member of the Interparliamentary Union. In 1912 there were 3,640 members. Headquarters in Brussels. Publications: Annuaire de l'Union Interparlementaire; Documents Interparlementaire.

D. The year 1889 is important in peace annals, as it marks several events of significance: First Pan-American Congress; Establishment of the Interparliamentary Union; Resumption of International Peace Congresses; the acceptance by leading governments of

the principle of arbitration. These all were forces which helped produce the Hague Conference in 1899. Since 1889 the activities against war have become numerous and variegated.

E. Leo Tolstoi occupies a unique place in pacifism. In his writings, particularly in "War and Peace," he advocates extreme non-resistance.

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XIX

INDUCTIVE OR PRACTICAL PACIFISM

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENGINEERING

I. Inductive pacifism is that which favors peace, not as an end in itself, but as the natural and logical, but incidental, consequence of other aims. It is rational and not emotional, is in keeping with the scientific tendencies of our age.

Its starting point is, not peace, but some actual condition of the present-day international relations which is not what it ought to be. It proposes a remedy which is the rational conclusion from the preceding critical study, one which will harmonize discordant factors and result in greater efficiency. Pointing out the defect or fallacy is the first step; proposing a remedy is next in importance; securing peace is incidental to the remedy. Its method is *a posteriori*. For this reason some object to being classed as peace advocates. Norman Angell distinguishes his enterprise from pacifism by calling it "civilism" or the international polity movement. Political engineering well describes it.

II. Inductive pacifism has only recently become important. It is largely critical, but it includes much of the recent so-called "constructive pacifism." The faults inherent in present international relations have been treated in detail elsewhere, and need merely be summarized here: —

A. The supposed economic benefits of war are challenged:

"Angellism" (see Chapter V); and the economic harm of war and the armed peace are demonstrated. (See Chapters VI, VII.)

B. The biological effects of war are investigated and are declared to be injurious. (See Chapter X.)

C. The consequences and dangers of the race in armaments are studied by Bloch and others. (See Chapter VI.)

D. The weaknesses of international law and its collapse in the face of nationalism are studied. (See Chapter XX.)

E. Nationalism is scrutinized and questioned. (See Chapters IV, XVI.)

F. Projects for reconstructing society are advanced. (See Chapters XVI, XXVI.)

XX

INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. Ancient times.

A. The co-existence of states was not a recognized principle; each state sought to subject or exterminate all other states. Oriental states and Roman Empire.

Thus there could be no international relations in the present sense.

B. Greeks admitted the principle of co-existing states.

The Greek city states all represented the same general culture and language.

They had relations properly called international.

They gradually fell to quarreling among themselves as did their neighbors and sought to subject each other. The interference of Rome put an end to their struggles before any state had been fully victorious.

II. Medieval times.

A. The Teutonic migrations broke up the Roman Empire and substituted a number of tribal units independent of each other.

B. This new society abandoned the ancient conception that states could not co-exist.

1. The influence of the Christian religion and the church.
2. The Teutonic ideal admitted the existence of clans and tribes side by side.
3. The confusion and darkness of the early medieval period obscured the differences between peoples.

C. Medieval states had relatively slight relations.

1. Under the feudal system a state was not a homoge-

neous organization, but rather a union of feudal entities held together by the personal bond of liege homage. It was these feudal entities, as much as the states themselves, that had relationships in the earlier middle ages.

2. In this period there was no such thing as international law.

III. The beginnings of international relations and laws.

A. International relations in the modern sense began to appear in the twelfth century.

1. The crusades developed a sense of nationalism among the various peoples of western Europe.
2. The feudal system began to yield before monarchical power.
3. The Reformation and especially the religious wars developed the sense of nationalism to a high degree in Europe.

B. In this period states, as such, steadily increased their dealings with one another, and at the time of the religious wars carried their animosities and national sentiments to exaggeration.

C. Early writers on international relations.

1. Legnano. Professor of Law at Bologna.
   "De bello, de represaliis, et de duello," 1360.
2. Belli. (Italian.)
   "De re militari et de bello," 1563.
3. Bruno. (German.)
   "De legationibus," 1548.
4. Victoria. (Spaniard.)
   "Reflectiones theologicæ," 1557.
5. Ayala. (Spaniard living in the Netherlands.)
   "De jure et officiis bellicis" . . . 1582.
6. Suarez. (Spanish Jesuit at Coimbra, Portugal.)
   "Tractatus de legibus et de legislatore," 1612.

7. Gentilis. (Italian.)
"De legationibus," 1585.
"Commentationes de jure belli," 1588–89.
"De jure belli libri tres," 1598.
"Advocatio Hispanica," 1613.

IV. The modern period.

A. National consciousness and international antipathies were fully developed by the time of the Thirty Years War, which involved practically all the nations of western Europe.

1. The consequence of this bitter period was an overemphasis on national independence; the absolute independence of a state from every other.

2. This condition arose in a monarchical age; and monarchs were in a position to exploit national antipathies.

Government by the people has replaced monarchy. The spread of democratic principles should operate to bring nations closer together.

B. International law developed in this age.

1. Hugo Grotius (1583–1635). "Father of the Law of Nations."

"De jure belli ac pacis libri tres." 1625. (Engl. transl. Whewell; and Extract in Old South Leaflets, Vol. 5, No. 101, pp. 1–24.)

This work recognizes both—

Customary or voluntary law. (Positive law.)

Natural law: This is held to be most important, hence: *Jus gentium, i. e.*, law of nations.

2. Zouche, 1590–1660. (Englishman.)

"Iuris et iudicii fecialis, sive iuris inter gentes, et quæstionum de eodem explicatio." (Edited by Holland; transl. by Brierly.)

Emphasizes voluntary international law at the expense of the natural law of Grotius. Hence: *Jus inter gentes, i. e.*, international law.

C. Three schools of the law of nations.

1. Naturalists: accept natural law.
2. Positivists: reject natural law.
3. Grotians: Recognize natural and voluntary law.

D. Historical development.

1. Naturalists and Grotians predominated to and through French Revolution.
2. Nineteenth century saw triumph of positivists.

V. The scope of international law has continually developed with increasing international intercourse, but has always been somewhat behind.

A. Conventions regulating the relations of nations in time of peace have been found useful and necessary and have constantly increased in number.

B. During the nineteenth century, conventions providing the rules for war have been adopted.

The principal conventions and international agreements which have placed restrictions on warfare:

1. Declaration of Paris, 1856.
   Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences, 349.
   [Francis Lieber Code, 1863. Not a treaty, but instructions to the Federal Army in the Civil War. Scott: Texts, 350–376.]
2. Geneva Convention, 1864. (1868.)
   Scott: Texts, 376–381.
   The Red Cross developed from this. (See Chapter XIV.)
3. Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868.
   Scott: Texts, 381–382.
   [Project of an international declaration concerning the laws and customs of war, adopted by the

Conference of Brussels, August 27, 1874. Scott: Texts, 382–389.]

[Laws of war on land. Recommended for adoption by the Institute of International Law at its session in Oxford, September 9, 1880. Scott: Texts, 389–400.]

4. Hague Peace Conference, 1899.
   Scott: Texts 1–92.
5. Convention regarding hospital ships (The Hague), 1904.
   Scott: Texts, 400–402.
6. Second Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the sick and wounded of armies in the field, 1906.
   Scott: Texts, 402–409.
7. The Second Hague Conference, 1907.
   Scott: Texts, 93–334.
8. Declaration of London, 1909.
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   This declaration failed to secure the signature of England, which as the chief naval power, thus practically defeated it. Still, the many appeals to the declaration during the Great War, indicate a wide-spread recognition of the soundness of the principles of the declaration.

VI. International law is made by treaty between states, by court decisions involving international relations which may, though they need not, become precedents, and in some measure by custom which nations follow as long as they please. International law is, as yet, merely the law dictated by a nation with power to enforce its desires: England makes sea law. As treaties bind only those who make them, and as the parties to any given treaty have usually been small in number,

international law may be very different between different pairs of nations. International law is not universal and lacks uniformity.

The Hague Conferences began to remedy this grave defect by bringing a large number of nations together to discuss common agreement. It is the nearest approach to a codification of common international law for all nations that we have had, and it needs to be continued.

VII. Sanction. International law as yet lacks an adequate sanction.

A. Nations are bound only by treaties which they sign.

B. They are bound only as long as they choose to be.

There is no force to compel the observance of a treaty.

Besides full sovereignty of a nation — the same which determined whether it should sign a treaty — seems to imply the right to abrogate the treaty; for, if it cannot do so, it is not sovereign.

C. Public opinion, upon which all law — including national law — depends for its effectiveness, is by reason of education, not behind international law but behind some one national interpretation of international law. Public opinion cannot be behind both nationalism and international law.

When it is back of a law of nations it will be effective.

D. It is to secure an adequate sanction that a world federation, a world police and similar institutions are being proposed in many quarters.

VIII. Five morals that Oppenheim deduced from the development of the Law of Nations to date. (Oppenheim, I, 73–76.)

A law of nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the family of nations.

International law can develop progressively only when

international politics, especially intervention, are made on the basis of real state interests.

The principle of nationality is of such force that it is fruitless to try to stop its victory.

Every progress in the development of international law wants due time to ripen.

The progressive development of international law depends chiefly upon the standard of public morality on the one hand, and, on the other, the economic interests.

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XXI

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

I. Ancient period.

A. Oriental states: arbitration had no place in an age when some one state must be supreme and all others subject.

B. Greece: Arbitration well known. About 75 cases recorded.

Arbiters: Amphictyonic Council, oracles, friendly cities.

Awards executed in a ratio of 17: 3.

C. Rome: Arbitration known, but the extension of the Empire tended to bring it into disuse.

Three classes of arbitration (Phillipson, 154).

International, federal, administrative.

II. Medieval period. Not a feature of the middle ages though many differences were settled by means of arbitration.

A. Arbiters: pope, emperor, various potentates, cities.

B. Cases of arbitral settlement in the middle ages are numerous, but relatively unimportant. The most famous is the fixing of the Line of Demarcation by Alexander VI, 1493, determining the Spanish and Portuguese claims to the newly discovered lands and seas.

C. Special agreements to arbitrate (Moch, 36–38).

1238. Treaty of alliance between Genoa and Venice contained a general arbitral clause.

1291. Three Swiss cantons accepted arbitration.

1389. Denmark and Norway obliged by treaty to

submit their differences to the Hanse for settlement.

1418. Hanseatic cities adopted principle of arbitration.

1516. "Perpetual peace" between France and Switzerland recognized the principle.

III. Modern period.

A. Early advocates of arbitration. (See Chapters XVII, XVIII.)

B. Arbitration and mediation in the early modern period. Monaco and Savoy, 1713. (See Bridgman: First Book of World Law, 72.)

C. Early treaties involving the principle of arbitration (Darby, 240 f.).

"Conservators of Commerce," 1606.

Treaties of Westminster, 1654–1674.

Treaty of Florence: England and Savoy, 1669.

Judges Conservators, 1712. (Assiento.)

Treaty of Ryswick, 1697.

Jay Treaty: United States and England, 1794. Usually regarded as the first modern treaty of arbitration.

D. The acceptance of arbitration by legislative bodies.

(It will be noticed that the work of the peace advocates mentioned in Chapters XVII and XVIII was in the main of a private, unofficial character; it prepared the way for legislative or official consideration of arbitration which is here treated.)

The United States played a leading rôle.

1835. Resolution favoring the erection of an international tribunal of arbitration adopted by the Senate of Massachusetts. (Ladd and Thompson.)

1837. Similar resolution adopted by both House and Senate of Massachusetts.

1842. William Jay proposed a treaty of arbitration with England.

1851. Foreign Affairs Committee (Senate) approved of arbitration.

1853. Senate of the United States unanimously adopted Underwood resolution favoring arbitration.

1870. Arbitration of the Alabama claims.

1874. Senate adopted a resolution favoring arbitration in the settlement of international differences. (Hamlin.)

1874. Resolution in House.

1882. President Arthur's message favored arbitration.

1889. First Pan-American Conference. United States favored advanced arbitration agreement.

1890. Congress approved a resolution favoring treaties of arbitration with all powers. (Sherman-Hitt.)

1896. President Cleveland favored advanced arbitration treaty with Great Britain.

1904. President Roosevelt took steps to secure a Second Hague Conference.

1910. President Taft advocated unreserved arbitration.

1913. Secretary of State Bryan proposed a definite plan whereby no dispute shall become a cause for war until it shall have been reviewed by an international commission. This to supplement arbitration treaties.

France, first in Europe.

1849. Bouvert introduced a resolution in favor of arbitration into National Assembly. Defeated.

England.

1849. Bill favoring arbitration defeated by Commons after violent debate. (Cobden, Hobhouse, Milner-Gibson.)

1873. Commons approved arbitration, though opposed by Gladstone. (Richard, Lawson.)

1887. Bill introduced into the House of Lords but withdrawn because of the opposition of Lord Salisbury. (Marquis of Bristol.)

1887. Treaty of arbitration with United States attempted by England at the instance of John Bright.

The Netherlands.

1873–4. Question of arbitration raised in the States-General by Van Eck and Bredius. No action. Carried further in 1878 and 1904.

Italy.

1873. Mancini introduced a bill into Chambers favoring the insertion of arbitral clauses in treaties. Adopted. Has been put into practice.

Sweden.

1874. Lower House adopted resolution favoring a permanent arbitral tribunal. (Jonassen.)

Denmark.

1875. Measure similar to the last above defeated in the Folketing.

1878. Folketing adopted a petition favoring the arbitration of differences between Scandinavian states.

Belgium.

1875. Senate and Chamber of Representatives adopted a measure favoring arbitration. (Couvreur, Thonissen, Kint de Roodenbeke.)

The establishment of the Interparliamentary Union, 1889, and the initial success of the Pan-American movement, 1889, practically saw the triumph of the principle of arbitration of international differences. Since that time the question has been what the scope of arbitration shall be, as will appear from the following.

IV. Classification of treaties of arbitration.

(Writers differ in their classification, and the following grouping is a combination of several schemes.)

In all treaties of arbitration the clause of reference is particularly important, as it determines the character of the treaty as well as the class of matters to be submitted to arbitration. (*Am. J. of Intern. Law*, 2, 823 f.)

A. Treaties submitting a specific difference to arbitration, drafted *after* the dispute began ("occasional" arbitration). This type of treaty dates from about 1800.

B. Treaties agreeing to submit to arbitration *future* differences ("permanent"). This type of treaty dates from about 1835. The principle was fairly well accepted by 1889. These treaties submit differences:

1. Over the interpretation of the treaty (containing the clause of arbitration) or rising out of it ("à clause spéciale").

First of this kind: Chile–Peru, 1823 (Moch, 9).

For a list (incomplete) of treaties of this kind see La Fontaine: Pasicrisie, xii.

2. Over any matter, whether rising out of treaties or otherwise, usually excepting certain categories of disputes (general treaties).

[This has been accomplished (1) by inserting a clause to that effect in a treaty relating to another matter ("à clause générale." The first treaty of

this kind according to La Fontaine, x, is Colombia-Central Republic, 1825. La Fontaine gives an incomplete list of these treaties); or (2), by a treaty made especially for the purpose (a treaty of arbitration proper). Moch, p. 41, seems to hold that the first treaty of this character was one between Colombia and Peru, 1822.]

Disputes which are excepted from arbitration by treaties:

Questions concerning the constitution of a state.

Questions of vital interest, independence, national honor, and those which concern the interests of third parties. (France–England, 1903; U. S.–England, 1908; and many others.)

Questions not justiciable in their nature by reason of not being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity. (So-called Taft treaties with England and France, pending 1912.)

C. Compulsory or "obligatory" treaties.

Treaties have been drawn which aim to define what disputes between nations cannot be said to compromise vital interest, independence, national honor, or the interests of third parties, or any of the subjects included under exceptions from arbitration, and which guarantee to submit to arbitration all disputes of this class. These are treaties of compulsory arbitration. Though these treaties differ somewhat in detail they roughly agree that, if diplomacy fails, arbitration shall be regarded as compulsory for the following classes of differences:

1. Disputes concerning the application or interpretation of any treaty, relating to:

(1) Matters of international private law.

(2) The management of companies.

(3) Matters of civil and criminal procedure and of extradition.

2. Disputes concerning pecuniary claims based on damages (with certain limitations).

3. Differences of a judicial order. (*Am. J. of Int. Law*, 2, 823–30.)

D. Unlimited treaties agree to arbitrate all differences except:

1. Those which can be settled by diplomacy.

All the treaties make this exception, but it does not properly constitute a reservation.

2. Those which affect the principles of the constitution of either country.

3. Those (between individuals and states) which according to the existing laws of the country fall within the jurisdiction of the national courts, unless —

The difference arises out of the application of a convention between the states.

Justice has been denied.

From the foregoing it appears that none of the so-called treaties of unlimited arbitration agrees to submit *all* international disputes to arbitration; rather, they contemplate the arbitration of all questions which are *truly international*, and not purely governmental in character.

Treaties of this kind have been entered into by Belgium, Siam, Argentine, Chile, Denmark, The Netherlands, Italy, Colombia, Ecuador, Portugal, and the Central American States.

It should be observed that most of these treaties agreeing to submit all differences to arbitration are between nations that are of second class or are remote

from each other and whose differences are therefore not likely to be acute or subject to settlement by war.

E. National and international treaties of arbitration.

1. The foregoing are *national* treaties, that is they are agreements which each contracting party made with the other according to its individual convenience. If each of the forty-nine sovereign states of earth made a treaty with every other, there would be 1,176 treaties. This complexity has led to a desire for a general, or international treaty which all nations shall accept.

2. International treaties already exist in The Hague Conventions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes (see Chapters XXII, XXIII), the Central American convention to erect a Court of Justice (see Chapter XXIV), and the agreements of the Pan-American Conferences.

F. Life of treaties of arbitration.

Usually for five or ten years: renewable; lapse if not renewed.

Indeterminate: run until abrogated.

V. Number of treaties of arbitration is hard to establish because of the differences in classification, and incompleteness of researches.

A. Treaties of occasional arbitration; number not ascertained.

B. Treaties agreeing to submit future differences ("à clause spéciale" and "à clause générale").

La Fontaine, xiv–xv. 1821–1900.

North America	172
Europe	87
Africa	12
Asia	6
South America	4
Total	281

Moch, 127–130. 1822–1909.

314 treaties of all classes.

120 eliminated because counted twice or expired.

194 in force in 1909.

Of these, 163 are treaties of arbitration proper according to Moch's classification.

C. Treaties of compulsory or "obligatory" arbitration. These were made in pursuance of Article 19, of the Convention for Pacific Settlement, Hague Conference, 1899. (*Am. J. of Int. Law*, 2, 823–30.)

1903..... 2 treaties of this kind.
1904.....27
1905.....48
1906.....49
1907.....53
1908.....80

(Bulletin de la Conciliation Intern. No. 3, 1908.)

VI. Arbitral Procedure (Ralston: International Arbitral Law and Procedure, especially pp. 17–85; 129–140).

A. Special agreement ("compromis," protocol). Every case is submitted to arbitration by means of a special agreement.

1. Names the arbiters. (A list of persons who have been arbiters in Richet, 300–301.)

Single arbiter.

Tribunal: each disputant selects arbiters and these selected representatives name an umpire.

2. Defines the power of the arbiters.
3. Fixes the rules of procedure.
4. Defines the question at issue.
5. Promises to accept the award (sometimes).
6. Special agreement as provided by the Hague Conferences.

1899, I, Art. 31 (Scott: Texts, 36).
1907, I, Art. 52 (Scott: Texts, 177).
Differences about the special agreement may be arbitrated.

7. Each power ratifies the special agreement according to the provisions of its constitution.

B. Procedure.

The procedure is determined by special agreement. No code as yet accepted, though Hague Conferences make a beginning, 1899, I, Art. 48: The "tribunal is authorized to declare its competence in interpreting the 'Compromis' . . . and in applying the principles of international [the word 'international' was omitted from the draft of the Convention for Pacific Settlement, Art. 73, 1907] law." (Scott: Texts, 40–41.)

C. Appeal and revision.

Arbitration implies the intention to accept the award. Hague Conference, 1899, I, Art. 55: "The parties can reserve in the 'Compromis' the right to demand the revision of the award. In this case, and unless there be an agreement to the contrary, the demand must be addressed to the Tribunal which pronounced the award. It can only be made on the ground of the discovery of some new fact calculated to exercise a decisive influence on the award, and which, at the time the discussion was closed, was unknown to the Tribunal and to the party demanding the revision. Proceedings for revision can only be instituted by a decision of the Tribunal expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing in it the character described in the foregoing paragraph, and declaring the demand admissible on this ground. The 'Compromis' fixes the period within which the

demand for the revision must be made." (Scott: Texts, 42–43.)

Renewed in practically the same terms in 1907, Convention I, Art. 83. (Scott: Texts, 186–7.)

D. The sanction of arbitration: public opinion only.

VII. Frequency of recourse to arbitration. (Hague cases. See Chapter XXIV and Appendix V.)

Moch, 26. 1800–1900. 212 cases. All accepted.

Darby, 769–917. 1800–1900. 222 arbitrations proper.
1900–1904. 21
Total 243 formal arbitrations.

Besides these, Darby gives 297 instances in which he considers the principle of arbitration was applied.

La Fontaine, viii. 1794–1900, 177 arbitrations.

1794–1820.....15 cases.
1821–1840..... 8
1841–1860.....20
1861–1880.....44
1881–1900.....90.

By countries to 1901. (To 1904, Richet, p. 304.)

Great Britain.....70 (heads the list).
United States.....56
Chile.....26
France.....26

(For the complete list by countries and by grand divisions see La Fontaine, ix.)

Richet, 362–4. 1794–1904. 210 cases.

(Richet gives a list of these cases by years and by decades, showing the average per year.)

VIII. Serious differences settled by arbitration (selected).

Alabama case (1871–72); The Carolines (Germany and France, 1885); Samoan case (United States, Germany, England, 1899); Guiana boundary (England–Venezuela, 1899; United States intervened); Casa-

blanca affair (Germany–France, 1909); House-tax case (England, France, Germany-Japan, 1905), etc.

IX. Classes of differences submitted to arbitration.

Boundary disputes (probably most abundant), territory, violation of territorial integrity, pecuniary claims of all kinds (including the crown jewels of the House of Hanover), commerce, navigation of rivers, fisheries, interpretation of treaties, violations of treaties, indemnities, immigration, citizenship, tariffs, seizure of ships, false arrests (sovereignty? — succession to the throne of Persia, 1835; inheritance in Lippe-Detmold, 1897; House-tax in Japan, 1905; Ottoman Public Debt, 1903).

X. Success of arbitration: Every award has been accepted.

(Some mention the award of the King of the Netherlands in the Canadian boundary case between the United States and Great Britain, 1831, as an exception. However, the United States rejected the award on the ground that the arbiter had exceeded his powers hence this is not a real refusal to accept the decision. The difference was settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842.)

Bolivia and Peru threatened to reject an arbitral sentence in 1909, but finally accepted it.

XI. The cost of arbitration. It is insignificant compared to the cost of war.

XII. The weakness of arbitration.

A. There is no means of compelling nations to resort to arbitration. The Hague Conventions give third nations no authority except to remind nations at dispute of the Hague Tribunal. (The League to Enforce Peace suggests a remedy for this weakness. See Chapter XXVI.)

B. Nations submit only those differences which they do not consider worth fighting for, that is, unimportant matters. Arbitration is a palliative, not a cure, for war.

C. Powerful nations need not submit even unimportant differences with weak states to arbitration.

D. Nations object to obligating themselves in advance to arbitrate differences, as such an obligation would in effect be a limitation of their sovereignty or freedom of action.

E. Arbitration operates to the advantage of the weak or unprepared nation, by giving it time to prepare; accordingly a nation ready to act cannot accept arbitration of vital matters.

F. Arbitral awards lack an adequate sanction.

1. Public opinion is the only sanction so far, and it is not enough developed or unified to have any weight in international affairs.
2. Several plans for making arbitral awards effective have been proposed.
   a. Surrendering the object in dispute to the arbiters beforehand, to be disposed of according to the sentence; or, if that is not feasible, giving some pledge which is to be sequestered if the award is not accepted; such as territory, a building, property, lien on customs, a ship, etc.
   (Chile offered to deposit one million dollars with the Hague Tribunal in her dispute with the United States, 1909.)
   b. Loss of neutrality for the state refusing to accept award. (Proposed by Vianna at Latin American Scientific Congress at Montevideo.)

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XXII

THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

May 18—July 29, 1899

I. Origin.

A. The way for the Hague Conferences was blazed by the various advocates, notably William Ladd, mentioned in Chapters XVII and XVIII; also by the Universal Peace Congresses and the Pan-American Congresses.

B. The First Hague Conference was called by the Czar, who had been influenced by Bloch. (See Chapter XIV.)

1. Rescript of the Czar, August 24 (O. S. Aug. 12), 1898.
2. Second Rescript, January, 1899 (O. S. Dec., 1898), Scott: Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague, p. 4.

II. Place. The Hague, as convenient, and the capital of a smaller nation. Meetings were held in the House in the Woods ("Huis ten Bosch").

III. Participation.

A. Difficulty as to what powers should be invited.

B. Russia invited all those having representatives at St. Petersburg; a few exceptions. The fact that the Papacy was not asked to participate created ill-feeling which appeared at the final session (Scott: Conferences, I, 84 f.)

59 powers claimed sovereignty; 26 were represented.
20 European (Monaco, San Marino, Papacy, omitted).
4 Asiatic: China, Japan, Siam, Persia.
2 American: United States, Mexico.

100 delegates; from 1 to 8 per nation. Each country had *one* vote. Delegates seated alphabetically (by countries).

IV. Organization.

A. Conference. When all the delegates met, the meeting was called a plenary session. There were ten of these.

President: Baron de Staal (Russia) not well versed in parliamentary procedure.

Cabinet consisting of "first delegates."

Steering committee of first delegates of the seven great powers.

B. Commissions.

1. Armaments and the use of new implements, 50 members.
   a. Military warfare.
   b. Naval warfare.
2. Laws and customs of warfare, 67 members.
   a. Military.
   b. Naval.
3. Arbitration and other means of preventing war, 59 members. This commission achieved the most important work of the Conference.

Commissions on Petitions, 15 members.

Commission on Editing, 4 members.

(Each state had right to be represented on a commission and the first delegates determined membership.)

C. Honorary offices. There were quite a few of these and the appointments were made with a view to keeping delegates in a good humor.

V. Ceremonies and social functions were prominent features of the Conference; often they were arranged with a view to facilitating the work of the Conference by winning or placating influential persons. The

importance of the social side of the Conference in relation to its achievements, must not be overlooked. The American delegation arranged a Grotius ceremony for July 4.

VI. Procedure.

The language of the Conference was French, but any delegate might, on request, have an address translated into his language. Full, but not *verbatim* reports of the sessions were kept.

The sessions were secret, because the delegates feared that differences in the Conference would be featured and probably exaggerated by the press, and thus react injuriously on the Conference.

The reporters, who called themselves "the ambassadors of the peoples" strenuously objected, and finally summaries of the work of each session were authorized and released by the Commission on Editing.

Many deputations, delegations or petitions were directed to the Conference, which refused to receive some of them (the Persians) in compliance with the desires of certain powers.

Propositions were first considered and developed by the appropriate commission and then submitted to the Conference in plenary session. Thus the real work was done in the Commissions.

VII. Achievements.

A. The greatest achievement was undoubtedly the fact that the Conference accomplished anything at all, for it was generally expected to fail. The success of the first venture led to the Second Hague Conference. The Final Act has been called the "Magna Charta of International Law."

B. The common deliberation and general agreement of a large number of nations to given principles of law

was of the highest importance as it marks the nearest approach to codification of international law to that date.

C. The resolutions of the Conference, embodied in the Final Act, were of three kinds:

1. Conventions; there were three of these. (Scott: Texts, 21–79.)

a. Convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences. (Scott: Texts, 31–45.)

Good offices and mediation to be tried.

Object: to permit third powers to help disputants bring their differences to arbitration, or to bring a war to an end.

Encouraged by both the Hague Conferences.

1899, I. Arts. 2–8. (Scott: Texts, 24–26.)

1907, I. Arts. 2–8. (Scott: Texts, 157–159.)

International commissions of inquiry created and pronounced "useful" (and "desirable" in 1907). Ralston, 315–318. First formal recognition by Hague Conference, 1899, I, Arts. 9–14. (Scott: Texts, 26–28.)

If powers cannot settle a matter by diplomatic means, a commission may be appointed to investigate the facts.

Constituted by special agreement. (See Chapter XXI.)

Powers are expected to help the work of the commission by furnishing the facts in their possession.

Report of the commission has about it nothing of the character of an award, and leaves the nations at dispute their entire freedom.

Commission employed in the "Dogger Bank" affair, 1904, and in the differences between

France and Italy over the seizure of ships during the Tripolitan war, 1912. (See Appendix V.)

Second Hague Conference, (1907, I. Arts. 9–36 Scott: Texts, 159–168) elaborates the scheme.

Permanent Court of Arbitration established. The best thing accomplished by the first Conference. (Scott: Texts, 30–45.)

Germany offered the chief opposition, which was overcome by the work of Zorn backed by Andrew D. White and Holls. There was an attempt to provide for compulsory arbitration of given differences. This was defeated by German opposition.

After the court was agreed upon, the United States made a reservation calculated to exclude matters affecting the Monroe Doctrine from the scope of arbitration. (Scott: Conferences I, 80.)

Nations agreeing to this convention and the proportion of the world's population represented by them.

World's population, 1899: 1,531,463,430.

Signatories, 22 powers, representing 54 % of the world's population.

Signatories with reservation, 4 powers representing 8% of the world's population.

Total signers, 26 powers, representing 62%.

Adhering to the Convention later (not having been represented at The Hague), 18 powers, representing 29%.

Total accepting Convention, 44 nations, representing 91% of the world's population.

b. Convention regarding the laws and customs of war on land. (Scott: Texts, 45–71.)

Adopted a code of warfare, based on the Lieber Code, which sought not only to alleviate suffering, but to prevent it as well.

c. Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, 1864. (Scott: Texts, 71–79.)

2. Declarations. (Scott, 79–85.)

a. To prevent the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods. (Scott: Texts, 79–80.) For five years.

b. To prohibit the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. (Scott: Texts, 81–83.)

c. To prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body (mushroom or dum-dum bullets) such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions. (Scott: Texts, 83–85.)

The opposition to these declarations was strongly supported by Captain Mahan, delegated from the United States. (White: The First Hague Conference.)

3. Wishes. (Scott: Texts, 20–21.)

a. For a revision of the Geneva Convention.

b. Insertion of rights and duties of neutrals in program of an international conference.

c. For a study of employment of new types and calibers of guns.

d. For consideration of limitation of armaments and war budgets.

e. For consideration by a future conference of the inviolability of private property at sea.

f. For consideration by a future conference of the

question of bombardment of posts, towns and villages by naval forces.

VIII. Signatures, ratifications, and reservations. (Scott: Hague Conventions and Declarations, pp. 229–234.)

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XXIII

THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE

June 15–October 18, 1907

I. Origin. (Scott: Texts, 93–111.)

Requested by the Interparliamentary Union in St. Louis, 1904, which sent a delegation to President Roosevelt, asking him to take the initiative.

Circular of Secretary Hay, 1904.

Roosevelt relinquished the honor of calling the Conference to the Czar.

Czar issued invitation and program.

Limitation of armaments, at the request of the United States, Spain, England.

Collection of contract debts. Requested by the United States.

II. Place: The Hague; Hall of the Knights ("De Ridderzaal").

III. Participation.

More nations invited than to First Conference (South American Republics).

59 states claimed sovereignty: 47 were invited; 44 accepted, representing more than 96% of the world's population.

21 European states (Norway having become independent). The Papacy was not invited.

4 Asiatic.

19 American.

256 delegates: 1 to 11 per country (including technical

delegates); one vote per country; delegates seated as before.

IV. Organization: much like that of the First Conference.

A. Conference. Eleven plenary sessions.

President: M. Nelidow of Russia.

Steering committee consisting of the first delegates of the Great Powers.

B. Commissions.

1. Arbitration.

a. Projects for arbitration and prevention of war, 103 members.

b. Maritime prizes, 89 members.

2. War on land.

a. Laws and customs of war on land, 79 members.

b. Rights and duties of neutrals on land, and declaration of war, 82 members.

3. War on the sea.

a. Bombardment of ports, and the use of submarine mines, torpedoes, etc., 73 members.

b. Belligerent ships in neutral waters; and the application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, 82 members.

4. Maritime law, 114 members.

Commission on petitions, 5 members.

Commission on editing, 29 members.

V. Ceremonies and festivities were like those of the First Conference.

Some considered the social functions to be overdone to the detriment of the work of the Conference.

Cornerstone of the Palace of Peace (gift of Carnegie) laid, July 30.

Each country to furnish something in the way of decoration for the structure. (Suggestion of d'Estournelles de Constant.)

VI. Procedure.

Much the same as in the First Conference. The proceedings were more open.

VII. Achievements.

A. The Second Conference achieved less striking results than the first; indeed its chief work lay in improving and developing the work of the former Conference. The session dragged out to considerable length and grew tedious for the delegates.

B. The work of the Conference embodied in the Final Act was of several kinds:

1. Conventions.

Convention I, for the pacific settlement of international disputes. (Scott: Texts, 155–193.)

Improved the procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the facilities of good offices, mediation and commissions of inquiry.

Either party to a dispute may, without consulting the other, declare its willingness to submit the difference to arbitration.

Arbitration remained voluntary except in case of contract debts (Convention II) and of Prize (Convention XII).

Convention II, limiting the use of force for the recovery of contract debts. (Scott, 193–198.)

Force to be used only after arbitration has failed.

Conventions III, IV, V. Further rules of warfare on land. (Scott, 198–240.)

Conventions VI, XI, XIII. Rules for maritime warfare. (Scott, 240–288.)

Convention XII, relative to the creation of an international Prize Court. (Scott, 288–315.)

2. Declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons. (Scott, 332–334.)

The nations were cautious in signing this.

3. Declarations of principle. (Scott, 137–8.) The Conference unanimously:
   a. Admitted the principle of compulsory arbitration.
   b. Declared that certain disputes, particularly those relating to the interpretation and application of treaties, may, without restriction, be submitted to compulsory arbitration.
4. The conference expressed its faith in the usefulness of international conferences, urged the limitation of military expenditure, and further examination of means to this end.
5. Opinions. The Conference:
   a. Recommended the adoption of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice. (Scott, 141–154. See also 350.)
   b. In case of war pacific relations, particularly commercial and industrial relations, of belligerents and neutrals should be maintained by all.
   c. Powers should by treaty regulate the position, as regards military charges, of foreigners residing within their territories.
   d. Regulations relative to the law and customs of naval warfare should figure in the program of the next Conference, and that, as far as possible, powers should at sea apply the laws and customs of war on land.
6. The Conference expressed a wish for a third Conference to be "held within a period corresponding to that which has elapsed since the preceding Conference." The calling of this new Conference was taken out of the hands of any one government and given to an international committee which is to meet for that purpose about two years before Conference

XXIV

THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY

I. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1899. (Scott: Texts, pp. 30–45; 170–188.)

A. Administration of the court.

1. Permanent Administrative Council consists of diplomatic representatives accredited to The Hague.
   Organizes and administers the International Bureau.
2. International Bureau; record office of court.
   Secretarial in character; has custody of archives.
   Makes necessary preparations and gives its premises for court purposes.
   Publishes the documents of cases determined by the court.
   Expenses carried by signatory powers in proportion fixed by Universal Postal Union.

B. Jurisdiction.

1. Competent for all arbitration cases unless parties agree to institute a special tribunal.
2. Non-signatory powers may use court free.

C. Organization.

1. Judges. (See list of in World Almanac 1916, pp. 130–132.)
   Each power selects four or less persons. Same person may be selected by several powers.
   150 selected up to 1912.
   Term six years; renewable.
2. Judges for any particular case.
   Each disputant selects an equal number of judges from list above.

assembles. A Committee has charge of preparing the program. Preliminary steps were taken in The Hague in February, 1912, for the summoning of the Third Conference in 1915, and France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and The Netherlands had moved in the matter. The Great War has postponed the further consideration of a Conference.

VIII. Signatures, ratifications, and reservations. (Scott: Hague Conventions and Declarations, pp. 235–259.)

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   150 selected up to 1912.
   Term six years; renewable.
2. Judges for any particular case.
   Each disputant selects an equal number of judges from list above.

Only one may be from nation of disputant (1907 amendment).

These four choose an umpire.

Failing to agree, selection is entrusted to a third power.

This failing, each party selects a different power and these two determine the umpire.

This failing, after two months, each party selects two judges from list above (not nationals) and lot determines which of these is to be umpire (1907).

3. Arbitrators enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

D. Operation.

1. Preliminaries.

a. Agreement of nations necessary to bring case before the court (amendment 1907).

b. "Compromis" (text of this agreement) states difference and arbitrators' powers.

c. Signatory powers have duty of reminding other states of court.

2. Procedure.

a. To sit at The Hague unless some other place be selected by the arbitrators (1907).

b. Language to be used determined by the court.

c. Discussions public only if parties assent.

d. Recorded in "procès-verbaux."

This supplied to the powers invited to the Second Peace Conference as well as to powers which have adhered to the convention (1907).

E. Deliberations of the court private ("and remain secret," 1907).

3. Award.

a. Given by majority vote, accompanied by reasons. Minority may record dissent when signing.

b. Award is binding upon parties.

c. No appeal from the award.

d. Revision permitted if:

(1) Stipulated by "compromis" and within time stipulated.

(2) New facts of vital importance are discovered which were unknown at time of award to court and party demanding revision. (Court determines that question, 1907.)

e. Drawn up in writing and read at a public meeting of the tribunal, the agents and counsel of the parties being present.

4. Expenses of a hearing.

Each party pays its own and an equal share of the court's.

F. Cases decided by the court (See Appendix V).

II. International Prize Court, 1907. (Scott, pp. 288–317.)

A. Administration.

1. The Administrative Council fulfills with regard to the Prize Court the same functions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration but only representatives of contracting powers may be members of it.

2. The International Bureau acts as registry to the court.

B. Jurisdiction.

1. Cases appealed under fixed conditions after having been tried in national courts. No further appeal.

2. It has always been assumed that the declaration of London will serve as a sort of code for the court.

C. Organization.

1. Composed of judges and deputy judges appointed by the contracting powers.

2. Appointed for six year term; appointments renewable; judges equal in rank; seniority obtains.

3. The court is composed of fifteen judges; 8 powers are represented all the time: Germany, United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia. Judges from others sit "by rota," as shown by a table in Scott, pp. 316–7.
4. Paid by International Bureau. No other compensation allowed.

D. So far the court has not been used.

III. Central American Court of Justice, 1907. (International Bureau of American Republics, Vol. 25, pp. 1351–57.)

A. Administration.

1. Court elects its own officials, including president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer.
2. Makes its own rules of procedure.
3. Sits at city of Cartago in Costa Rica unless necessary to move.

B. Jurisdiction.

1. "All controversies or questions which may arise among them of whatsoever nature and no matter what their origin may be, in case the respective Departments of Foreign Affairs should not have been able to reach an understanding."
2. Also international questions which may arise between a Central American government and a foreign government.
3. Questions between an individual and a Central American government.
4. Shall also have jurisdiction over the conflicts which may arise between the legislative, judicial and executive powers.

C. Organization.

1. Five justices, named by the legislative body of the respective powers and also two substitutes from each.

2. Appointed for five years and can carry on no other work during period.
3. All five necessary for a quorum. Agreement of three or more necessary for a decision.
4. Judgments communicated to all five Republics. Binding and final. Salaries paid by treasurer of the court. Expenses borne equally by all nations.

D. This agreement is valid for ten years.

IV. Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, planned at the Second Hague Conference, 1907. (Scott: Texts, pp. 141–154.)

A. Administration.

Administered by International Bureau.

B. Jurisdiction.

1. Cases to be decided on their merits.
2. Only signatory powers can use it.

C. Organization.

1. Composed of judges and deputy judges selected from persons of high standing in their respective countries, as far as possible from members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Method of appointment left to individual nations.
2. Term of judges 12 years; equal in rank; seniority.
3. Three judges, selected annually by others, form delegation to carry the administrative work of court.
4. This delegation is competent to decide certain types of questions if disputants submit them; but each disputant has the right to have one of its nationals act as judge in a case in which it is concerned.
5. Judge not to act in case where his country is a litigant.
6. Salaries paid by International Bureau. No other compensation permitted.
7. Enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

D. Procedure.

1. Court to meet at fixed times and sit until business is finished.
2. Sits at The Hague and cannot be transferred unless absolutely obliged by circumstances.
3. A report of the doings of the court drawn up every year by the delegation and sent to contracting powers.

E. The Hague Conference left it to diplomatic agency to complete the erection of this court; this has never occurred.

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XXV

MISCELLANEOUS PROJECTS FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY

I. Diplomatic agreements and proposals to remove friction between nations.

A. Readjustment of boundaries and territories.

1. Boundaries and territorial acquisitions have often been satisfactorily arranged without war.

Boundary and separation of Norway and Sweden, 1905.

Canadian-American boundary settlements. In this connection the agreement not to fortify the Canadian frontier and the effect of this step on the good relations of Canada and the United States should be noted.

Louisiana purchased from France by the United States, 1803.

Gadsden Purchase by the United States, 1853.

Alaska purchased from Russia by the United States, 1867.

Brazil purchased a disputed area from Bolivia in 1904.

Partition of Samoa by Great Britain, Germany and the United States.

2. Proposals for territorial and boundary readjustments.

Proposal that the United States voluntarily surrender the Panhandle to Canada. House Joint Res. 146, introduced by Mr. Smith of Maryland, Oct. 31, 1913. Also H. J. Res. 83.

[Though not related to boundaries, the voluntary act of the United States in returning the amount of the

Boxer Indemnity to China may be mentioned here as an instance of international good will.]

B. Neutralizations.

1. Neutralizations in the past. (See Chapter XXVI.)
2. Proposed neutralizations.
   Alsace-Lorraine, Philippines, Panama Canal.

C. Immunity of private property at sea.

The Hague Conventions provided for the immunity of private property on land. Similar immunity on the sea was opposed and defeated by Great Britain, both at The Hague and also at the London Conference (1909). The United States has long advocated this principle and stood for it at the Hague Conferences. (White: The First Hague Conference.)

D. Joint—or world—control of arenas of conflict (Lippmann's proposal).

E. Many disputes have been settled by diplomatic means. A few of the graver disputes have been designated by Fried (Handbuch I, 96–103) as "unfought wars."

II. Schemes to delay the outbreak of war: "Cold storage treaties."

A. This is the idea behind commissions of inquiry (see Chapters XXII, XXIII), and particularly behind the Bryan Treaties by which the signatories agree that all disputes which cannot be settled by diplomacy shall go before an international commission which shall have a year to investigate, during which neither disputant may declare war. Thirty treaties of this kind between United States and other nations. (November, 1915.) Argentine, Brazil and Chile entered into a similar treaty May 28, 1915. See *New York Times*, September 20, 1914. Myers: The Commission of Inquiry; The Wilson-Bryan Peace

Plan. World Peace Foundation, November, 1913. Vol. III, No. 11, Part I.

B. The objection to these treaties is that, like arbitration, they give an unprepared power a chance to prepare and therefore deprive the ready nation of the fruits of its vigilance and effort.

III. Limitation of Armaments.

A. There has usually been a demand for disarmament, reduction of armaments, or limitation of armaments, chiefly on the part of religious pacifists and peace societies, on the ground that the possession of arms is a cause of war.

The Interparliamentary Union has considered disarmament.

The League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, New York.

Others regard armaments as a result of the danger of war, which is inherent in the present nationalism, hence attack the latter as the root of the evil.

B. Official projects.

1. Prince Kaunitz, Prime Minister of Austria, about 1764, proposed to Prussia that each country dismiss three-fourths of its army. Prussia declined. Joseph II of Austria renewed the suggestion in 1769, but Frederick the Great again declined. (Fried: Handbuch II, p. 32.)
2. The Agreement not to fortify the Canadian frontier, 1817, was, in effect, a limitation of armaments.
3. Robert Peel, in House of Commons, 1841.
4. Garibaldi's manifesto, 1860 (unofficial).
5. Disraeli in 1862 in the House of Commons proposed a convention with France for limiting armaments. Cobden's "The Three Panics," 1863, was probably responsible for Disraeli's proposal.

6. Napoleon III in 1853 stated his design to call a European Conference to reduce armaments. He discussed the project in 1867 with Czar Alexander II and William I of Prussia. He made another proposal to Prussia in 1870 through the English Ambassador, but Bismarck rejected it. France voluntarily reduced her army from 100,000 to 90,000 and the bill to this effect became a law two weeks before the Franco-Prussian war broke out.
7. Bismarck broached the idea of a Franco-German agreement in 1870 before the Franco-Prussian war ("Une Lettre inédite de Bismarck," printed in *Le Matin*, Feb. 14, 1914).
8. Deputy Götz in the Reichstag of the North German Union 1867, and Virchow in 1869 introduced bills for reduction of armaments. In 1879 Deputy van Bühler introduced a resolution into the German Reichstag calling for a conference to secure a limitation of armaments. Resubmitted it in 1880. Bismarck defeated it.
9. In 1878 Crispi suggested a restriction of armaments to Bismarck, who rejected it.
10. Henry Richard, in 1880, urged Parliament to attempt a reduction of armaments.
11. Argentine and Chile limited naval armaments by treaty, 1902–1903. (British and Foreign State Papers, 95, 759; 96, 311–12.) "The Christ of the Andes" commemorates the treaty.
12. Churchill's proposal to Germany for a "naval holiday," 1913.
13. The Congress of the United States on June 25, 1910, by joint resolution authorized a Commission of five to inquire into the possibility of securing some limitation of armaments, and of constituting the

combined navies of the world into an international police force. The Commission was never appointed.

14. The First Hague Conference was called chiefly to consider a limitation of armaments. Its endeavor has been noted. (See Chapter XXII.)

C. There are practical difficulties to any program for disarmament. (Hobson: Towards International Government, p. 15 f.)

1. Difficulty in securing consent of suspicious governments.
2. What constitutes an equal reduction on the part of several nations?
3. Russia could not disarm the Cossacks.
4. Advance contracts for munitions would hinder any limitation of armaments.

IV. Agencies working for the improvement of international relations through diplomacy and international law.

Institut de droit international, founded 1873. 11 rue Savaen, Ghent.

International Law Association, founded 1873; took its present name in 1895. 1 Mitre Court Buildings, Temple, London, E. C.

American Society of International Law, Founded 1906. 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

American Institute of International Law, Founded 1915. 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, founded 1909. 14 West Mt. Vernon Place, Baltimore.

The National Council for Arbitration and Peace, founded 1911 (in connection with the Lake Mohonk Conference).

Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitra-

tion, founded 1895, by Albert K. Smiley. Lake Mohonk, New York.

Société belge de l'Arbitrage et de la Paix, founded 1889. Square Vergote 9, Brussels.

Société française pour l'Arbitrage entre nations (in connection with the Interparliamentary Union), founded 1867. 24 rue Pierre Curie, Paris.

Groupe parlementaire française de l'Arbitrage International. 27 bis Avenue Henri Martin, Paris.

International Arbitration League, founded 1870. 183 St. Stephen's House, Victoria Embankment, S. W., London.

International Arbitration and Peace Association, founded 1880. 40–41, Outer Temple, Strand, W. C. London.

Società Operaia pro Arbitrato internazionale obligatorio e Disarmo. Casa del Popolo, Milano.

Schwedische Friedens — und Schiedsgerichtsvereinigung, founded 1883. Regeringsgatan 74, Stockholm.

World's Court League of America, founded 1915. 18 East 41st Street, New York.

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XXVI

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FEDERATION

THE LIMITATION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

I. Diplomatic settlements have this fundamental shortcoming, that the interests of a given nation take precedence over international law, as has been shown so well by the Great War. Thus diplomacy and international law, which are relied upon to help nations in their dealings with each other, fail when they run counter to the interests of a nation; they are useful for ordinary questions, but fail in crises, and nothing more can be expected of them as long as nationalism prevails. For this reason it is advocated that there must be some form or reorganization with concomitant restriction of the present sovereignty of nations.

II. The extent to which sovereignty shall be restricted.

A. Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not, as yet, feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a coöperative union of sovereign states, a true concert of powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being placed on faults of the present system. Fried (Handbuch II, 267) speaks of an international "Zweckverband," meaning voluntary union of states for special

purposes like the Postal Union. Lippmann's proposal for control of "arenas of conflict" by international commissions is of this order.

1. Internationalists favor Pan-Europeanism rather than a United States of Europe.
2. Pan-Americanism belongs to this class.
   a. The Monroe Doctrine is unilateral and constitutes an extension of the sovereignty of the United States beyond its boundaries. Thus it may be, and to some extent is, resented by Latin America.
   b. For this reason Pan-Americanism is advocated as a voluntary coöperative agreement — not an alliance — of the states of the Western Hemisphere. The A. B. C. Conference at Niagara Falls, 1914.

B. Federationists. (Note Chapters XVII, XVIII.)

1. The contentions of the federationists.
   a. They believe that nationalism is out of date; that as long as it and national sovereignty exist, war and its ills will continue; that international law can never remedy these evils, because international law is merely the embodiment of principles to which rival self-seeking nations agree, and they agree to nothing that they consider essential to themselves; that the fundamental step toward eliminating war is an organization with power, above the several states, which shall determine what is right and just in any given case.
   b. They hold that nations should retain their local autonomy in order to develop their own qualities and institutions, their Kultur, to the highest possible extent.
   c. They would have nations lose their absolute sover-

eignty so that their Kultur may be safe, as long as sovereignty survives, nations will think that their peculiar ideals are in conflict with other ideals, and there will be war, in which one tries to suppress the Kultur of the other. Only under some federation will local Kulturs be safe.

2. The basis for federation is at hand.
   a. The interdependence and interrelation of nations actually exists in adequate measure in all fields except the political.
   b. Even in the political field there are marked tendencies away from nationalism.
   The many voluntary conventions respecting common interests.
   The Hague Conferences suggest a world legislature, a parliament of man; but in fact they were conferences of ambassadors.
   The Hague Tribunal may prove to be the beginning of a world court.
   c. Federations have, as a whole, been successful.
   The Achaian League, B. C. 281–146.
   The Swiss Confederation, A. D. 1291–date.
   The United Provinces, A. D. 1579–1795.
   United States, 1789–date.
   German Empire (1866), 1871–date.
   South African Union, 1910.
3. Federation implies a central organization.
4. Federation also implies a change in the conception of patriotism. Instead of being national it must be planetary. "Above the nations is humanity" — Goethe.

The old patriotism: "Our country! May she always be in the right, but our country right or wrong." — Stephen Decatur.

The new patriotism: "Our country! When right to be kept right, when wrong to be put right."—
Carl Schurz.

5. Projects.
   a. William Ladd's project (See Chapter XVIII.) which is that of the American Peace Society.
   b. The Armed International Tribunal Association. (Temporary Headquarters: 1707 H Street, Washington, D. C.)

C. Cosmopolitans would obliterate all national boundaries and have a world government and world citizenship. "Cosmocracy." It is not very widely advocated.

III. The means and methods of restricting national sovereignty.

A. Some plans contemplate *voluntary* restriction.

There has been a slight tendency to place what was regarded as the general interest above the interests of individual states. This tendency, of course, implies a limitation of the liberty of individual states, a restriction of their sovereignty, and hence it cannot, under prevailing conceptions, expect to make headway.

1. Intervention is an illustration. One or several states claim a right to intervene in the affairs of another. International law recognizes a well-defined right to intervene. It is significant to note that, if there is such a thing as intervention by right, there is no such thing as the absolute sovereignty of nations. Intervention in the affairs of another nation on the ground of humanity is an admission that humanity takes precedence over national sovereignty.

Intervention in Naples (1821) and Spain (1823), by Austria and France respectively to overthrow

anti-monarchical governments; it was done with a semblance of enforcing treaties.

Intervention of the United States in Cuba (1898), on the plea of humanitarianism.

The Monroe Doctrine, representing as it does a claim of the United States to a paramount interest in the Western Hemisphere, implies limitations of the action of Latin American states.

2. Neutralization of a state involves a limitation of sovereignty (Wicker: Neutralization). The chief instances of neutralization are:

Switzerland, 1815.
Belgium, 1839 (violated, 1914).
Black Sea, 1856 (abrogated 1871).
Luxemburg, 1867 (violated, 1914).
Congo Basin, 1885.

3. Guarantees of territorial integrity also involve a surrender of sovereignty. They are rare.

Protocol of London, 1850, guaranteed the integrity of Denmark excepting Schleswig and Holstein.

4. Extra-territorial rights denote a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the state which grants them.

The Capitulations in Turkey, and the consular jurisdictions of foreign powers in Persia, China and formerly in Japan were of this kind.

B. Others propose leagues of several states strong enough to impose their interpretation of what is for the general good. "Peace syndicates." (Molinari, 251, 287.)

1. This, though fundamentally different in purpose, is much like present alliances and may simply result in an opposing combination of states, and, hence, in a perpetuation of the theory of equilibrium or balance of power.

2. Theoretically it is nothing new, for it still contains the fallacious principle which is causing all war, that each party decides what is right without consulting the other, and then tries to enforce its opinion.
3. Proposals of this class are innumerable; a few are given for illustration.

League of neutrals (Molinari, 258; 287).

League of Great Britain, France and the United States (Fullerton: Problems of Power).

Federation of the English-speaking world (Johnston: Arms and the Race, 143).

League of the Allies in the Great War (Hobhouse: The World in Conflict).

An international police. This has long and often been advocated in some form or other: Henry IV, Grotius, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Penn, Concert of European Powers 1815, Holy Alliance, etc. Roosevelt's "Posse comitatus."

The League to Enforce Peace. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

League of Economic non-intercourse. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

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(See also references to Chapter XVIII.)

XXVII

MISCELLANEOUS FORCES WORKING FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. Socialists and laboring classes.

A. Before the Great War, the socialists of the leading nations declared that the fundamental struggle of society was between classes and not between nations. They professed to be internationals; in some cases, — Hervé and the anti-militarists of France — they were anti-patriotic. Briand some years ago recommended a general strike of workmen to check a country from declaring war.

B. International socialism collapsed under the war, thus showing much less power than it was supposed to have.

II. Woman.

A. Her nature.

1. Sees and concerns herself more about social and economic evils; and will want to have these removed in place of indulging in war.
2. Is less combative by nature than man; is opposed to violence.
3. Is less destructive and wasteful than man.
4. Often experiences the losses and consequences of war more keenly than man.
5. Suffrage gives her the power to express her opinion effectively.
6. International marriages among the upper classes often lead to a closer relationship between those in authority in different nations.

B. The Woman's Peace Party, organized in Washington, D. C., January 10, 1915. Jane Addams, National Chairman.

Platform: "The purpose of this Organization is to enlist all American women in arousing the nations to respect the sacredness of human life and to abolish war. The following is adopted as our platform:

"1. The immediate calling of a convention of neutral nations in the interest of early peace.

"2. Limitation of armaments and the nationalization of their manufacture.

"3. Organized opposition to militarism in our own country.

"4. Education of youth in the ideals of peace.

"5. Democratic control of foreign policies.

"6. The further humanizing of governments by the extension of the franchise to women.

"7. 'Concert of Nations' to supersede 'Balance of Power.'

"8. Action toward the gradual organization of the world to substitute Law for War.

"9. The substitution of an international police for rival armies and navies.

"10. Removal of the economic causes of war.

"11. The appointment by our Government of a commission of men and women, with an adequate appropriation, to promote international peace."

C. The interest of women is shown by their activity in the great humanitarian society of the Red Cross; the International Congress of Women at The Hague, April, 1915; the International Conference of Women Workers to Promote Permanent Peace at the Panama-Pacific Exposition, July, 1915; the Peace Sections in Women's Clubs, etc.

III. Free traders.

Tariffs create artificial restraints of trade. The fundamental purpose of protective tariffs — to profit by reducing foreign competition — is a cause for international disputes and war.

Emeric Crucé was the first to link free trade with peace.

The Cobden Club, and its early leaders, Richard Cobden and John Bright, favored free trade as a means to peace.

IV. International languages, — World language.

The difference in languages is a real obstacle in all endeavors to bring different nationalities together; it is to overcome this that international languages are advocated. There are various of these: Ido, Esperanto (Zamenhof's scheme), Solresol, Volapük, Neutral, Pan-roman (Universal), Interlingua, Simplo, Adjuvilo, Langue bleue (Bollack's scheme), etc. Ido and Esperanto are the most important.

V. Foundations.

A. The World Peace Foundation (endowed by Edwin Ginn, 1910), 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston.

Subsidiary: American School Peace League, 403 Marlborough Street, Boston.

B. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (endowed by Andrew Carnegie, 1910).

1. Division of Intercourse and Education, Nicholas Murray Butler, Director, 407 West 117th St., New York.

Subsidiary: American Association for International Conciliation, F. P. Keppel, Secretary, 407 West 117th St., New York City.

2. Division of Economics and History, John Bates Clark, Director, 407 West 117th Street, New York City.

3. Division of International Law, James Brown Scott, Director, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

C. Garton Foundation. To promote the study of International Polity. Maurice V. Brett, Secretary, Whitehall House, Whitehall, London, S. W.

D. Nobel Peace Prize.

Founded by Alfred Nobel, 1895, as one of five annual prizes distributed by the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Storthing, — Headquarters, Drammensvei 19, Christiania, Norway.

Recipients:

1901. H. Dunant, founder of the Red Cross Society, and Frederic Passy of Paris, Nestor of the peace movement.

1902. E. Ducommun and A. Gobat, successive secretaries of the International Peace Bureau of Berne.

1903. Randal Cremer, founder of the Interparliamentary Union.

1904. Institute of International Law.

1905. The Baroness von Suttner.

1906. Theodore Roosevelt.

1907. L. Renault of France and E. T. Moneta of Italy.

1908. K. P. Arnoldson of Sweden and Frederick Bajer of Denmark.

1909. M. A. Beernaert of Belgium and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant of France.

1910. The International Peace Bureau.

1911. T. M. C. Asser of Holland, founder of the Institut de Droit International, and Alfred Fried of Vienna, editor of the *Friedenswarte*.

1912. No award (later to Elihu Root of the United States).

1913. Senator Henri La Fontaine of Belgium.
1914 and 1915. No award.

E. Church Peace Union, Founded by Andrew Carnegie, Frederick Lynch, Secretary, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

VI. International Friendship Societies. See the International Peace Year Book, 1915, pp. 69–70.

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XXVIII

SCHEMES FOR DIMINISHING THE CHANCE OF WAR AND FOR COMPELLING NATIONS TO KEEP PEACE

I. Miscellaneous proposals.

A. General strike of the laboring classes is advocated by socialists.

B. Discouraging enlistment in armies. Anti-Enlistment League.

C. Limiting armaments, and opposing enlargement of armaments, on the ground that the present rivalry in armaments is practically certain to lead to war. (See above, Chapter XXV.) League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, New York; Rational Defense League, Washington, D. C.; American Union against Militarism, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.

D. Making an impartial and thorough investigation of the facts of an international difference *before*, instead of after, the war.

E. Providing for publicity of all the facts in dispute. Combating the dissemination of fictitious news. Enacting an International Libel Law. Reducing sensationalism in the press.

F. Improving international law.

1. Codifying international law.
2. Providing for periodic meetings of the Hague Conference.
3. Increasing the authority of the Hague Conferences, in the direction of making them more truly a world legislature.

G. Improving the system of arbitration.

1. Increasing the scope of arbitration. Making unlimited treaties of arbitration.
2. Providing for judicial settlement of differences. (American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Baltimore.)
3. Securing a general treaty of arbitration to be signed by *all* powers.
4. Inserting a clause in the constitution of countries binding them by their fundamental law to resort to arbitration. This has been done by Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, San Domingo, and certain Central American States.

Brazil. Constitution of 1891, Art. 34, Sec. II. (Dodd: Modern Constitutions, I, 158.)

"The national congress shall have exclusive power to authorize the government to declare war, when arbitration has failed or cannot take place, and to make peace."

Venezuela. Constitution of 1904, Art. 120. (Larned: History for Ready Reference, VII, 686.)

This article provides that all international treaties shall contain the clause: "All differences between the contracting parties shall be decided by arbitration without going to war."

5. Extending the scope of compulsory arbitration.

H. Wiping out secret diplomacy, and providing for popular control of treaties, and for a plebiscite before war is declared. Union of Democratic Control. (See below.)

I. Establishing an international coinage and monetary system.

J. Prohibiting war loans and the export of money to belligerents; declaring money contraband.

K. Providing substitutes for war.

1. William James, in his "Moral Equivalent of War", urges social conscription under which the conscripts would perform peaceful duties related to the welfare of the state.
2. Felix Adler advocates a reform of social conditions that will make ordinary life more attractive and remove the premium and economic pressure on going to war.
3. Ray Stannard Baker: The Great American Conscription. *American Magazine*, January, 1916.
4. Making peace more attractive.
   "When peace is made as handsome as war there will be hope of war's passing." — Woodrow Wilson.
5. MacKaye: A Substitute for War, 1915.
6. Smith, Luther E.: Municipal Pageants as Destroyers of Race Prejudice, — in *Proceedings* of the Sagamore (Mass.) Sociological Conference, July, 1914.
7. Jane Addams: Newer Ideals of Peace. The chance for enterprise in social work.

L. Providing symbols or emblems: peace flags, buttons, uniforms, minister or secretary of peace, etc.

M. Economic pressure and non-intercourse, boycotts. It would mean refusing to recognize the nation, its officials, its acts, papers, stamps, citizens, ships, goods, declining to trade with it, refusing loans, cancelling bonds and stocks listed at boards of trade, putting discriminating tariffs on its goods, etc.

Pacific blockades belong to this group.

N. Compelling recourse to arbitration.

1. The League to Enforce Peace formed in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915 (Headquarters, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York), has four proposals: Article I. "All justiciable questions arising between

the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question."

Article II. "All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation."

Article III. "The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing." [1]

Article IV. "Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal mentioned in article I."

a. Article III is most significant in this connection. It proposes to compel *recourse to arbitration* (not peace) by the use of *economic* and *military* force.

[1] On January 20, 1916, the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace revised this Article so as to bring it into agreement with the plan of the Chamber of Commerce mentioned elsewhere in this section. The revised Article reads:

"The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory."

That is, it proposes to limit the sovereignty of states in this one respect that they shall not go to war before trying peaceful settlement. It does not propose to compel the acceptance of an arbitral award.

b. The place of the League to Enforce Peace in the natural course of development is thus stated by Hamilton Holt.

The first step to restrict war was to devise machinery to make war less probable. This was attempted by the Hague Conference.

The second was *urging* the use of this machinery as has been done by many.

The third is *compelling* the use of the machinery. This is the proposal of the League to Enforce Peace.

The fourth will be to compel nations to accept the decision of the machinery.

c. The difficulties.

The signatories are to act against any one of their number that commits "acts of hostility," but each nation retains the power to decide what constitutes an act of hostility, hence agreement will be difficult.

Like arbitration and "cooling off" treaties this proposal operates to deprive the ready nation of its advantage by giving the other a delay.

The League affects only signatories. Nations which refuse to join may be most dangerous to peace.

2. The proposal of the Special Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States on the Economic Results of the War on American Business (Edward Filene, Chairman), Nov., 1915.

a. It proposes the organization of *commercial and financial* non-intercourse — a boycott (to be followed by military force if necessary) to be applied to nations entering the agreement and then going to war without first submitting their differences to a tribunal. The Chambers of Commerce of the United States approved it by a large majority, 1915.

b. It encounters the same difficulties as the League to Enforce Peace.

II. The European War has resulted in many suggestions for securing a lasting peace.

A. One of these is that of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, Theresiastraat 51, The Hague (successor to the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad) which has the following Minimum-Program:

1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made contrary to the interests and wishes of the population concerned. Where possible their consent shall be obtained by plebiscite or otherwise.

   The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, included in their boundaries, equality before the law, religious liberty and the free use of their native languages.

2. The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations.

3. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall be developed.

   The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent organization and meet at regular intervals.

   The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to

peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be created, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbitration:

a. A permanent Court of International Justice.

b. A permanent international Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

The States shall bind themselves to take concerted action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case any State should resort to military measures instead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision or to the mediation of the Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

4. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments. In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom of the seas assured.

5. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of the parliaments of the respective nations.

Secret treaties shall be void.

B. The Union of Democratic Control. King's Chambers, London, W. C. Program:

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without consent by plebiscite of the population of such Province.

2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall be not aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power," but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of the Powers and the setting up of an International

Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, part of the labor of such Council to be the creation of definite Treaties of Arbitration and the establishment of Courts for their interpretation and enforcement.

4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalization of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

C. Additional proposals. (See references and Chapter XXX.)

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The International Industry of War.

MacDonald, J. Ramsay: War and the Workers.

Why we Should State Terms of Settlement.

Towards an International Understanding.

Swanwick, H. M.: Women and War.

[Pole, A.]: The Polish Question.

Angell: The Prussian in our Midst.

The Balance of Power.

XXIX

EDUCATION AND PEACE

I. Education is to prepare persons for a life that is before them.

A. Hence first and foremost it must teach right thinking.

B. It cannot be merely a perpetuation and preservation of the past.

C. It must be fully up-to-date.

Hence it must be increasingly scientific.

This means a reduction of fear, superstition, ignorance, all of which have a considerable connection with war.

It means telling the truth about war, peace, nationalism, etc.

It means taking account of internationalism now in existence.

D. Education (study, travel, reading, etc.), if at all impartial, has a tendency to remove bias and prejudices of all kinds. The removal of international and interracial prejudices is a proper function of education.

II. Military training bears the natural fruit.

A. The effect of education along military lines is thus stated by Maude in his translation of Clausewitz "On War," I, p. viii. August, 1914, proved his statement to be true.

"Clausewitz's work has been the ultimate foundation on which every drill regulation in Europe, except our own,

has been reared. It is this ceaseless repetition of his fundamental ideas to which one-half of the male population of every Continental Nation has been subjected for two to three years of their lives, which has tuned their minds to vibrate in harmony with his precepts, and those who know and appreciate this fact at its true value have only to strike the necessary chords in order to evoke a response sufficient to overpower any other ethical conception which those who have not organized their forces beforehand can appeal to."

B. Compulsory military training especially in schools is, to say the least, a doubtful institution in a democratic state. Democracy exalts personal rights and conscience; military training, to be efficient, requires obedience and abandonment of personal rights.

III. Various media have been used to educate for peace.

A. The Schools.

1. American School Peace League, 403 Marlborough Street, Boston. It has sought among other things to get schools to celebrate May 18 as Peace Day.
2. College courses in international relations.

B. Books, journals, circulars, lectures, etc.

C. Pictures, photographs, cartoons, motion pictures, paintings (Wirtz, Verestchagin). *Review of Reviews*, 29: 545–50. *Outlook*, 70: 270–6.

D. Museums. Lucerne Peace Museum, founded by Bloch.

E. Exhibits at expositions.

F. Exchanges of professors and students.

G. Celebration of the One Hundred Years of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, 1915.

H. Drama. (See Appendix.)

I. Music as an international language.

IV. The cause of peace will be helped by placing correct emphasis on certain subjects.

A. Commercial geography should be taught at the expense of political geography. The former is more instructive of modern conditions and gets more at the heart of modern international forces.

B. Contemporary politics needs to be taught much more generally and carefully than is at present the case.

1. Under modern popular government the citizen is often required to vote on questions that involve foreign affairs.
2. The study of the subject will show that there is a broad similarity in the problems, aspirations and institutions of all civilized nations, and will develop the international point of view, the "international mind."
3. It will counterbalance, and likewise complete the ordinary historical knowledge, which generally is not up-to-date.

C. History.

1. It should try to teach the truth. The truth about the past will deprive war of much glamor.

The truth about causes of war.

The truth about service in the army as a private.

The truth about the fruits of war.

The frequent failure of war to settle or improve matters.

The growth of law.

The spread of democracy.

The use and success of arbitration.

The achievements of the Hague Conferences.

The truth in history will counteract the effect of

romanticism in fiction and literature such as "The Charge of the Light Brigade," the courage of Medieval Knights, and the like.

2. Continuity of history should be emphasized.
   History is genetic, not cataclysmic.
   Results of this conception:
   The present is not justified by the past.
   There is growth in time of peace as well as in war.
   War is not the only or the greatest motive power of progress.
   War is not the motive force of progress, but merely the clash of forces resulting from progress.
   Progress does not necessarily mean war, as ideas absolutely subversive of accepted beliefs have made their way without bloodshed: Darwinism.
   Abolition of slavery in Great Britain.
   The only solid progress is that which comes from sound growth; progress forced by war alone is not lasting.
   The chief emphasis should be placed on the trend of civilization, instead of mere occurrences of the past, as is so often the case.
3. History should be made more nearly a "biography of man" instead of a record of his *political* doings.
   Should touch all sides of human endeavor.
   Should measure the success or expediency of any procedure in terms of all of man's interests, instead of merely in terms of political consequences. A step, which has good political consequences, may be bad considered from an economic, social or moral point of view.
   The objection of time: it is impossible to teach all

sides of history in the time allotted to the subject.

This does not justify teaching what is untrue.

If anything is to be omitted, it should be the interesting rather than the true. (The reverse has been too common.)

Writers of texts of history have already begun to reduce the space given to wars and to increase other matter in proportion.

UNITED STATES HISTORY—THE WAR OF 1812

	Quackenbos [1]	Holmes [2]	Montgomery [3]	Hart [4]
Pages in book	458	323	365	583
Total pages to war	218	123	145	113
Percentage	47.6%	38%	39.7%	19.3%
Pages to this war	44	12	6	8
Percentage	9.6%	3.7%	1.6%	1.3%
Detailing maneuvers	32½	5½	5	3
Percentage	7%	1.7%	1.3%	.5%
Total illustrations in book	63	87	82	146
Illustrations to this war	8	5	4	5
Percentage	12.7%	5.7%	4.9%	3.4%
Total maps in book	42	7	72	56
Maps for this war	9	1	5	1
Percentage	21.4%	14.3%	6.9%	1.8%

[1] Quackenbos: Illustrated School History of the United States, 1861.

[2] Holmes: Sheldon's History of the United States, 1884.

[3] Montgomery: American History, 1896.

[4] Hart: Essentials in American History, 1905.

GREEK HISTORY—PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 431–404 B. C.

	Gillie [1]	Pinnock [2]	Oman [3]	Morey [4]
Pages in book.....	475	384	546	353
Total to war.....	216	174	319	43½
Percentage.....	45.5%	45.3%	58.4%	12.3%
Pages to this war....	80	52	126	13
Percentage.....	16.8%	13.5%	23.1%	3.7%
Detailing maneuvers	19	19	48	6
Percentage.....	4%	5%	8.8%	1.7%
Total illustrations in book.....	0	32	0	97
Illustrations to this war.....	0	4	0	1
Percentage.....		12.5%		1%
Total maps in book..	1	2	12	40
Maps for this war...	0	2	4	5
Percentage.....		100%	33.3%	12.5%

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5. Rowntree, Arthur: Education in Relation to Internationalism.
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XXX

THE GREAT WAR AND PACIFISM

I. The Great War has refined or reversed the thought of the opponents of war and has made them more guarded in their statements, for it has brought the realization that war is not so improbable or impossible as was asserted.

A. A number of pacifists, chiefly churchmen, have become, if not non-resistants, at least more firmly convinced that the only thing that can overcome evil is, not force, but the spiritual weapon of good-will. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (temporary address, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York).

B. Many have abandoned pacifism.

II. The Great War has justified the contention of the opponents of militarism that competitive armaments do not secure peace, but produce war.

III. The Great War has demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing "preventatives" for war. It has shown that nationalism, as it now is understood, makes war probable.

IV. It has stimulated thinking along the line of a better system, and has produced a great number of proposals, on the one hand, for bringing the Great War to a close, and on the other, for establishing permanent peace.

A. Plans for bringing the Great War to an end ("putting out a conflagration"). "The hardest operation of a war is to stop it." See references below.

1. Several governments have offered mediation.
2. A Congress of neutral nations to initiate peace proceedings has been widely advocated.
3. Continuous mediation without armistice.
   Proposed by Julia Grace Wales of the University of Wisconsin.
   Adopted by the International Congress of Women at The Hague, April 28–30, 1915. It has been advocated by the Woman's Peace Party, 116 South Michigan Street, Chicago.
   Various futile attempts have been made to secure the backing of some neutral government for the project.
   Henry Ford was influenced by advocates of this plan to send out his "peace ship." Dec., 1915.

B. Plans for securing permanent peace ("building a fireproof structure"). There have been a great many of these, and no more is attempted than to give an incomplete list of them. See references below.

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American League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, New York City.

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APPENDIX

I

Total Naval Expenditures by Principal Naval Powers

(Knight, Navy Yearbook, 63d Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document 637, p. 859, 1914.)

Fiscal Year	Great Britain April 1–March 31 [1]	United States July 1–June 30	Germany April to March	France January to December
1900–1901	$145,792,850	$61,721,695	$37,173,074	$72,683,180
1901–2...	150,569,190	68,438,301	46,315,800	67,079,011
1902–3...	150,679,328	82,977,641	48,818,700	59,217,558
1903–4...	173,548,058	104,126,192	50,544,000	59,740,222
1904–5...	179,138,049	116,655,826	49,110,300	60,178,623
1905–6...	161,117,947	109,725,059	54,918,000	61,565,779
1906–7..,	152,954,342	98,392,144	58,344,300	59,514,296
1907–8...	151,880,617	117,353,474	69,133,500	[2] 60,685,813
1908–9...	156,401,161	120,421,579	[2] 80,737,626	[2] 62,194,916
1909–10..	181,936,341	122,247,365	[2] 95,047,820	64,899,589
1910–11..	202,056,258	111,791,980	[2] 103,302,773	74,102,439
1911–12..	211,596,296	133,559,071	[2] 107,178,480	[2] 80,371,109
1912–13..	224,443,296	129,787,233	[2] 109,989,096	[2] 81,692,832
1913–14..	[2] 237,530,459	136,858,301	[2] 112,091,125	[2] 90,164,625
1914–15..	[2] 260,714,275	[2,3] 141,872,786	113,993,329	[2] 123,828,872

[1] Does not include amounts expended under naval works acts during the years 1896–1909, amounting to about $155,000,000.

[2] Appropriation.

[3] Includes $4,635,000 this year's allotment of proceeds from sale of the Idaho and Mississippi.

II

Army Appropriations of the Principal Powers

(World Almanac, 1915, p. 434)

Great Britain	1914–5	$143,331,350
France	"	202,141,122
Russia	"	393,193,808
Italy	"	80,025,234
German Empire	"	293,289,155
Austria-Hungary	"	47,571,755
Japan	"	47,037,809
United States	"	[1] 94,229,047

III

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Advocate of Peace. Founded, 1846. Washington, D. C.
War and Peace. Founded, 1913. London.
Peace Forum. Founded, 1912. New York.
Maryland Quarterly. Founded, 1910. Baltimore.
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Die Friedenswarte. Founded, 1899. Berlin.
Völker-Friede. Founded, 1900. Esslingen.
Der Friede. Founded, 1894. Bern.
Die Friedens-Bewegung. Founded, 1912. Bern.
La Paix par le Droit. Founded, 1891. Nîmes.
Les États-Unis d'Europe. Founded, 1868. Bern.

[1] This does not include the cost of fortifications, Military Academy, etc. (which represent an addition of about $50,000,000), pensions, or the expenditures of the several states on the National Guard.

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World Peace Foundation. 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts.
The National Peace Council, 167 St. Stephen's House, Westminster.
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Complementary Notes to V

(See page 263.)

Case 16. — In 1911 the Portuguese Republic passed a law separating the state and church and abolishing diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In 1912 the state voted to take over all church properties, many of which were owned or controlled by Roman Catholic religious orders. Foreign governments objected to the treatment of properties owned by the religious of their nationalities established in Portugal. As a consequence, the arbitral tribunal is, by the compromis, "charged with passing upon the claims relative to the properties of French, British and Spanish nationals expropriated by the government of the Portuguese Republic after the proclamation of the Republic."

Case 17. — France *vs.* Peru regarding claims of creditors. On May 1, 1910, France and Peru agreed by protocol that fr. 25,000,000 would be deducted from a loan to be placed by Peru on the official Paris Bourse to pay certain French creditors. On October 8, 1912, the French minister to Peru complained that the said creditors were not included in a list of creditors submitted to the Congress. Peru replied that the protocol recognized the French creditors conditionally only and that, as its conditions were not realized, Peru was not under obligation. A compromis was signed at Lima on February 2, 1914.

Case 18. — On January 28, 1915, the German armed cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* sank on the high seas the American steel sailing vessel *William P. Frye*, Seattle to Queenstown, Falmouth or Plymouth, with a cargo of wheat owned by the American charterer. The United States presented to Germany a claim for $228,059.54 for damages suffered. The German Government admitted liability under the Prussian-American treaties of 1785 (Art. 12), 1799 (Art. 13), and 1828 (Art. 12), but insisted on prize court proceedings. The United States held further that indemnity was due by reason of violation of the treaty provisions; Germany held that the payment was "a duty or policy founded on the existing treaty stipulations." Payment of the indemnity is to be made without prejudice to the question of treaty interpretation.

V

Cases Decided by the Permanent Court

(Under Arts. 20–57 (1899) and 41–85 (1907) of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.)
Reproduced by permission of The World Peace Foundation from Myers' *The Record of the Hague.*

	Parties	Case	Date of compromis	First session	Session of closure	Number of sessions [1]	Date of decisions	Arbitrators
1	United States of America *v.* United Mexican States.	Pious funds of the Californias.	May 22 1902	Sept. 15 1902	Oct. 1 1902	11	Oct. 14 1902	MATZEN,[2] Sir Edward Fry, Martens, Asser, de Savornin Lohman.
2	Germany, Great Britain and Italy *v.* Venezuela (Belgium, Spain, United States, France, Mexico, Netherlands, and Sweden and Norway).	Right of preference claimed by blockading powers.	May 7 1903	Oct. 1 1903	Nov. 13 1903	14	Feb. 22 1904	MURAVEV, Lammasch, Martens.
3	Germany, France and Great Britain *v.* Japan.	Perpetual leases in Japan.	Aug. 28 1902	Nov. 21 1904	May 15 1905	4	May 22 1905	GRAM, Renault, Motono.
4	France *v.* Great Britain.	Dhows of Mascat.	Oct. 13 1904	July 25 1905	Aug. 2 1905	4	Aug. 8 1905	LAMMASCH, Melville W. Fuller, de Savornin Lohman...
5	Germany *v.* France.	Casablanca deserters.	Nov. 10 1908	May 1 1909	May 17 1909	6	May 22 1909	DE HAMMARSKJÖLD, Sir Edw. Fry, Fusinato, Kriege, Renault.
6	Norway *v.* Sweden.[3]	Maritime frontier.	Mar. 14 1908	Aug. 28 1909	Oct. 18 1909	13 [4]	Oct. 23 1909	LOEFF,[6] Beichmann,[6] Hammarskjöld.
7	United States of America *v.* Great Britain.	North Atlantic fisheries.	Jan. 27 1909	July 1 1910	Aug. 12 1910	41	Sept. 7 1910	LAMMASCH, de Savornin Lohman, George Gray, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, Drago.
8	United States of America *v.* Venezuela.	Claims of the "Orinoco" Company.	Feb. 13 1909	Sept. 28 1910	Oct. 19 1910	8	Oct. 25 1910	LAMMASCH, Beernaert, de Quesada.
9	France *v.* Great Britain.	Arrest and restitution of Savarkar.	Oct. 25 1910	Feb. 14 1911	Feb. 17 1911	4	Feb. 24 1911	BEERNAERT, Renault, Lord Desart, Gram, de Savornin Lohman.
10	Italy *v.* Peru.	Canevaro claim.	April 25 1910	April 20 1912	April 22 1912	3	May 3 1912	RENAULT, Fusinato, Calderón.
11	Russia *v.* Turkey.[5]	Arrears of interest claimed for Russian indemnitaries for damages sustained during the war of 1877.	Aug. 4 1910	Feb. 15 1911 [5]	Nov. 6 1912	10	Nov. 11 1912	LARDY, Baron de Taube, Mandelstam,[6] Herante Abro Bey,[6] Ahmed Rechid Bey.[6]

CASES DECIDED BY THE PERMANENT COURT—*Continued*

Parties	Case	Date of compromis	First session	Session of closure	Number of sessions[1]	Date of decisions	Arbitrators
12 France *v.* Italy.	Seizure of the *Manouba*.	Mar. 6 1912	Mar. 31 1913	April 26 1913	10	May 6 1913	HAMMARSKJÖLD, Fusinato, Kriege, Renault, Baron de Taube.
13 France *v.* Italy.	Seizure of the *Carthage*.	Mar. 6 1912	Mar. 31 1913	April 26 1913	10	May 6 1913	Same as 12.
14 France *v.* Italy.	Seizure of the *Tavignano* and cannon shots fired at the Tunisian mahones *Kamouna* and *Gaulois*.	Nov. 8 1912	April 26 1913	May 3 1913	3	Litigants agreed to settle the affairs directly	Same as 12.
15 Netherlands *v.* Portugal.	Dutch-Portuguese frontiers in the island of Timor.	April 3 1913	—	—	—	June 25 1914	LARDY (sole arbitrator).
16[7] Spain, France and Great Britain *v.* Portugal.	Seizure of religious goods in Portugal.	July 31 1913	—	—	—	—	ROOT, de Savornin Lohman, Lardy.
17 France *v.* Peru.	French claims against Peru.	Feb. 2 1914					
18[7] United States *v.* Germany.	Interpretation of treaty rights.						

[1] Includes opening session and session at which decision was given. [2] President's name in capitals. [3] Special arbitral tribunal. [4] Excluding visits to other places, July 14–21, 1909. [5] To regulate questions of procedure. [6] Not member of the court. [7] Constituted under the summary procedure provided by Chapter IV.

See complementary notes on page 261.

MATTERS REFERRED TO COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

(Under Arts. 9–14 (1899) and 9–36 (1907) of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.)

Parties	Subject	[1] Date of convention	Sessions began	Report delivered	Members of Commission	Settlement
1 Great Britain and Russia.	North Sea incident, Oct. 21–22, 1904.	Nov. (12) 25, 1904	Dec. 22 1904	Feb. 26 1905	Admirals Spaun, Dubassov, Beaumont, Fournier, Davis.	Russia responsible; paid £60,000 for damages done.
2 France and Italy.	*a.* Seizure of the *Tavignano*, Jan. 25, 1912.	April 25 1912	June 30 1912	July 23 1912	Capt. James Segrave, Capt. Sombron, Capt. Zerbi, Lieut. Violette, Count Gravina.	Referred to Hague Court on questions of law and award of damages (14, above).
	b. Cannon-shots fired at the Tunisian mahones *Kamouna* and *Gaulois*, Jan. 25, 1912.	April 25 1912	—	July 23 1912		

[1] The convention of reference. The North Sea incident convention was officially called a declaration.

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